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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the U.S. wartime presidential campaign of 1944. In 1944, 
the United States was at war with the Axis Powers of World War II, and Democrat 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, already serving an unprecedented third term as President of the 
United States, was seeking a fourth. Roosevelt was a very able politician and-combined 
with his successful performance as wartime commander-in-chief-- waged an effective, 
and ultimately successful, reelection campaign. Republicans, meanwhile, rallied behind 
New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Dewey emerged as leader of the GOP at a 
critical time. Since the coming of the Great Depression -for which Republicans were 
blamed-the party had suffered a series of political setbacks. Republicans were 
demoralized, and by the early 1940s, divided into two general national factions: Robert 
Taft conservatives and Wendell WiIlkie "liberals." Believing his party's chances of 
victory over the skilled and wily commander-in-chiefto be slim, Dewey nevertheless 
committed himself to wage a competent and centrist campaign, to hold the Republican 
Party together, and to transform it into a relevant alternative within the postwar New Deal 
political order. Often overlooked by historians, the low-key and "uninteresting" Dewey 
was an institutional preserver, opening the door to a Dwight Eisenhower presidency, and 
the "Modem Republicanism" of the 1950s. Unlike Taft (and Herbert Hoover before 
him), Dewey (and Eisenhower after him) tacitly condoned the basic New Deal reform 
structure. Though set against a backdrop of global war, the 1944 campaign was also an 
old-fashioned, free-swinging, partisan affair-including stump speeches, rallies and 
parades, radio and newspaper advertising, harsh rhetoric, and a near record voter turnout 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
on Election Day. As an ordinary event in an extraordinary time, the 1944 campaign was 
a testimony to the strength of American democracy. 
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Chapter One: 
Introduction 
The United States was in the midst of a presidential election, and at war. The 
president was running for reelection, and his poll numbers were at an all time low. His 
challenger, an aloof, intelligent, and sophisticated Northeasterner, loathed the president, 
believing that the U.S. was "lied, not led into war," and that the upcoming election was 
one between "competence and incompetent bungling."] The opposition party, selecting 
its nominee early in the election process, and without much fight, affirmed the need for 
partisanship and constructive, wartime criticism. The president, to the disbelief and 
anger of his critics, refused to acknowledge mistakes, and used his status as commander-
in-chief to promote his candidacy-even addressing the nation from a battleship in the 
Pacific. He was, detractors charged, arrogant, deceitful, and reckless. He faltered before 
the media-fumbling his words, and appearing both agitated and distant. Investigations 
into the reasons for America's entry into the war also abounded-- could the President 
have done something to prevent the attack on America just three years earlier? The 
President, meanwhile, hammered at his opponent's vagueness and inconsistencies on 
policy issues-particularly as it related to foreign policy. "Let's have an end to the 
shilly-shallying," declared one of the President's more vocal supporters. "Do you 
remember [the opposition] candidate as a courageous leader who took strong stands ... Or 
do you remember him as an office seeker dealing in platitudes and sitting on the fence 
waiting to find out which way to jump? ... Can you afford to take a chance on a fence 
straddler with a record on foreign affairs like that ... when your future and that of your 
children is at stake?,,2 The United States was at a crossroads. Emotions were high, lines 
were drawn, the campaign was intense, and the year was 1944. 
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The election of 1944 was the first presidential election since 1864 to take place while 
the nation was at war. After a brief primary season, the Republican Party, in late June, 
settled upon New York Governor Thomas Edmund Dewey~the former District 
Attorney, and popular special prosecutor of Legs Diamond and Lucky Luciano~as its 
nominee for President of the United States. Dewey, aged forty-two, was the first 
presidential candidate to be born in the twentieth century. His running mate was the 
conservative Governor of Ohio, John W. Bricker. The Democratic nominee for President 
was the three-term incumbent, sixty-two year-old Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Though 
there was little doubt about Roosevelt seeking a fourth term, much speculation existed 
concerning his choice for a running mate. Vice President Henry Wallace was widely 
unpopular among party elites, especially those from the South, who objected to his liberal 
views on race, and who feared that Roosevelt~rumored to be deteriorating in health~ 
might not survive a fourth term. In the end, Democratic professionals replaced Wallace 
with Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri. Sensitive to the wartime setting of the 
election, both Roosevelt and Dewey~early in their campaigns~adopted dignified and 
low-key electoral strategies. By late September, however, "politics as usual" returned, as 
the campaign degenerated into a "free-swinging" partisan affair, characterized by 
political "body punches and head-rocking.,,3 On Election Day, despite polls indicating a 
race too close to call, the Roosevelt-Truman ticket received fifty-three percent of the 
popular vote, and 432 electoral votes. Still, this was the closest presidential election 
since Woodrow Wilson's upset over Charles Evans Hughes in 1916. A shift of only 
500,000 votes in the right states would have given Dewey an Electoral College win, and 
the White House. 
2 
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Though it took place in wartime and was extremely close, the 1944 election has 
interested few scholars. There are several reasons for this neglect. One is that it does not 
conform to what Harvard political scientist V.O. Key described in the 1950s as a "critical 
election.,,4 "According to Key, critical elections have occurred periodically in American 
history, generating high levels of voter interest, upsetting the previous balance of power 
among competing parties, and producing durable changes in the compositions of the 
voter coalitions supporting each party.,,5 Examples of such elections include 1860, 1896, 
and 1936. By this standard, then, 1944 was a not a "critical election," but a mere 
"maintaining election" that resulted in neither a transfer of power nor a major 
realignment in voter allegiance. 
A second reason is that the relevance of the American presidential campaign in 
general has come under attack in recent decades from both historians and political 
scientists. With the rise of "new history"-characterized by an emphasis on the 
experience of ordinary Americans, quantification and cultural analysis, and the eclipse of 
conventional political and intellectual history-- many historians, by the 1970s, began to 
dismiss presidential elections studies as narrow, elitist, and ill-equipped to examine those 
changes-- such as family, environment, and social beliefs-- that have most affected the 
human condition.6 "The old 'presidential synthesis'-which understood the evolution of 
American society chiefly via presidential elections and administrations-is dead (and not 
lamented)," historian Eric Foner declared in the early 1990s.7 Similarly, many political 
scientists have, since the 1940s, argued against dwelling on "campaign effects"-those 
twists and turns of candidate strategies, endorsements, and appearances that "impact" 
elections. "Voters are not fools," v.o. Key once observed, and neither are they 
3 
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"straitjacketed by social detenninants or moved by unconscious urges triggered by 
devilishly skillful propagandists."s Instead, they are retrospective: "As voters mark their 
ballot they may have in their minds impressions of the last television spectacular of the 
campaign, but, more important, they have in their minds recollections of their 
experiences of the past four years.,,9 Meanwhile, those voters who are not retrospective, 
are loyal partisans instead, and will not be swayed regardless. By the 1990s, 
retrospective issue voting had given birth to the "theory of the predictable campaign."]O 
Presidential campaigns, this view holds, are not only limited, but also-through an 
examination of the state of the election year economy and incumbent approval ratings--
predictable, and thus irrelevant. Though their approaches are different, the conclusions 
of many historians and political scientists are fundamentally the same-- i.e. presidential 
campaigns matter very little. It is the purpose of this study, focusing on the 1944 
presidential election, to refute these notions. 
A "political campaign" is multi-dimensional in nature, and thus subject to a variety of 
definitions and interpretations. For example, it can mean the spring and summer primary 
election contests that result in the nomination of a candidate, or it can mean only the fall 
campaign-that period between the summer nominating conventions and the November 
election--or it can simultaneously refer to both. These spectacles include smiling 
candidates, camera flashes, balloon drops, parades, cross-country stump speeches, ill-
tempered reporters, mass advertising, and, in more recent years, televised debates. In 
addition, "campaign" can refer to a "pennanent" presence of electoral preparation and 
positioning. While presidential elections occur every four years, their campaigns in some 
fonn are perpetually in progress. "Even before an election is over, speculation begins 
4 
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about who might make the run in the next election or even in the one after that. Every 
major policy decision, every triumph or misstep by a national politician is read in the 
context of its implications for the next presidential election, and every act of every 
prominent politician is interpreted as politically calculated to achieve the upper hand in 
the next campaign."]] Finally-in a more abstract sense-- a "campaign" is a 
conversation. As Roderick P. Hart, Professor of Government at the University of Texas 
in Austin, argues in Campaign Talk: Why Elections Are Good for Us (2000), campaigns 
are collections of words and that words-- all by themselves-- are important: "If we are 
patient enough to examine [words] carefully, if we are willing to look for connections 
among them, much can be learned. Much can be learned because people treat their words 
casually, as if they were no more substantial than gossamer, irrelevant to the relations 
they share with one another. But even a moment's reflection finds this is a canard ... By 
choosing one word a speaker decides not to use another, thereby creating a sociolinguistic 
map that can be read.,,]2 
Thomas M. Carsey, in an excellent analysis of gubernatorial races entitled Campaign 
Dynamics (2001), adds that "Central to the unfolding of a campaign is the struggle 
between candidates to provide new information to voters. Candidates shape the 
information context within which voters make their decisions by battling to influence 
what is salient to voters when they cast their ballots. Through this process, the content of 
campaigns influences voting behavior."] 3 Campaigns, then, are rivaling stories about the 
past, present, and future. While the information voters have prior to the beginning of a 
campaign will influence their voting behavior, voters do not possess complete 
information. "Incomplete information creates uncertainty in the electoral process, and 
5 
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candidates try to reduce that uncertainty by providing additional infonnation to voters 
over the course of a campaign.,,14 The result is what Carsey calls "heresthetic change"-
i.e. changing the nature of the "issue space" for voters so they are encouraged to change 
which candidate they support. "The campaign becomes a struggle between candidates 
providing infonnation to voters as they try to define for voters the important issues in that 
particular election.,,15 The following study seeks to consider "campaign" in all its 
political dimensions. 
The American presidential election campaign matters. From the perspective of history 
as a discipline, presidential campaigns-swirls of issues, events, people, and words-
have the potential to constitute what historian Alan Brinkley has described as an 
"important frontier" between great public events and the less visible social phenomena 
that fonn their context. 16 The actual history of presidential campaigns, meanwhile, has 
valuable light to shed on political scientists' understanding of "campaign theory." For 
example, most advocates ofthe predictable campaign theory, dismiss (predictably) 
Carsey's above arguments on the grounds that heresthetic change (1) cannot compete 
with the retrospective voter's own experiences with issues, and (2) is inherently limited 
by the existence of partisanship. This view, however, fails to consider non-voters. Non-
voters are usually this way because they are uninspired, uninfonned, and uninterested. If 
a campaign can connect to the culture in such a way-- as 19th century presidential 
campaigns did-so as to relate to and involve citizens-- generating passion about issues, 
candidates, and even parties-it can inspire "new voters" to go to the polls. Finally, 
campaigns matter substantively-i.e. they are, quite literally, "the pulse of our 
6 
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democracy." They are, Lyndon Johnson once observed, "a blur, a whirlwind, an 
excitement~frustrating, exhilarating, exhausting, and necessary [italics added]."17 
Specifically, the presidential election of 1944 is worthy of serious examination for at 
least seven reasons. First, it was a wartime presidential campaign. The United States has 
experienced few such contests. In fact, 1944 was only the third in U. S. history up to that 
time~1812 and 1864 being the other two. Since 1944, there have been four: 1952 and 
Korea, 1968 and Vietnam, 1972 and Vietnam, and 2004 and Iraq. In 1944, the United 
States was at war against the Axis Powers of World War II: Germany, Italy, and Japan. 
Second, it was an ordinary election during an extraordinary time. While the United 
States was fighting a global war, over forty-seven million Americans participated in free 
and fair elections at home. It was an incredible testimony of the power of American 
democracy. 
Third, the 1944 election embodied the principle and practice that candidates actually 
campaign for the office. Throughout most of American history, stumping for the 
presidency was considered vulgar. In 1896, Democrat William Jennings Bryan broke 
with precedent, and campaigned openly for the job, traveling over 18,000 miles and 
averaging 80,000 words per day.18 He lost. Traditional sensibilities lingered into the 
early decades ofthe twentieth century, as candidates such as Theodore Roosevelt, 
Woodrow Wilson, and James Cox tried to find an uneasy balance between tradition and 
modem campaigning with modem democratic demands. During the 1930s, Franklin 
Roosevelt "helped propel the candidate toward the people. His three reelection bids 
capped the trend whereby Presidents campaigned. His four efforts, as well as those of his 
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opponents, helped settle the century-long debate between active and passive candidacies. 
Henceforth all nominees, challengers and incumbents, would campaign energetically.,,19 
Fourth, it witnessed the beginning of a nonpartisan, or "at the water's edge," foreign 
policy that would last through the Cold War. Though specifics might be subject to 
debate, the basic contours-in this case (1944), the need to pursue the Axis nations to an 
"unconditional surrender," and to create a postwar international organization to help keep 
the future peace-were never challenged. 
Fifth, the 1944 election coincided with rising suspicions of the Soviet Union. As the 
campaign made clear, there existed within the United States a definite (and growing) anti-
communism that-coupled with Stalin's postwar rhetoric and aggression-contributed to 
the Cold War. Contrary to popular belief, there existed in wartime America great 
concern over communism. In fact, the roots of "McCarthyism" were not in the 
deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations after World War II, but in conservative wartime 
fears of an emerging New Deal/military super-state. 
Sixth, 1944 was the last time the "Solid South" voted solidly Democratic. There were 
deep and growing divisions among Democrats over race and the New Deal (especially in 
the South) in 1944, and Roosevelt, due to tremendous personal appeal, the war, and 
concessions to conservatives, was able to keep the party together one last time. He died 
in April 1945, and never again would Democrats be able to take the South for granted, 
and never again would they overwhelmingly carry the region.2o 
The reemerging Republican majority of the late 20th century was grounded largely in a 
divided postwar Democratic Party. The seeds of that division were sown in 1944 over 
reform, race and communism. Central to this Democratic divide-as it related to 
8 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
communism-- were two key players in the presidential election of 1944: Henry Wallace 
and Harry Truman. Though the lines between the two men were not that stark in 1944 
(when Truman was still an unknown senator from Missouri), the dumping of Wallace as 
vice president and the selection of Truman as his replacement marked an important 
watershed in Democratic Party history. By 1948, Wallace had come to represent the 
small number of liberals willing to accept American Communist Party leader Earl 
Browder's vision of party and international cooperation. Harry Truman, in contrast, had 
become the champion of not only anti-communist liberals, such as historian Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. and Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, but also mainstream 
"Roosevelt Democrats," such as actor Ronald Reagan, who believed that the defeat of 
Nazism had cleared the way "for the rise of a new, more menacing threat to the principles 
of liberty and democracy-the Soviet Union.,,21 
And seventh, 1944 was important in that it maintained "politics as usual" in the sense 
that the traditional American two-party system--on the verge of collapse-- was preserved. 
Instrumental in saving the two-party system was "moderate" Republican Thomas E. 
Dewey of New York. By 1944, the Republican Party, despite modest rebounds in the 
1938 and 1942 midterm elections, was in critical shape. Saddled with the blame for the 
Great Depression, and unable to articulate a clear and positive vision for economic 
recovery, Republicans witnessed their power-- and majority status--diminish at all levels 
of government throughout the 1930s. Furthermore, the party lacked serious and popular 
direction, and by 1944, in the midst of World War II, was weak, fragmented, and in 
danger of extinction. 
9 
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It was in that context the 1944 election campaign unfolded. Though few, including 
Dewey, expected the GOP to defeat an incumbent in wartime, the goal for many 
Republican leaders was to revitalize the party. This was especially true of Dewey, who 
did win the GOP nomination that year, and who passionately believed that the two party 
system was in danger of collapsing. He became the face of the Republican Party, and 
remained so throughout the 1940s and early 1950s and was the vehicle for party change, 
unity, and, ultimately, success. He was something that Roosevelt's other Republican 
opponents, including Wendell Willkie, were not, and that was a party builder. Ever the 
pragmatist, he accepted the social welfare legislation of the New Deal, while 
simultaneously expressing devotion to basic party traditions and rhetoric. Ever the 
innovator, Dewey-- even before Pearl Harbor-- abandoned isolationism, and 
acknowledged America's growing global responsibilities. Believing that without the 
existence of two or more internally diverse parties competing for support of the electorate 
and power in government, American liberties would be in danger, he chartered a cautious 
course and avoided extremes-particularly conservative ones. Not surprisingly this put 
him at odds with such GOP leaders as Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio (and later Eugene 
McCarthy and Barry Goldwater). Dismissed by his critics as an opportunist, liberal, 
accommodator, Tory, and loser, Dewey nonetheless revitalized the Republican Party, 
and, in doing so, rescued the party from collapse, and laid the foundation for Republican 
presidential victories in the second half of the twentieth century. He was the youthful 
face of the party, and an essential transition or bridge between Hoover and Eisenhower. 
10 
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Despite his own three unsuccessful campaigns for the presidency in the 1940s, Dewey 
rebuilt the party of Herbert Hoover to fit into, and to be a relevant alternative within, the 
post-World War II, New Deal political order. He sought not to roll back the New Deal, 
but to ensure (within a New Deal context) that America would continue it's "pursuit of 
our bright ideal... our right to Freedom and the Pursuit of Happiness." As Ford Bond, 
Dewey's radio director in 1944 observed shortly after the election, when Dewey 
"advocated broadening and extending the benefits of social and economic legislation to 
more and more of our people [as he did in a speech in San Francisco that fall], he wasn't 
saying' Elect a Republican administration and we will give you these [Democratic] things 
too.' He was giving voice to the American ideal. He was saying, in effect, 'You can 
have these things and Freedom too.'" The objective of Dewey, and all ofthose 
associated with him, Bond concluded, was to rebuild the Republican Party "to be worthy 
of national truSt.,,22 As such, Dewey was very much an institutional preserver, paving the 
way for Eisenhower and the "Modem Republicanism" ofthe 1950s. Indeed, Dewey was 
one of the more prominent GOP leaders to encourage an Eisenhower candidacy in 1952. 
Disturbed by McCarthyism, and dismayed by what he called Taft's "stupid jackass idea" 
to, in 1951, oppose President Harry Truman's plan to shift 70,000 American soldiers to 
Europe on the grounds that it might strain the national economy, Dewey repeatedly told 
journalists (beginning as early as October 1950) that he would recommend to his own 
New York delegation that "they support General Eisenhower for President.,,23 Privately, 
he was in frequent conversation with Eisenhower, and was ultimately successful in 
appealing to the General's sense of duty. As President from 1953 to 1961, Eisenhower 
11 
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did not disappoint, accepting both the New Deal (while "holding the line" on spending) 
and an internationalist foreign policy. Though power struggles within the GOP did not 
end with the Eisenhower presidency, the party had nevertheless~through the efforts of 
moderates like Dewey~emerged from the very critical 1930s and 1940s, intact. 
12 
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Chapter Two: 
The State of the Nation 
War 
It came literally from out of the blue. Shortly before 7 :55 a.m., on 7 December 1941, 
a Japanese attack wave, consisting of 183 torpedo planes, dive bombers, level bombers, 
and fighters, appeared over an unsuspecting u.S. Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor 
in Hawaii. There, on the island of Oahu, American sailors were sleeping, eating 
breakfast, and lounging on decks. It was a bright, clear and calm Sunday morning. 
"Everything was perfect," Rear Admiral William Rea Furlong of the Oglala later 
recalled. l The sun was shining, buglers were preparing to sound "To the Colors," and a 
church bell rang in the distance. Then the sounds of dive bombers, sirens, and explosions 
filled the air. As the first Japanese bombs fell, Fleet headquarters cabled the Navy 
Department in Washington: "Air Raid, Pearl Harbor-This is No Drill." In the nation's 
capitol, where Secretary of Navy Frank Knox received the Fleet's message, it was 1 :20 
p.m. Knox immediately telephoned President Franklin Roosevelt in the Oval Office and 
informed him of the attack. According to aide Harry Hopkins, who was in a meeting 
with the President at the time of Knox's call, Roosevelt was calm, solemn, and even 
reflective. He discussed with Hopkins, in some detail, his administration's efforts to keep 
the country out of the war, and then concluded that the matter was, due to Japan's 
actions, out of his hands. Nearly thirty minutes later, the President informed Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull of the report, and called for a meeting of senior military and cabinet 
officials. Back at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese attack continued for nearly another two 
hours, until 9:45 a.m. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was shattered. Twenty-one ships, including 
13 
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eight battleships, were either disabled or sunk. At Oahu's airfields, 164 American planes 
were destroyed, and 128 damaged. Over 2,300 Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor, 
and over 1,100 more were wounded. The United States was at war. 
World War II was the joining of two geographically separated anned conflicts. 2 One 
originated in East Asia in 1937 from Japanese militarism, and the island nation's 
hegemonic designs for Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. The other conflict began 
in 1939, with Nazi Gennany's invasion of Poland on 1 September, and the subsequent 
British and French declarations of war. Officially, the United States remained neutral 
during the first two years of the war, not entering the conflict until December 1941, when 
it was forced to do so in response to both the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and a 
Gennan declaration of war. In reality, however, the United States had become an 
unofficial belligerent and ally of Great Britain in mid 1940, and by the fall of 1941, was 
engaged in an undeclared naval war with the Third Reich. "The fundamental reason for 
this shift in U.S. policy was the series of dramatic Gennan military victories in the spring 
of 1940, culminating in the June conquest of France. The speed and totality of these 
victories ... led many Americans to question their traditional belief that the Atlantic 
Ocean constituted a defensive moat that freed them from concern with the European 
balance of power and provided extensive time to prepare for any threat. Gennan power 
now appeared to pose such a threat, one capable of crossing the Atlantic at will and easily 
defeating the meager U.S. military forces then in existence.,,3 
Following Roosevelt's election to an unprecedented third tenn in November 1940, the 
United States had moved slowly toward war with what it perceived to be the greatest 
threat to America: Gennany. On 17 December 1940, the President, during a press 
14 
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conference with reporters in the Oval Office, announced that there would be no 
slackening of America's detennination to assist the Allies. "Suppose my neighbor's 
house catches fire," he said, "and 1 have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet 
away. Ifhe can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, 1 may help him 
to put out the fire. Now what do I do? 1 don't say to him before that operation, 
'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.' What is the 
transaction that goes on? 1 don't want $15-1 want my garden hose back after the fire is 
over. .. ,,4 With that story, Roosevelt introduced his concept of Lend-Lease assistance to 
the Allies. Explaining that Great Britain did not have the money to purchase essential 
materials, he asked Congress to rescind the cash provision of cash-and-carry, and pennit 
the President to lend or lease supplies to any country whose defense was vital to the 
security of the United States. "In the face of great perils never before encountered," 
Roosevelt declared during his Third Inaugural Address, "our strong purpose is to protect 
and to perpetuate the integrity of democracy."s 
The Lend-Lease bill generated much controversy. As the weeks passed, it became 
apparent that the country was divided on the issue without regard to party, profession, 
background, or creed. For example, James B. Conant, president of Harvard, insisted that 
"our only hope as a free people lies in a defeat of the Axis Powers." Robert M. Hutchins 
of the University of Chicago, meanwhile, feared that 'the American people are about to 
commit suicide.",6 Labor and business were also divided, as were the nation's 
politicians. Among the country's fonner presidential candidates, Democrats J ames Cox, 
John W. Davis, and Alfred Smith, and Republican Wendell Willkie, supported the bill, 
while Republican Alf Landon and Socialist Nonnan Thomas were finnly opposed. 
15 
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Herbert Hoover, the only living ex-president, was also against the measure. Thomas E. 
Dewey of New York, a candidate for governor in 1942, and the frontrunner among 
Republican presidential contenders for 1944, called in January 1941, for "every possible 
aid to Great Britain short of war," but clumsily added that the Lend-Lease Bill itself 
"would bring an end to free Government in the United States and would abolish Congress 
for all practical purposes." 7 Less than a month later, at a Lincoln Day dinner in 
Washington, Dewey-perhaps with eyes on a Gallup poll that showed 68% of Americans 
approved of the President's plan-clarified his position, announcing: "I believe our party 
stands out almost unanimously for all-out aid to the heroic people of Britain. With some 
necessary reservations of power to the people through Congress, 1 am satisfied the House 
[Lend-Lease] Bill will be adopted. Speaking for myself alone, 1 hope it will be."s After 
much debate, Congress approved the measure, and Roosevelt signed it into law on 11 
March 1941. "Through this legislation," the President observed, "our country has 
determined to do its full part in creating an adequate arsenal of democracy.,,9 
On 6 January 1941-as Lend-Lease began making its way through the legislative 
process-Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, and enunciated what he called 
the "Four Freedoms" essential to any lasting postwar peace. These freedoms-freedom 
of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from 
fear (or war)-must be realized "everywhere in the world."lO "Nazi forces," the 
President said later at the annual White House Correspondents' Association Dinner, "are 
not seeking mere modifications in colonial maps or in minor European boundaries. They 
openly seek the destruction of all elective systems of government on every continent." 
16 
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Liberty, as epitomized by the Four Freedoms, must be defended. Human rights must 
reign supreme. "The light of democracy must be kept burning.,,]l 
That spring, U.S. forces occupied Greenland and Iceland to keep them out of the 
hands of the Nazis. Simultaneously, the United States began to assist the British in 
tracking German submarines in the Atlantic. Then, on 10 August 1941, Roosevelt met 
with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill aboard a warship off the coast of 
Newfoundland to discuss joint military strategy, and to express their mutual vision of a 
postwar world. In their public statement following their conference, the two leaders 
announced the Atlantic Charter. Overall, they condemned aggression, affirmed the right 
of national self-determination, advocated freedom of the seas and liberal trading 
practices, and endorsed the principles of collective security and disarmament. The 
following month, a German submarine fired at an American destroyer (the Greer), and on 
11 September, Roosevelt addressed the nation, and-in reviewing German attacks against 
American shipping on the high seas-- denounced the Nazis as the "rattlesnakes of the 
Atlantic.,,]2 In addition, the President-explaining that "when you see a rattlesnake 
poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him" -- announced a 
policy of "preemption," authorizing naval patrols to shoot on sight all Axis vessels 
operating between the United States and Iceland: 
Do not let us split hairs. Let us not say: 'We will only defend ourselves 
if the torpedo succeeds in getting horne, or if the crew and the passengers 
are drowned. ' 
This is the time for prevention of attack. 
In the naval waters which we deem necessary for our defense, 
American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until 
Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of 
the sea, strike their deadly blow-first. 
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My obligation as President is historic; it is clear. It is inescapable. 
It is no act of war on our part when we decide to protect the seas that 
are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely 
defense. 
But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian 
vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for 
American defense, they do so at their own peril. 13 
Then, in late October, the Reuben James was sunk by a German submarine, and 115 
American sailors were lost. The u.s. was bracing itself for war with Germany. Then 
came Pearl Harbor. 
At 2:28 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on 7 December, Admiral Harold Stark 
telephoned Roosevelt and confirmed the attack at Pearl Harbor. The report was very 
preliminary, but he did convey to the President that the attack had been very severe, and 
that American lives had been lost. A few moments later, Roosevelt called Steve Early, 
the White House Press Secretary, and dictated a news release which Early was to 
immediately release to the press. At 3 :00, the President met with Secretary Hull, 
Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall. 
"The conference," Harry Hopkins observed in his diary, "met in not too tense an 
atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy was 
Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we 
were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity. Everybody, 
however, agreed on the seriousness of the war and that it would be a long, hard 
strugg1e.,,14 One hundred miles away, at Pawling, New York, Thomas E. Dewey-
serving his last month as New York's District Attorney-was leaving a golf course when 
he received news of Pearl Harbor. "Well," Dewey sighed, "it is a different world now.,,15 
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Roosevelt woke at dawn on the morning of 8 December, and completed his draft of 
the message to Congress requesting a declaration of war against Japan. Outside the 
White House, a large crowd gathered in show of support. Occasionally, the people broke 
out in tune, singing "God Bless America," "America the Beautiful," "My Country 'Tis of 
Thee," and other patriotic songs. 16 At 12:30 that afternoon, Roosevelt was driven in an 
open car down Pennsylvania A venue to the Capitol Building. As he entered the House 
chamber, he was greeted by unanimous and thunderous applause. "Even his bitterest 
opponents now saw him as commander in chief of a wronged, righteous, and vengeful 
nation.,,17 From the well ofthe House, he began: "Yesterday, December 7, 1941-a date 
which will live in infamy-the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately 
attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan." The President spoke for only 
six minutes. His speech was solemn, "eloquent and powerfully delivered, capturing 
exactly the mood of his countrymen and their legislators.,,18 After cataloguing Japan's 
actions over the past several hours-including its attacks on Hong Kong, Guam, the 
Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway Island-Roosevelt braced the nation for war: 
As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed 
that all measures be taken for our defense. 
Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against 
us. 
No matter how long it may take us to overcome this 
premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous 
might will win through to absolute victory. 
I believe I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people 
when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the 
uttermost but will make very certain that this form of treachery 
shall never endanger us again. 
Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, 
our territory and our interests are in grave danger. 
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With confidence in our armed forces-with the unbounding 
determination of our people-we will gain the inevitable 
triumph-so help us God. 
I ask that the Congress declare that since the un~rovoked and 
dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December i\ a state of war 
has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire. 19 
The assembly broke out in applause. There was no debate in Congress, and exactly two 
and one-half hours later, the President signed the official declaration of war. Three days 
later, on 11 December, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. 
On 1 January 1942, the Allied nations, including the United States, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and China, signed the Declaration of the United Nations, "pledging 
themselves to military victory and the creation of a postwar world based on the principles 
ofthe Atlantic Charter.,,2o In an address to the nation a few weeks later, Roosevelt 
reminded his countrymen that "This war is a new kind of war," and then presented in 
very clear terms the challenges the United States now faced: 
The broad oceans which have been heralded in the past as our 
protection from attack have become endless battlefields on which 
we are constantly being challenged by our enemies. 
We must all understand and face the hard fact that our job now 
is to fight at distances which extend all the way around the globe. 
We fight at these vast distances because that is where our 
enemies are. Until our flow of supplies gives us clear superiority 
we must keep on striking our enemies wherever and whenever we 
can meet them, even if, for a while, we have yielded ground. 
Actually we are taking a heavy toll of the enemy every day that 
goes by. 
We must fight at these vast distances to protect our supply lines 
and our lines of communication with our allies-protect these lines 
from the enemies who are bending every ounce of their strength, 
striving against time, to cut them. The object of the Nazis and the 
Japanese is to separate the United States, Britain, China, and 
Russia, and to isolate them one from another, so that each will be 
surrounded and cut off from sources of supplies and 
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reinforcements. It is the old familiar Axis policy of 'divide and 
conquer.,21 
Victory would not be easy, the President insisted; it required "hard work and sorrow and 
blood.,,22 Indeed, the entry of the United States into the war was followed by a series of 
stunning defeats in the Pacific. The Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Malaya, the 
Philippines, and Burma were all overrun by the Japanese war machine, and it appeared 
that India, New Zealand, and Australia might be next. The situation in North Africa and 
Europe, meanwhile, was just as bleak. By summer, the Nazis were advancing to 
positions within miles of the Suez Canal in Egypt, and were clamoring at the gates of 
Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Americans at home 
were experiencing the "pinch of war" in shortages, rationing, higher prices, and long 
hours of work. 23 Still, America's first year of war was not without important successes. 
For example, at the Battle of Midway in June, the entire Japanese Air Fleet was 
devastated, and Japanese expansion was stopped. From this point on, Japan would be on 
the defensive. In the European Theater of Operations that November, the Allies launched 
Operation Torch against Nazi and Vichy forces in North Africa, resulting in a French 
surrender in Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. 
The year 1943 began with the Allies, at Casablanca, committing themselves to the 
elimination of German and Japanese war power, and to the "unconditional surrender" of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan. Slowly, the tide of war turned in favor of the Allies. In 
February, the Soviets broke the German siege at Stalingrad, and began to drive the 
Germans out of Russia. In May, Nazi forces were crushed in Tunisia, clearing the 
Mediterranean for Allied shipping and opening the door for Operation Husky, the 
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invasion of Italy, in July. Then, on 3 September, Italy surrendered unconditionally. In an 
address to the nation that summer on the situation in Italy, Roosevelt declared: "The 
massed, angered forces of common humanity are on the march ... The first crack in the 
Axis has come.,,24 In the course of the year, Samuel Rosenman, a speech writer for the 
President, later observed, "the ultimate outcome of the war became certain. The question 
at the end of 1943 was no longer whether the United Nations would win the war. The 
questions were when would they win, and could they, after they had won, win the 
peace?,,25 
Then on 6 June 1944 came the much anticipated Allied, D-Day invasion of "Fortress 
Europe"-the storming of the beaches at Normandy, and the opening of the so-called 
"Second Front." It was the last major military event to take place before the party 
conventions convened in Chicago that summer. Though an Allied success-Germany 
began a slow retreat across northern France-- over 4,000 young Americans had been 
killed in a single day.26 In a powerful address broadcast over radio, Roosevelt, in a 
message he composed himself, led the nation in prayer. He prayed: 
Almighty God: Our sons, pride of our Nation, this day have set upon a 
mighty endeavor, a struggle to preserve our Republic, our religion and our 
civilization, and to set free a suffering humanity .... 
They will need Thy blessings. Their road will be long and hard. The 
enemy is strong. He may hurl back our forces. Success may not come 
with rushing speed, but we shall return again and again; and we know that 
by Thy grace, and by the righteousness of our cause, our sons will 
triumph ... 
For these are men are men lately drawn from the ways of peace. They 
fight not for the lust of conquest. They fight to end conquest. They fight 
to liberate. They fight to let justice arise, and tolerance and good will 
among all Thy people. They yearn but for the end of battle, for their 
return to the haven of home ... 
With Thy blessing, we shall prevail over the unholy forces of our 
enemy. Help us to conquer the apostles of greed and racial arrogancies. 
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Lead us to the saving of our country, and with or sister nations into a 
world unity that will spell a sure peace-a peace invulnerable to the 
scheming of unworthy men. And a peace that will let all men live in 
freedom, reaping the just rewards of their honest toil. 
Thy will be done, Almighty God. 
Amen.27 
Though Roosevelt's prayer was well received-it was published in pamphlet form later 
that year-not all sentiment coming into the White House was positive, as a letter, dated 
7 June, from a resident of Braintree, Massachusetts, made perfectly clear: 
My dear President: 
... What insanity this war is, to drag our country in to save the British 
Empire. 
The American people will never forgive you for the deaths, maimed 
and insane boys you are directly responsible for. 
What are our war aims and what are we fighting for? Our finish will 
come when we go bankrupt, total Chaos and Revolution all because a 
willful President planned it that way. 
God help you on Nov. i h [Election Day]. Hope you can take the 
humiliation without committing suicide.28 
The end of the war was now clearly in sight. 
The Home Front 
The Second World War was a watershed event in American history. "Socially, 
politically, economically, militarily, culturally, racially, sexually, demographically, even 
mythologically, World War II," journalist Haynes Johnson wrote in 1995, "was the 
crucible that forged modem America. It was the transforming event that reshaped all 
who lived through it, and continues to affect those born after it.,,29 During the war, the 
nation was changed from one of want and Depression to one of opportunity and 
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prosperity. It was a time of government growth, economic planning, population 
movement, and social reordering. It was also, contrary to popular belief, a time not of 
universal harmony but of healthy national debate and partisan division. Change often 
required political response, which, in tum, frequently sparked controversies and partisan 
debates. The United States, for example, was unprepared for war in 1941. Yet plants 
would have to be built to manufacture war goods, supplies would have to be acquired to 
maintain those facilities, and workers would have to be found to operate those plants-all 
the while maintaining domestic levels of consumption. In addition, wages and prices had 
to be brought under control in order to avoid ruinous inflation, and money had to be 
found to finance the entire war mobilization and production process. These necessities 
were neither cheap nor easy, and thus triggered much partisan discussion. 
Not surprisingly, some in politics and academia expressed reservations about 
democratic processes in time of war. For example, Albert Guerard, writing in The New 
Republic in early 1943, argued that "If we choose to retain partisan labels, the Democrats, 
still nominally in power, are bound to suffer heavily... For the Republicans will vote for 
all the essential war measures, and claim credit for their patriotism; but the Democrats 
alone will be blamed for the discomforts inevitably arising out of these measures.,,30 The 
result, he predicted, would be a reaction at the ballot box in 1944 that would "engulf the 
Democratic Party, the New Deal, and with them much our recent social progress.,,31 
Others feared that partisanship, with its "party squabbles and politics in high places," 
might undermine the war effort both at home and abroad. Harold W. Dodds, president of 
Princeton University, disagreed. Political parties, he argued in an article for The Yale 
Review in the summer of 1942, were essential to both political liberty and national unity. 
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"It is their struggles for power that activate government," Dodds noted. "Freedom of 
speech or opinion would be in vain without them to implement our liberties. There 
appears to be no alternative to elections except tyranny." Under the two-party system, he 
added, political parties tended to "dull the keen edges of issues on which people divide 
rather than to sharpen them by introducing new causes of disunity. It is in their interest to 
do so ... Each side wants to gain the support also of the independent middle-of-the-road 
voters not affiliated with it. As the two parties bid for votes their programs naturally 
move to the centre.,,32 Writing in his Marxist magazine, Politics, in early 1944, journalist 
Dwight Macdonald, meanwhile, argued that calls for national unity had dangerous 
implications, noting that "In the totalitarian nations politics has vanished completely, at 
least in the sense of open, institutionalized contests between various interest groups." As 
long class societies exist, he concluded, the only hope of the submerged majority to 
change things for their good "will rest on political action, breaking through the fiction of 
organic unity between the lion and the lamb and setting class groups off openly against 
each other.,,33 
The war, of course, did not interrupt American politics. In fact, the war not only 
failed to bring about an end of partisan conflict, it also caused many new issues to emerge 
and altered existing political alignments.34 One issue of high political importance was 
regulation of the wartime economy. Though the Roosevelt administration had made 
preliminary efforts at war mobilization before Pearl Harbor, it was not until early 1942 
that mobilization agencies were galvanized. That January the President created the War 
Production Board (WPB), which was designed to exercise general responsibility over the 
economy in order to effect conversion to war production, restrict nonessential economic 
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activity, and coordinate material and production priorities. The WPB proved to be a 
disappointment to the administration. Headed by the mild-mannered and indecisive 
Donald Nelson of Sears-Roebuck, the power of the WPB was very limited. It lacked, 
among other things, authority over rubber and petroleum (which were placed instead 
under independent "czars"), and labor (having to rely solely on incentives). In addition, 
the army and navy continued to award contracts with little regard for available facilities 
and the supply oflabor and materials. The result was mass confusion and inefficiency. 
After disastrous midterm elections for his party, Roosevelt, in early 1943, struck back, 
establishing a number of "alphabet agencies"-inc1uding the Office of War Mobilization 
(OWM)-and implementing the Controlled Materials Plan, which allowed the army and 
navy to continue to award contracts but gave the WPB control of material allocations and 
production schedules. 
The Office of War Mobilization, headed by South Carolina Democrat (and former 
Supreme Court justice) James F. Byrnes, culminated a four-year effort to organize 
economic mobilization.35 Superimposed on existing organizations, the OWM had 
policymaking authority, and, according to historian Allan Winkler, became a court of 
final appeal when industrial arguments occurred. 36 Byrnes, a skilled and restless 
politician, assumed neither operating functions nor administrative chores. He was used 
instead to employ his political savvy to provide needed coordination. Byrnes's 
appointment as Director of OWM conferred upon him greater authority than a President 
had ever previously delegated. It gave him, as he later recalled, "power to originate 
policies and layout programs that would coordinate the work of all the war agencies and 
federal departments in any way connected with the production, procurement, 
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transportation and distribution of both civilian and military supplies;" moreover, it gave 
him the power to ensure that decisions were carried OUt.37 He was so successful that he 
soon had an office in the White House and began being referred to as "assistant 
president." In 1944, the OWM was succeeded by the Office of War Mobilization and 
Reconversion (OWMR), also under Byrnes, which aimed to prepare for the end of the 
war and demobilization. 
The Roosevelt administration also faced serious challenges with labor. "Soon after 
Pearl Harbor FDR negotiated a no-strike/ no-lockout agreement with unions and 
management and then established the National War Labor Board (NWLB) to head off 
labor strife that might impair the war effort.,,38 The board was successful, imposing 
settlements in some 20,000 wage disputes affecting 20 million workers, and approving 
415,000 wage agreements by war's end in 1945. It also helped expand union 
membership and assisted workers in winning better working conditions and higher 
wages. Due to these things-not to mention old-fashioned patriotism following Pearl 
Harbor-- strikes and stoppages fell off sharply in 1942. However, many workers and 
unions still had real grievances. Wages, for example, continued to lag behind prices and 
profits. Also, manpower controls prevented some workers in specified jobs from seeking 
better positions and higher salaries elsewhere.39 Since union leaders enjoyed their "team" 
status with the administration-as well as fear of appearing unpatriotic-they rarely 
sanctioned strikes, thus opening the door to a number of "wildcat" strikes after 1942. 
The New Deal and America's entry into the Second World War also constituted a 
major turning point in American race relations. During the course of the 1930s and 
1940s, black expectations (and power) rose, while white hostility in some quarters 
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outside the South slowly diminished. In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt became the first 
Democrat since Franklin Pierce in 1852 to win the presidency with a majority of the 
popular vote. That majority, however, did not include blacks, most of whom still voted-
if at all-Republican. Though FDR did not push for civil rights legislation, he did, 
during his first term, ensure black representation in such New Deal programs as the 
WP A. During the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt provided token representation for blacks at 
the DNC, and even allowed some blacks leaders to be photographed with him. On 
election night 1936, Roosevelt won anywhere from 60 to 250% more votes in black 
neighborhoods in major cities than in 1932. For the first time, then, blacks voted 
overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party, and became a part of the Roosevelt coalition.4o 
Though blacks had supported Roosevelt in record numbers in his landslide 1936 
victory, very little concerning race changed in the administration, and the Democratic 
Party-as revealed by its failure to adopt a civil rights plank in its party platform in 
1940-seemed slow, if not unwilling, to move on civil rights. Furthermore, in the spring 
of 1940, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People began pushing 
for an end of discrimination in the armed services. Though the President did respond-
directing the War Department that September to release a statement that "colored men 
will have equal opportunity with white men in all departments of the Army," and that 
blacks, formerly limited to labor battalions, be given "proportionate shares in all branches 
of the Army, in the proper ratio to their population"-he did not address the issue of 
desegregation in the armed forces. 41 In fact, Roosevelt, relenting to pressure from 
conservatives in the War Department, reneged on a promise made to NAACP leaders, 
and backed away from the controversy, releasing instead a statement in October 1940 
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announcing that the anned services' policy on blacks would remain the same-i.e. they 
were "not to intenningle colored and white personnel in the same regimental 
. . ,,42 
orgamzatIOns. 
Meanwhile, Republican presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie actively sought black 
support. In the party platfonn, drafted in Philadelphia that summer, Willkie presided 
over the drafting of the strongest civil rights plank in American history up to that time. 
Republicans supported federal anti-lynching legislation and protection of blacks' right to 
vote. Furthennore, Republicans promised to end discrimination in civil service, anny, 
navy, and all other branches of the government. Fearful oflosing black support (yet 
mindful of divisions within his own party), the President announced the creation of the 
U.S. Office of Education to oversee a nondiscriminatory policy for its defense training 
program, and in October, he released to the press plans for a new Air Corps unit for 
blacks at Tuskegee. Still, he had backed away from complete desegregation ofthe anned 
forces. Hurrying to save face, Roosevelt, just two weeks before the 1940 presidential 
election, agreed to make a series of appointments that would demonstrate his desire to 
end discrimination in the military. He announced the promotion of Colonel Benjamin O. 
Davis, the only African-American of that rank in the regular Anny, to Brigadier General. 
In addition, the President appointed the NAACP's William Hastie as Civilian Aide to the 
Secretary of War, and he created a special post of Negro Advisor to the Director of 
Selective Service, to be filled by Campbell Johnson. 
Although the President carefully avoided publicly condemning Jim Crow in the 
defense program, his concessions to the black leadership accelerated the train of events 
propelling civil rights to the fore as a national issue. Never before had the movement 
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been able to force the President to respond so directly to it demands. Roosevelt won that 
November, and with many middle-class whites and farmers returning to the Republican 
fold, blacks were optimistic since their support would be all the more important. Indeed, 
Roosevelt owed his narrow victories in Illinois, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, to black support. To keep the pressure on the 
Administration, the NAACP-well aware now of its importance to the administration and 
electoral victories-- organized a March-on-Washington Movement for 1941, to stop 
discrimination in the armed services. In late June, the President issued Executive Order 
8802, stipulating that all employers, unions, and government agencies concerned with 
vocational training must provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in 
defense agencies, without discrimination. To administer the ruling, Roosevelt established 
a Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC) to investigate complaints. Hailing 
this as a second Emancipation Proclamation, black leaders called off the march. 
According to historian Harvard Sitkoff, Executive Order 8802-though failing to live 
up to black demands for total desegregation of the armed forces-- represented "an 
uncompromised victory for black protest" and unleashed a "greater militancy that would 
accelerate the fight to bring civil rights to the fore as a major national concern." "Now is 
the time for action," demanded the black Pittsburgh Courier, while the Norfolk Journal 
and Guide insisted that "This is no time to be conservative ... There never was a time in 
the history of the United States when Negroes were more united concerning the impact of 
segregation on their lives." "We are not exaggerating," the Defender warned white 
America on the eve of Pearl Harbor, "when we say that the American Negro is damned 
tired of spilling his blood for empty promises of better days.,,43 Then, in early1944, a 
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group of prominent black intellectuals led by Rayford Logan (and including the aged 
W.E.B. DuBois) published a collection of essays under the title, What the Negro Wants. 
Though the authors carne from a variety of ideological backgrounds-conservative, 
liberal, and radical-they all agreed that segregation must end, and that democracy, 
equality, freedom, and human rights be provided for all in America. In a 2001 reprint 
edition of Logan's book, Kenneth Robert Janken, a history professor at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, added that the importance of the collection was in the fact 
that "liberal" white Southerners had previously (and successfully) argued that they knew 
best how to handle race relations and that the only alternative to their "mild" fonn of 
segregation was that of race haters like the Ku Klux Klan. The appearance of a broad-
based black intellectual and political movement organized against segregation, seriously 
undennined the Southern race liberals' moral authority, and ultimately opened the door 
for the Brown decision of 1954. 
That same year, the publication of the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal's An 
American Dilemma also generated controversy. In 1938, the Carnegie Corporation 
commissioned Myrdal to direct a two-year study on the segregation regime in the 
American Deep South. The result was An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy, published in two volumes in 1944. According to Myrdal, all 
Americans, even poor, uneducated, white Southerners, possessed within them a 
commitment to "the American Creed"- those values that include liberty, equality, 
justice, and opportunity for everyone. Unfortunately, unreasoning prejudice corrupted 
the white mind and undermined that creed. The American dilemma in race, then, was the 
conflict between high democratic values on the one hand and discriminatory behavior on 
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the other. Myrdal was optimistic, however. "People," he wrote, "want to be rational, 
and they want to feel that they are good and righteous. They want to have the society 
they live in, and their behavior in this society, explained and justified to their 
conscience.,,44 Due to education and the experiences of World War II, their attitudes and 
behavior were being tom to pieces, and recognized as marks of ignorance.45 The war was 
changing America. It could not fight and defeat oppression abroad, only to allow 
discrimination to continue at home. World War II was about the "American Creed"-
democracy and freedom-being spread around the world. The world was changing 
because of America, he concluded, and because of the war, America too was changing. 
Though naIve and overly optimistic-he believed that "Negro advancement" would break 
down discrimination more or less automatically without violent reaction-Myrdal's work 
was nevertheless influential in shaping opinion around the country concerning the issue 
of "inferiority." Blacks, Myrdal argued, were not inferior to whites, but only appeared to 
be, and that their condition was wholly and completely a product of race prejudice and 
the consequent disabilities inflicted on them by whites. The articulation of that argument 
played an important role in undermining segregation in the United States-to the point 
that when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned "Separate But Equal" in Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka (1954), the Court made reference to Myrdal and An American 
Dilemma. 
Wartime America was also a time of migration-by war's end, one in every five 
Americans had relocated. Eight million moved permanently to different states, half of 
those to different regions. One migratory stream traveled from south to north, while 
another flowed from east to west. The populations of Washington, Oregon, and 
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California exploded. By 1950, the population of California was 72% greater than it was 
in 1940. Thousands of workers poured into the great metropolitan centers of defense 
production-Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, Portland, 
and Seattle. "In a harbinger of postwar social geography they settled disproportionately 
not in the central cities but in the newly burgeoning suburbs, which grew at nearly three 
times the rate of traditional urban cores.,,46 This mass movement of people significantly 
influenced and altered the American wartime experience. The nation was in a state of 
incredible change and uncertainty-a state that one contemporary described as a "journey 
through chaos.,,47 
In the port city of Mobile, Alabama, for example, novelist John Dos Passos noted in 
1943 that the city was outgrowing itself and undergoing tremendous change. According 
to Dos Passos, every other man in Mobile seemed to be in work clothes, while the women 
wore slacks and overalls. Furthermore, the sidewalks were crowded and the gutters 
stacked with litter. Garbage cans overflowed, and the grass in peoples' yards was 
trampled. The town was spilling into the country, as farmlands were converted into 
residential areas. Meanwhile, the country was pouring into the town, as white families 
moved from farm to factory in search of better economic opportunities. Mobile was a 
wonder land to these country folk, many of whom had never experienced electricity and 
running water. There were street cars and busses, and electric street lights. The city also, 
Dos Passos concluded, offered boundless opportunity for sin. "Girls," he observed, "can 
go to beauty parlors, get their nails manicured, buy readymade dresses. In the backwoods 
a girl who's reached puberty feels she's a woman. She's never worried much about 
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restraining her feelings when she had any. Is it any wonder that they can't stay home at 
dusk when the streets fill up with hungry boys in uniform?,,48 
In Buffalo, New York, in 1943, journalist Agnes Meyer observed that the general 
atmosphere was similar to that of a Western mining town that had just struck gold. Due 
to the brand new war industries being opened in the area-including Bell Aircraft Corp-
the demand for manpower was great. All sorts flocked to plants, and while many loved 
their work and felt patriotic pride, others, "thrown into the hurly-burly of a large-scale 
production, crowds, a strange environment, easy money, and temptations of every kind, 
are morally and mentally confused. Their lives have been turned upside down by night 
work. Housing conditions for the workers who have flocked to the city 30,000 strong are 
bad. Th~y sleep in shifts as they work in shifts.,,49 Furthermore, the family was altered. 
"Children, especially those in the teen age, run the streets at all hours because both 
parents work"-the result: rising delinquency. Married couples were often employed in 
different plants (or at least different parts of the same plant), and thus rode to work with 
another member of the opposite sex and worked with another member of the opposite 
sex. This-coupled with the emergence of women as financially independent-had led 
to what Meyer described as numerous "marital tangles.,,5o 
In Uniontown, Pennsylvania, in May 1943, coal miners were on strike because 
consumer costs were on the rise and because food rations were woefully insufficient, 
especially for workers involved in such hard manual labor. Meanwhile, Detroit, 
Michigan-where numerous white and black Southerners had migrated in search of jobs 
(including those in the police force)-- became the scene of one ofthe worst race riots in 
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American history, resulting in $2 million worth of property damage, the deaths of twenty-
five blacks and nine whites, and the injuring of over 800. 
The Rise of Conservatism and Anti-Communism 
These wartime changes to the home front-along with the Roosevelt administration's 
responses-led to a conservative renaissance. By the early 1940s, with the election of 
Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932, and again in 1936 and 1940, 
conservatism-widely associated with individualism, isolationism, a reluctance to fight 
fascism, big business, and the past-was viewed by many Americans as "obsolete, 
impotent, [and] even quaint."sl Scattered and few in number, American conservatives 
felt lonely, despised, and lost in "a boundless wilderness of collectivism."s2 Overall, 
they believed that the New Deal, along with the war, had brought a "domestic superstate, 
a partially controlled economy, millions of conscripts under arms, and widespread fears 
of reversion to depression once demobilization set in."s3 The future seemed bleak. As it 
turned out, the war years witnessed the emergence-or what Godrey Hodgson called the 
"Headwaters" -- of modem American conservatism. 
In 1943, seventy-one-year-o1d Albert Jay Nock-e1itist, pessimist, and libertarian-
published Memoirs of a Superfluous Man, a critical, if indirect, assessment of the New 
Deal. Nock, ajournalist and former Episcopalian minister, lamented the abandonment of 
the classics from public education, and concluded: 
If [the current education system] had done nothing to raise the genera11evel of 
intelligence, it had succeeded in making our citizenry more easily gullible. It 
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tended powerfully to focus the credulousness of Homo sapiens upon the printed 
word, and to conform him in the crude authoritarian or fetishistic spirit which one 
sees most highly developed, perhaps, in the habitual readers of newspapers. By 
being inured to taking as true whatever he read in his schoolbooks and whatever 
his teachers told him, he is bred to a habit of unthinking acquiescence, rather than 
to an exercise of such intelligence as he may have. In later life he puts this habit 
at the unreasoning service of his prejudices. Having not the slightest sense of 
what constitutes a competent authority, he tends to take as authoritative whatever 
best falls in with his own disorderly imaginings. 
Thus a system of State-controlled compulsory popular instruction is a great aid 
in making Homo sapiens an easy mark for whatever deleterious nonsense may be 
presented to him under the appearance of authority. 54 
Nock the classicist, the man of culture, became convinced that the masses could never be 
saved. A "Remnant," however, could be. For in every age there existed a small Remnant 
of truly intelligent people; it was the task of each would-be Isaiah, alarmed at decay and 
impending doom, simply to preach. ,,55 Though Nock died two years later, a Remnant of 
sorts did find him. In fact, the years 1943 and 1944 witnessed the publication of six 
"remnant" books that were especially important in the development of postwar 
conservatism: Isabel Paterson's The God of the Machine (1943), Ayn Rand's The 
Fountainhead (1943), Garet Garrett's The Revolution Was (1944), Friedrich A. Hayek's 
The Road to Serfdom (1944), and Ludwig von Mises's Omnipotent Government (1944) 
and Bureaucracy (1944). In one way or another, each of these writings represented a 
feeling in the United States that "mass society, bureaucracy, [and] mediocrity, were 
robbing the individual, as citizen, as employee, as consumer and human being, of 
individuality," and freedom. 56 
One ofthe most important "remnant" writings of World War II was Friedrich Hayek's 
1944 The Road to Serfdom. Hayek, an Austrian-born professor of economics at the 
London School of Economics, argued that economic planning-that is, "planning against 
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competition"-leads to dictatorship. "Economic control," he wrote, "is not merely 
control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of 
the means for all our ends." Whoever controlled the means also determined which ends 
were to be served, and which values were to be rated higher and lower-"in short, what 
men should believe and strive for." Instead of collectivism, Hayek favored making "as 
much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible 
to coercion ... " Thus individualism became the supreme value, and could not be 
"reconciled with the supremacy of one single person to which the whole of society must 
be entirely and permanently subordinated."s7 
Another important conservative critique of big government was Ludwig von Mises's 
Omnipotent Government: The Rise of the Total State and Total War, also published in 
1944. Von Mises, an Austrian economist living in the United States, argued that the roots 
of Nazi totalitarianism (and thus World War II) were grounded in the post-World War I 
German ideology of etatism (or "trend toward government control of business"). 
Nazism, he insisted, was a not a product of capitalism, but of government control. This 
control characterized Nazi Germany, and it was the quest to enhance that government 
control that led to war in 1939. "A nation's policy, von Mises wrote, "forms an integral 
whole. Foreign policy and domestic policy are closely linked together; they are but one 
system; they condition each other." Since the further a nation "goes on the road toward 
public regulation and regimentation, the more it is pushed toward economic isolation," it 
should be no surprise that Nazi Germany sought Lebensraum and, ultimately, world 
hegemony. Its national sovereignty hindered by international division of labor and free 
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trade, Nazi Germany went on the attack, seeking to control all economies so as to be in 
control, and to not be challenged by free trade and democracy. 58 
Closely linked to conservative fears of rising bureaucracy and "omnipotent 
government" were American interpretations of "totalitarianism." A state "based on a 
self-conscious ideology with both the desire and the ability to maintain absolute power 
and control over its politically fragmented population," "totalitarianism" was an imported 
word from Europe that was first applied to Mussolini's Italy, and then to Hitler's 
Germany, in the mid-1930s. By the start of the Second World War in 1939, some anti-
Communist observers (including liberals) in the United States began using the term 
"totalitarianism" to describe the Soviet Union, which, by that time, had signed a non-
aggression pact with Hitler, and had participated in the invasion and division of Poland. 
According to historians Les Adler and Thomas Paterson, in an excellent 1970 essay on 
"The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of 
Totalitarianism," "Soviet secretiveness, censorship, unconcern for public opinion, purges, 
ideological purification, and frenzied denunciation of enemies in the 1930s seemed to 
echo characteristics of the Nazi regime." Many Americans, then, blurred the ideological 
differences between Communism and fascism and tended to believe that totalitarian 
methods overrode the role of ideology in shaping political forms." Thus, even after 
Hitler turned against Stalin in the summer of 1941, many Americans still viewed the two 
ideologies "as denials of human freedom and tolerance, saw Germany and Russia as 
international aggressors, and pictured Hitler and Stalin as evil comrades." "The 
American people," The Wall Street Journal observed that June, "know that the principal 
difference between Mr. Hitler and Mr. Stalin is the size of their respective mustaches." 
38 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In a Fortune magazine poll conducted in October 1941,35% of those surveyed thought 
Germany and the Soviet Union equally bad, while 32% believed that while there was not 
much choice between the two, the Soviet Union was slightly better. Roosevelt's decision 
to extend lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union that fall (1941) was met with fierce 
opposition, especially from conservatives. 59 
After the United States joined the war effort with Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
in December 1941, an effort was made by the administration, as well as those in 
academia and media, to stress "common cause" among the Grand Alliance. For example, 
James E. Davies, a friend ofFDR and former u.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
(1937-1938), argued in his 1941 Mission to Moscow that "the Russia of Lenin and 
Trotsky-the Russia of the Bolshevik Revolution-no longer exists." Communism there 
had proven to be inefficient, and after a long and sometimes cruel process, the Soviet 
Union transformed into "a system of state socialism operating on capitalistic principles 
[which is] steadily and irresistibly swinging to the right." Even if Communism did 
survive inside the Soviet Union, Davies concluded, it was not a threat to the United 
States. Stalin was neither a revolutionary nor a bloody tyrant-"A child would like to sit 
in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him"- but a leader attempting to create an 
egalitarian society in which all men would be governed according to ethical principles-
"the same principle ofthe 'brotherhood of man' which Jesus preached.,,6o Similarly, 
Foster Rhea Dulles's The Road to Teheran: The Story o/Russia and America, 1781-1943 
(1944) attempted to demonstrate the absence of conflict between the two nations, as well 
as their common revolutionary pasts and anti-imperialism stands. Even Wendell Willkie, 
the Republican presidential nominee in 1940, wrote of a "new Russia" in his 1943 
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bestseller One World that would neither "eat us [nor] seduce us.,,61 It was somewhat of 
an intellectual stretch, however, and many Americans-both liberal and conservative-
continued to be skeptical of Communist Russia. 
Not all Americans were so easily convinced "that the fires of war had purified the 
Stalinist dictatorship," and demanded a more realistic view of the Soviet Union.62 This 
group was diverse (and relatively small) and included: William Henry Chamberlain, 
Eugene Lyons, and John Dewey. Meanwhile, a foreign book to have tremendous impact 
in the United States was Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon, published in 1941. 
Koestler was a Hungarian and former Marxist, who became disillusioned by Stalin and 
the purges of the late 1930s. The book eventually went through several editions, and by 
the mid-1940s was an anticommunist classic. However, as historian John Lewis Gaddis 
observed in The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (1972), while "antipathy 
for communism remained strong within the United States throughout the war. .. 
Americans directed this hostility against their own communists, not Russian ones.,,63 
Indeed, with the expansion of government power during the New Deal and World War II, 
some Americans became convinced that some form of collectivism, including 
communism, might develop indigenously in the United States.64 By 1944, with Earl 
Browder's "nonpartisan" Communist Political Association's endorsement of Roosevelt 
for President, and the rise of Sidney Hillman's CIO-PAC (also for FDR), tensions were 
high. "Today," declared one candidate for President in 1944, "that pagan philosophy [of 
communism] is sweeping through much of the world. As we look abroad we see that in 
country after country its advocates are making a bid for power. We would be fools not to 
look for that same danger here. And we haven't far to 100k.,,65 
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Postwar Planning 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 dealt a devastating blow to 
isolationism in the United States. In a Gallup poll the previous summer, only 38% of 
Americans questioned wanted the U.S. to join a league of nations after the war, while 
39% objected. By the summer of 1942, those numbers had dramatically changed, with 
73% in favor, and 27% opposed.66 The lessons of war, coupled with the ceaseless 
activity of internationalist pressure groups, such as the Committee to Study the 
Organization of Peace, had finally crippled isolationism and convinced many Americans 
that the United States had to play an active role in the postwar world. But what kind of 
role would that be? "Internationalism" was subject to various meanings, and its 
advocates, regardless of political party, were often in disagreement as to the purpose of 
American involvement in the war and the nature of the peace that would follow. One 
group, including Clarence Streit, Henry Wallace, and Sumner Welles, subscribed to the 
Wilsonian tenets of "progressive internationalism," with the hope that the war would 
usher in a period of worldwide social reform and the belief that peace should be founded 
on the equality of all nations. Other internationalists, meanwhile, contended that such 
views were overly idealistic. According to this more "conservative" and "realistic" 
group, including Walter Lippmann, H.1. Taylor, and John Foster Dulles, Americans 
"should understand the limitations upon world order imposed by nationalism, and 
recognize that peace could be attained only by agreement among the big powers.,,67 
Sensing a growing curiosity among the American people, publishers and magazine 
editors produced an outpouring of books and articles dealing with the postwar world. 68 
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As a result, by the end of 1944, a voluminous literature of postwar international relations 
had emerged, and Americans now had a chance to read and discuss every possible 
approach to the future peace.69 
One of the first monographs to articulate a postwar peace plan was Clarence Streit's 
"progressive" or "idealistic" Union Now, published in late 1939. According to Streit, a 
journalist for the New York Times, the perfect model for postwar planning could be found 
in America's experience with federalism. Following the American Revolution in the late 
18th century, the United States joined together in a loose national plan of union styled the 
Articles of Confederation. Over time, Streit observed, this confederation failed to govern 
adequately and subsequently gave birth to a federal union under the Constitution of 1787. 
Similarly, he argued, the League of Nations had been the world's attempt at a 
confederation in the 20th century. It too failed, and must now give way to a federal union 
of democratic nations called "the Great Republic." This utopian organization would 
consist only of those nations that believed in self-government and the freedom of the 
individual. Members of this body would enjoy the benefits of "a union defense force, a 
union customs-free economy, union money and a union postal and communications 
system. But, like the American states, the member nations would retain complete home 
rule and separate powers of government to handle local matters." Structurally, the union 
would resemble the United States with a bicameral congress, with representation to the 
lower house based on population and representation in the upper house being equal. 
Instead of a president, Streit proposed a five-member executive board. Streit's book was 
an immediate success and (by 1944) had undergone fourteen printings. He also had the 
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support of such high profile personalities as Clare Boothe Luce, W. Somerset Maugham, 
Robert Sherwood, Thomas Mann, and Raymond Massey. 
In The Century of the Common Man (1943), Henry A. Wallace, the incumbent Vice 
President of the United States, presented another "progressive" vision of a postwar world 
order. Wallace and other social liberals "came to enthusiastically define the war as a 
revolutionary struggle and to look to America to redeem her own revolutionary heritage 
by uniting with the forces that sought the destruction of colonialism and by working to 
construct international organizations to eliminate the social and economic inequalities 
that produce war.,,70 Wallace devoted much of his book to that on which, he believed, 
peace ultimately depends: strong domestic programs. "We now know," he wrote, "that 
the modem world must be recognized for what it is-an economic unit-and that wise 
arrangements must be made so that trade will be encouraged. The foundations of 
democracy can be rendered safe only when people everywhere have an opportunity to 
work and buy and sell with a reasonable assurance that they will be able to enjoy the 
fruits of their workS.,,71 The defeat of Germany and Japan, then, was only half the battle; 
the United States must build a world in which its human and material resources were 
used to the utmost if it is to win a complete victory. Indeed, the potential abundance of 
the world must be translated into real wealth and a higher standard of living. "Certain 
minimum standards of food, clothing, and shelter ought to be established, and 
arrangements ought to be made to guarantee that no one shall fall below those 
standards."n Between bill-of-rights democracy (the U.S. political model) and economic 
democracy (the Soviet communistic model), Wallace continued, there was an emerging 
democracy of the common man. According to the Vice President, this new democracy 
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was dependent upon the construction of a lasting international structure of peace, and was 
characterized by a promotion of equality of economic opportunity, free education, and 
minority and women's rights. In this democratic world community, "there will be a place 
for everyone-the worker, the farmer, the business man, the housewife, the doctor, the 
salesman, the teacher, the student, the store clerk, the taxi driver, the preacher, the 
engineer-all the millions who make up our world.,,73 The future of America, Wallace 
concluded, was a "middle class" existence, where the average American enjoys the 
conveniences of modem science: electric lights, modem plumbing, washing machines, 
refrigeration, radios, central heating, and comfortable furniture and rugs. "They include a 
car neither old nor ramshackle, decent clothes and books. They include his share of 
recreation-movies or theatre, trips, vacations, high school and college for his children, 
horse-racing, football, baseball, golf, or tennis, as his taste is inclined.,,74 This is 
America's future if it can translate its "present great productivity for war to an equally 
great productivity for peace.,,75 
Echoing Wallace were such idealists as Michael Straight, Freda Kirchwey, and 
Mortimer Adler. In his Make This the Last War (1943), the twenty-six-year-old Straight, 
an economist for the European Division in the U.S. State Department (and son of New 
Republic founder, Willard Straight), argued that the Second World War was "the crucial 
phase of a large struggle to achieve world unity" and that the war could not be won until 
the underlying conditions of world unity had been attained"-namely, full employment, 
national economic development, social harmony, and the creation of a world 
organization.76 Wars, then, would cease when the world became a single economic and 
political community under a federal government: "The flood tide is upon us that leads to 
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fortune ... We must now declare that the joint boards of the United Nations are the 
beginnings of the permanent structure of world government, that the combined Chiefs of 
Staff are the leaders of a world army that will be the only armed force in the future peace. 
We need to declare now that the Supreme Council ofthe United Nations which we form 
is the central executive of a provisional world government: that the full Council of all the 
United Nations will become the provisional assembly of a world legislature; that the 
twenty-eight states of the United Nations, like our own original thirteen, will grow until 
the United Nations becomes the United Nations of the World. The time is now." Writing 
in The Nation in March 1944, the liberal journalist Freda Kirchwey stated it even more 
bluntly than Wallace and Straight: "News from the underground in every country 
indicates an overwhelming conviction on the part of the people that the old system must 
be replaced with some form or degree of collectivist control, under democratic 
sanctions ... Only a New Deal for the world, more far-reaching and consistent than our 
own faltering New Deal, can prevent the coming of World War III." 77 In How to Think 
About War and Peace (1944), Mortimer 1. Adler, Professor of Philosophy of Law at the 
University of Chicago, added that war is caused by anarchy while peace is caused by 
government. While world wars are the result of world anarchy, world peace can be 
achieved through world government. 78 
The most popular of the "progressive" writings, however, was Wendell Willkie's 
One World (1943), which sold 197,130 copies in its first week in print, and over a half-
million after three weeks.79 Willkie, the unsuccessful Republican nominee for President 
in 1940, spent most of his 206 pages reflecting upon his recent forty-nine-day (and 
31 ,OOO-mile) trip around the world, detailing (through anecdote) his visits to the Soviet 
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Union, China, and the Middle East, as well as his meetings with leaders such as Joseph 
Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. "In the last third of One World, Willkie drew on his 
experiences to deliver a sermon on internationalism."so He argued that "There are no 
distant points in the world any longer. I learned by this trip that the myriad of millions of 
human beings of the Far East are as close to us as Los Angeles is to New York by the 
fastest trains. I cannot escape the conviction that in the future what concerns them must 
concern us, almost as much as the problems of the people of California concern the 
people of New York. Our thinking in the future must be world-wide."sl Alarmed by a 
lack of articulated Allied war aims, he warned that a war without purpose is a war 
without victory, and that there must be open discussions among the nations and within 
nations. He laid out three specific proposals concerning the postwar world. First, new 
order required a common council of the "United Nations" in which all planned together 
and devise grand military strategies, war production strategies, future economic 
cooperation strategies, administrative strategies for the defeated Axis nations, and 
organizational strategies to deal with the multiple problems accompanying the victorious, 
Allied nations in the war's aftermath. Failure to create such a council and to achieve 
those strategies would result in our "moving from one expediency to another, sowing the 
seeds of future discontents-racial, religious, political-not alone among the peoples we 
seek to free, but even among the United Nations themselves."s2 Second, the Allies, 
Willkie insisted, must agree that the war is one of liberation-i.e. "giving to all peoples 
freedom to govern themselves as soon as they are able, and the economic freedom on 
which all lasting self-government inevitably rests.,,83 Both aspects of freedom must be 
stressed and agreed upon, the victors will have won neither the peace nor the war. And 
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third, the United States must play an active and constructive role in the postwar and 
increasingly interdependent world. 
On the realist side of the postwar debate there were also several popular works, 
including, "Toward World Order" (1942), by John Foster Dulles, The Problems of 
Lasting Peace (1942), by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, us. War Aims (1944), by 
Walter Lippmann, How New Will the Better World Be? (1944), by Carl Becker, and The 
Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (1944), by Reinhold Niebuhr.84 Overall, 
realists emphasized power politics, and the need for an Allied-led postwar international 
order. To liberal internationalists such as Mortimer Adler, realists were "pessimists," 
who were "against aiming now at the kind of peace which could be perpetuated by world 
government alone and nothing less.,,85 
Near the close of 1942, former President Herbert Hoover and career diplomat Hugh 
Gibson offered their analysis of war and peace in The Problems of Lasting Peace. The 
book -largely due to Hoover's promotional efforts-became an immediate bestseller, 
and a selection in the Book-of-the-Month Club. According to Hoover and Gibson, there 
were six dynamic forces that contributed to war: ideologies, economic factors, 
nationalism, militarism, imperialism, and the forces of fear, hate, and revenge. "The 
history of war," they argued, "is largely a recitation of the operation of these [above] 
forces and the failure of men to comprehend and control them." Man, then, is 
ideological, and his ideas-involving human belief and faith-contain a militant, 
crusading spirit, and an inherent aggressiveness. Human beings, they continued, were 
also motivated by desires of economic benefit, as well as a love of family and country, 
and pride in racial accomplishments. Furthermore, Man was combative, egoistic, 
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arrogant, and a seeker of adventure and glory. Finally, he was a fearful, hateful, and 
vengeful being. All beings feared invasion, starvation, and economic disadvantage. He 
smoldered with hate from wrong, from rivalries, and from oppression, and yearns for 
revenge for past wrongs and defeats. All of these things, Hoover and Gibson argued, 
"will haunt the halls of the next peacemaking. It will not be a new world after this war. 
It will be a different world." So, what was the basis for a lasting peace? Two things: a 
foundation of settlements and a superstructure to preserve peace. The foundation for 
peace was achieved through the promotion of representative government, the provision of 
economic aid to both friends and foes, and the reduction of trade barriers. On top of this 
foundation should be built a superstructure of peace consisting of three elements: (1) a 
"conditional" period of armistice and settlement of certain urgent problems, (2) an 
intermediate period for economic recovery and the rebuilding of political life, and (3) a 
period of "cooling off' and discussion oflong view problems. Specifically, this 
"superstructure"-spanning all three stages-should include the instant surrender of arms 
and demobilization of all enemy military forces, the repatriation of military prisoners, the 
removal of all blockades, the temporary restoration of prewar commercial treaties, the 
designation of provisional boundaries, the immediate call of freely chosen elective 
bodies, and the building of an international machinery to preserve peace. The problems 
of lasting peace were great, Hoover and Gibson concluded, but in the peacemaking to 
come, the leaders of mankind would have a fleeting chance "to bind the wounds, to 
restore faith, and to bring new hope to the world."s6 
In a major speech in Chicago on 16 December of that year (1942), Hoover expanded 
on his collaboration with Gibson, especially as it related to a "cooling off' or transitional 
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period after the war. "The essence of my proposal," Hoover declared, "is that we have no 
armistice, no general peace conference, such as Versailles. But that we set the peace 
making in two stages.,,87 The first stage was what Hoover called an instant "conditional 
peace." This involved-as he and Gibson had articulated in The Problems of Lasting 
Peace-total disarmament of the enemy, the designation of provisional boundaries of 
nations, the removal of economic blockades, famine and pestilence relief, and the 
immediate call of freely chosen elective constitutional assemblies in the liberated and 
enemy countries. "With these minimums," Hoover asserted, "the world could move 
forward.,,88 The second and final stage in Hoover's "new approach to peace making" 
was "that the world should take time to cool off and work one by one" to find solutions 
for those problems that require time for deliberation, such as disarmament, reparations, 
intergovernmental debts, and the punishment of war crimes. These problems, Hoover 
concluded, "must have time for the cooling of war revenge and hatred. Many of them 
must have time for the development of world opinion and adherence. They should be 
separated from each other for solution and each saved on its merits.,,89 
Hoover's "cooling off' concept was quietly embraced by the Roosevelt 
administration. On 30 May 1942, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles-ten days 
after receiving an advance copy of The Problems of Lasting Peace-distinguished, in a 
widely acclaimed Memorial Day speech at the Arlington National Amphitheatre, between 
(1) immediate, postwar peace concerns and (2) final peace terms to be determined and 
entered into after the passing of a "period of social and economic chaos which will come 
inevitably upon the termination ofthe present war, and after the completion of the initial 
and gigantic task of relief, of reconstruction and of rehabilitation which will confront the 
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[Allies] at the time of the Annistice.,,9o At a press conference the following year, 
Roosevelt himself-without ever acknowledging Hoover-told reporters: 
People are awfully ... immature when they talk about' after the war.' 
They have the idea, because of certain precedents, that when the last shot 
is fired in one area ... there will be an immediate peace conference, or if all 
the areas stop shooting that there will be immediately a peace conference; 
there will be a great treaty signed between all the Nations of the world. 
I think that it is a pretty fair guess to say that there will be a transition 
period [italics added]. You have to remember that most of the world is 
pretty well shell-shocked now ... And I think that for the good of humanity 
perhaps it might be good before we start writing the fair copy of what is 
going to happen later on, that we should catch our breaths ... 
And so I rather look forward to a period of transition between the firing 
of the last shot and the signing of a fonnal agreement or treaty. 
Obviously, there are certain things that will happen during that transition 
period. One of them is the maintenance of peace ... by ... the victors. 91 
Writing to a friend a few days after Roosevelt's remarks, Hoover noted that the President 
had adopted his line, and added with satisfaction that "The newspapers here comment on 
the fact that it is my proposal.,,92 
In u.s. War Aims (1944), famed journalist Walter Lippmann argued that the issue of 
American involvement in world affairs had been settled by U.S. entry into World War II. 
The "period of our unique, effortless security is ended," he wrote. The popular notion 
that the Atlantic Ocean is too wide for an enemy to cross has been exposed as a myth, 
and "the United States has now to be defended, like all the other great states of history, by 
diplomacy, by policy, and by anns.,,93 "Instead of debating the need of any positive 
policy," Lippmann insisted, "we now have to deliberate upon what kind of positive 
policy we need.,,94 A follow-up to his 1943 u.s. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic--
in which Lippmann called for a resurrected Congress of Vienna (including the U.S., 
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Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China) to preserve international order and to serve as 
a nucleus for a more general postwar association of nations-- us. War Aims proposed six 
lines of American policy to establish a long and ordered peace. Overall, the United 
States should (1) consolidate the already existing strategic and diplomatic connections of 
the so-called Atlantic Community, (2) recognize a Russian orbit over Eastern Europe, (3) 
understand that while China will be the center of a third strategic system destined to 
include all of Eastern Asia, it-i.e. the interior of Asia-is far beyond the reach (and 
direct involvement) of the United States, (4) anticipate the creation ofIslamic and Hindu 
regional systems in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, (5) commit itself to the 
extinguishing of the war parties in the Axis nations, and (6) insure that neither Japan nor 
Germany are allowed to hold the balance of power in their respective regions of the 
world. In addition, Lippmann presented a scathing indictment of Wilsonian collective 
security. According to Lippmann, a former Wilson associate, the principles of the late 
Democratic president-outlined in his Fourteen Points speech of 1918-were a series of 
prohibitions grounded on the assumptions that national sovereignty was on the eve of 
yielding to world government. Thus, Wilsonian principles "forbid nation states to do the 
things which they have always done to defend their interests and to preserve their 
integrity.,,95 Though not an opponent of international organizations, Lippmann argued 
that the United States must not repeat the error of counting upon a world organization to 
establish peace. That is the responsibility of the victors. "They cannot delegate this 
responsibility to a world society which does not yet exist or has just barely been 
organized. We must establish peace specifically and directly in the world as we shall find 
it-by maintaining the combined defenses of the Atlantic nations, by continuing the great 
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coalition with the Soviet Union and with China, by making it impossible for Germany 
and Japan to undo the settlement of this war and to separate the victors.,,96 Any universal 
body that should exist must function primarily as a facilitator of intercourse among the 
nations already at peace. "Let us not be so naIve as to think that the great issues of war 
and peace, upon which hands the life of nations, will or can be settled by public debates 
and public voting in an international assembly.,,97 The responsibility for preventing war, 
Lippmann concluded, was with the great military states themselves. There was, he wrote, 
no escape from that reality. 
In How New Will the Better World Be? (1944), Carl L. Becker, Professor Emeritus of 
History at Cornell University, presented another "realistic" and pessimistic view of 
postwar planning. According to Becker, the nation-state is the principal force in the 
modem world. As such, all politics is power politics, and every display of power restores 
the overall balance of power in the world to somebody's favor or to somebody's loss. 
The Second World War, then, was simply the manifestation of power politics being 
played out on a grand scale, and the primary purpose of the Allies in this "game" was to 
retore the balance of power in their favor. Thus, Becker argued, the Allies-in contrast 
to the Axis Powers (who were attempting to establish a new world order)-were fighting 
to preserve the status quo in its fundamentals. Everyone, he wrote, "agrees that the 
United States is fighting to preserve the American way oflife, but what are the 
fundamentals of that way oflife? They are what they have always been since 1789-the 
sovereign political independence ofthe United States; the system of representative 
government as defined in the Constitution: free economic enterprise, and the 
constitutional guarantees of the rights of freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, 
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freedom of religion, and freedom of speech and the press.,,98 Though these freedoms are 
imperfectly realized, and our system of government certainly capable of improvement, it 
is, nevertheless, the system we have. They are the fundamentals ofthe status quo, and 
they are what the United States (and presumably the Allies as a whole) is fighting to 
preserve. In the end, as to the postwar political order, Becker had little faith in "leagues" 
or "federations." They were neither practical nor relevant. Indeed, Becker insisted that 
the League of Nations failed "not for a want of police force to back its decisions, but 
because, in all crucial situations, there were no decisions to be enforced. It failed 
because, being nothing but an agent of the member states, it could do only what the chief 
member states were willing to use it for doing; and in the crucial situations the member 
states were not willing to do what by signing the covenant they had promised to do. ,,99 
Furthermore, the League failed because it was based on a false assumption-i.e. that the 
prevention of war is always a major national interest. Every state, though, engaged in 
World War II was engaged in it because it regarded some things, such as national 
independence in the case of the Allies, as far more important than the prevention of war. 
Finally, the international organization failed because it attempted to transfer political 
power from states that have it to a league of several theoretically equal, but in fact very 
unequal states by covenants and treaties. Such a transfer is impossible. Political power, 
Becker concluded, would remain where it was, lodged chiefly in a few great states; and 
the issue of peace or war would depend, League or no League, upon the conflict of real or 
supposed national interests of these states and the inevitable power politics played by 
them. IOO The balance of power, then, remains the world order, and to prevent future 
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disruptions of it, the Allies in the postwar era must achieve economic unity with each 
other and the world. 
In The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy 
and A Critique of Its Traditional Defense (1944), Reinhold Niebuhr attempted to 
establish an ideological balance between the postwar visions of political realists, such as 
Carl Becker, and of Wilsonian idealists, such as Wendell Willkie. Like Becker, Niebuhr 
had little faith in leagues, police forces, or other international structures. He labeled the 
liberal internationalists, who held an optimistic, if naIve, view of the world and of human 
nature, as "children oflight." This group, he argued, mistakenly believes that the old 
simple universalism (with its moral imperative) and the new technological universalism 
(with its global interdependence) are poised to bring the political institutions of man into 
conformity with it. lOl Thus, the children oflight "think in terms of a possible world 
constitutional convention which would set up the authority and would then call upon the 
nations to subordinate their interests to this new sovereignty." 102 Naively, they 
underestimate the perennial power of particular and parochial loyalties that act as 
restraints on universality. Political realists, meanwhile, are "children of darkness." This 
group, perceiving international relations as a struggle among nations for dominance and 
control, believes that world politics cannot rise higher than the balance of power 
principle. 103 Unlike Becker, Niebuhr did not praise (or accept) power politics as the 
status quo. A balance of power, he observed, is a kind of "managed anarchy," and under 
it, no participant is ever quite satisfied with its own position. "Every center of power will 
seek to improve its position: and every such effort will be regarded by the others as an 
attempt to disturb the equilibrium. There is sufficient mistrust between the great 
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nations ... to make it quite certain that a mere equilibrium between them will not suffice 
to preserve the peace." Niebuhr's alternative vision of the postwar world was a 
compromise and a paradox. The compromise was the development of a genuine, 
democratic, world community resulting in a true world order. The foundations of this 
community (and peace) are mixed. It is a community grounded in a sophisticated, 
children oflight idealism (i.e. one that seeks complete universalism) and a healthy, 
children of darkness realism (i.e. the recognition that power is required in the 
organization of all human communities). The paradox is that, according to Niebuhr, this 
world community can never be achieved. Between the two extremes of the children of 
light and the children of darkness there is only chaos and conflict, and the hope of world 
community. "The world community," Niebuhr concluded, "standing thus as the final 
possibility and impossibility of human life, will be in actuality the perpetual problem as 
well as the constant fulfillment of human hopes.,,104 
Despite their differences in specific fields of postwar order, internationalists shared a 
common faith in international cooperation. "Discussion, arbitration, and conciliation 
were the techniques they believed would banish war from the world. Above all else, they 
worshipped Woodrow Wilson, finding his ideals their deepest convictions and vowing 
that one day they would make his vision of peace and brotherhood a reality. ,,105 
Overall, they were old-stock, white Protestant Americans. They were Anglophiles who 
believed that the u.s. had inherited England's role as arbiter of world affairs. They were 
bankers, lawyers, editors, professors, and ministers. A revival of Woodrow Wilson 
studies coincided with the surge of public support for u.s. entry into some form of world 
association after the war. "The Woodrow Wilson Foundation, almost totally inactive in 
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the 1930s, came to life again during the war. At their twentieth annual board meeting in 
1942, the directors took note of' a nation-wide return to the broad ideals of international 
cooperation and organization presented to the world by Woodrow Wilson.",lo6 That 
same year, the American Council of Public Affairs published a collection of Wilson's 
speeches entitled Wilson's Ideals. In his introduction, editor Saul Padover portrayed 
Wilson as a prophet rejected in his lifetime but vindicated by the present crisis: 
Ifhe had not been defeated in his struggle to secure permanent peace 
and the rights of nations, there would be no Armageddon today. If Wilson 
had not been defeated [by Republicans in the Senate], France would still 
be a nation, and Norway, and Holland, and Czechoslovakia, and Italy 
would be free; Greece would not be a charnel house; Poland would not be 
depopulated; Yugoslavia would not be a shambles. Because Wilson lost 
the battle for peace, millions of men have already died, and millions more 
·11 d· 107 WI yet Ie. 
Yet, Padover concluded, his work was not in vain: "There can be no doubt as to the 
[ military] outcome [of this war], but this time the peace, too, will be won and won 
essentially on the basis of Wilson's ideals. There can be no other durable peace but a 
democratic and cooperative peace, as Wilson had envisioned it."lo8 
The year 1944-with the coming the presidential election and the rise of interest in a 
postwar organization-- witnessed the publication of a number of other Woodrow Wilson 
and League of Nations studies. "Nearly all the authors were sympathetic to Wilson, 
treating him as a man whose tragedy was live before his time.,,]09 A very popular work, 
published at the beginning of the year, was Gerald Johnson's Woodrow Wilson: The 
Unforgettable Figure Who Has Returned to Haunt Us, a pictorial biography that stressed 
the people's failure to understand the prophetic vision of their president. According to 
Johnson, an editorial writer for The Baltimore Sun, Wilson had many faults. He was 
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"arrogant, bullheaded, puritanical, icy, or blistering on occasion, sometimes appearing to 
be self-righteous, frightfully candid, learned, and impatient of ignorance, with a faculty of 
being right in a most irritating way."]]O But that was not all, Johnson concluded: 
If that were all, then Wilson being down would stay down. But he 
doesn't. For the past two years, especially, he has haunted our minds like 
a bad conscience. Americans are thinking and talking of Wilson more 
than they are of some political leaders who consider themselves very 
much alive. Men have begun to examine him again and they find an 
interesting thin. His faults stuck out; they did not drive in. His bitterest 
enemy never called him weak. Ifhe was right, then the rest of us were 
wrong, terribly wrong. Why should Wilson's memory return to trouble us 
in the hour of our agony? We repudiated, dismissed and buried him long 
ago; why will he not stay dead? He will not be dismissed, he will not be 
ignored, he haunts us by night and by day. Is he, in a sense, the 
conscience of America?"]]] 
Then there was J. Eugene Harley's eulogistic Woodrow Wilson Still Lives, which told 
the familiar story of how isolationists frustrated Wilson's postwar vision of international 
cooperation. Harley, a professor of political science at the University of Southern 
California, described Wilson's ideals as "forming' a veritable Rock of Gibraltar' and' a 
strong rallying point for all who think of the days of peace and reconstruction ahead.'" ]]2 
Similarly, Karl Schriftgiesser's hard-hitting and popular biography of Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge-Wilson's Republican nemesis-- entitled The Gentlemanfrom 
Massachusetts, depicted Wilson as a man of vision and principle. Lodge, in contrast, 
was portrayed as "a man filled with a venomous hatred of Wilson," while the defeat of 
the League of Nations in the Senate was treated as "a conspiracy hatched at Theodore 
Roosevelt's sickbed and carried out against the national interest for partisan and personal 
motives."ll3 Early in World War I, Schriftgiesser observed, "Lodge had wanted a 
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League of Nations. When it came, it was the gift of a Democratic President, the gift of a 
man who his closest friend [former President Theodore Roosevelt] deeply hated and for 
whom he himself had built up a hatred equally intense. For that reason, and because he 
wanted to bring back his party into power, he fought to the bitter end.,,114 
Finally, one Wilson book of especial scholarly note was Thomas Bailey's objective 
Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, published in 1944. Bailey, a professor of history at 
Stanford University, criticized Wilson for losing "sight of the distinction between the 
fundamental causes of the war and the possible objectives of peace." 115 At the start of 
the war in Europe in 1914, Bailey observed, Wilson was the leading American 
isolationist, believing, like most Americans, that the war was not the affair of the United 
States. "When events later forced him to change his mind and become the leading 
internationalist, he expected that his isolationist following would change their minds too, 
and march right along behind him.,,116 He was wrong. While he took the lofty step to 
declare that the U.S. was-after April 1917-fighting to make the world safe for 
democracy, most of his countrymen believed they were fighting simply to defeat 
Germany. Wilson, Bailey reasoned, should either have reckoned with that body of public 
sentiment or have educated it. Nothing was to be gained by ignoring it. With Wilson and 
the League of Nations debate as a backdrop, Bailey concluded with seven principles that 
the American people should keep in mind in connection with a general peace at the end 
of World War II: (1) that war aims should be unambiguous, practicable, and acceptable to 
American public opinion; (2) that American public opinion should be educated in 
advance to its responsibilities in world affairs, and more particularly to its responsibilities 
in executing any peace treaty; (3) that the principle of "unconditional surrender" should 
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be imperative; (4) that the American peace commission should be bipartisan; (5) that the 
defeated powers should be privileged to discuss the terms of peace; (6) that no treaty can 
last unless it provides workable machinery for peaceful change in an ever-changing 
world; and (7) that "the victor can have vengeance, or he may have peace, but he cannot 
have both.,,117 
The deceased President made it into not only thousands of pages of print, but also a 
Hollywood film. Darryl F. Zanuck's Oscar-winning screenplay, Wilson (1944), a 
Twentieth Century Fox production, became an immediate and critical success, starring 
Alexander Knox (nominated for an Oscar as "Best Actor") in the lead role. In the film's 
final scene, Wilson stood in the ornate President's Room in the U.S. Capitol Building, 
and bade his cabinet farewell. The date was supposed to be 4 March 1921, Wilson's last 
day in office. A grandfather clock, reading three minutes until noon, ticked loudly in the 
background. Then, John Barton Payne, Secretary of the Interior, approached Wilson, and 
asked: "Mr. President, now that the United States has rejected the League, can we ever 
hope for peace-a real understanding among nations?" Knox's Wilson thoughtfully 
replied: 
Yes. I am not one of those who has the slightest anxiety about the 
eventual triumph of the things I've stood for. The fight has just begun. 
You and I may not live to see it finished, but that doesn't matter. The 
ideals of the League are not dead just because a few obstructive men now 
in the saddle say they are. The dream of a world united against the awful 
wastes of war is too deeply imbedded in the hearts of men everywhere ... 
I'll even make this concession to Providence-it may come about in a 
better way than we proposed. I 18 
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With one minute of the Wilson presidency remaining, Senator Lodge and his Republican 
cohorts then marched into the room, and reported that the sixty-eighth Congress was 
ready to adjourn. Wilson glared at his arch rival, and replied coldly: "The President has 
nothing further to communicate." The clock then struck noon, Wilson slowly exited the 
room, and with "My Country "Tis of Thee" playing in the background, the film credits 
began to roll. Watching a private showing of Wilson at the White House in early 
September 1944, President Roosevelt was inspired. Impressed by some of the quotations, 
he asked aide William Hassett to look them up for future reference in the presidential 
. 119 
campaIgn. 
One of the most substantive postwar plans presented that year was John Foster's 
Dulles's "Six Pillars ofPeace"-a plan that even President Roosevelt privately endorsed 
as "splendid." Dulles's work was especially important considering his role as foreign 
policy advisor for Thomas Dewey, a leading contender for the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1944. The two men had been neighbors in the Woolworth Building in 
New York, for some time, when in May 1937, over lunch, they began a mutually 
beneficial friendship that would last until Dulles's death in the late 1950s. Dulles, aged 
forty-nine in 1937, was the grandson of John Watson Foster, who had served as President 
Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State from 1892 to 1893, and the nephew of Robert 
Lansing, who had served as President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State from 1915 to 
1920. In 1937, Dulles was a law partner at Sullivan and Cromwell, and he informed the 
young prosecutor that the firm's senior litigation man was in poor health and likely to 
leave. Dulles wanted to see him replaced by someone "both youthful and poised, [and] 
capable of top-notch research and courtroom hypnosis"-someone like Dewey. Though 
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Dewey did not take Dulles's job offer-he ran unsuccessfully for governor in 1938 
instead, the two became close associates, and as Dewey contemplated higher national 
office, he sought advice from Dulles on foreign affairs. Though an admirer of Democrat 
Woodrow Wilson, Dulles embraced the young New York Republican, and, in tum, 
Dewey, who was a novice at international politics, "drank deeply from the Dulles CUp.,,120 
Dulles's first book was published in 1939, on the eve of World War II in Europe (and 
Dewey's first presidential bid), and was entitled War, Peace, and Change. Dulles's goal 
was to analyze and understand the origins and nature of war, so as to avoid it. "The war 
system," he wrote, "has long been tolerated. Force was sanctioned as a legitimate and 
indeed primary method of settling international differences and determining changes in 
the domains of the sovereign states. The war system was thus legitimized because force 
is the primitive, natural way of settling differences, and any alternative is hard to find." 
Though the development of modem science, and the experience of World War I, had led 
to a "worldwide" conviction that war was intolerable-as expressed in the founding of 
the League of Nations (1919), and the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1927)-the 
war system still prevailed and all people lived under its menace. Overall, Dulles argued 
that war, at the most basic level, was the result of man's selfishness, which created 
conflicts of desire that force-unless other means were provided-could solve. The 
avoidance of war, he insisted, depended on a proper understanding of peace, which had 
traditionally been misidentified with perpetuating the status quo. That was why the 
League of Nations, for example, had failed. The victors of the Great War, Dulles wrote, 
"conceived of peace as the avoidance of all change, the creation of a situation such that 
they would be left in tranquility to enjoy their existing status ... No thought was given to 
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setting up machinery to effect changes from time to time in those treaties and in those 
international conditions 'whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world. '" 
True peace, then, was "the avoidance of one particularly obnoxious method of change 
[i.e. force] by facilitating a less obnoxious method-that security [i.e. freedom from 
violent attack upon person or property] can be attained only at the price of insecurity [i.e. 
state measures short of force, such as sanctions and open trade, the would deter 
aggression and/or diminish cultural and national barriers].,,121 Dulles concluded by 
offering four general principles to be pursued ifthe elimination of force as the solvent of 
conflicting desires was to be achieved: (1) the restoration of individual reason to its 
proper position of control over human action, (2) the preservation of intellectual freedom, 
(3) the discouragement of exaggerated subservience to one's own state as the sole source 
of economic opportunity, and (4) the securing of elasticity in the treaty structure ofthe 
world. In summary, Dulles's vision of peace was "based on the concept that life is fluid 
and, if civilization is to survive, there must be means of change without war.,,122 
Then, in early 1941, Dulles was named chair of the Federal Council of Churches' 100-
member Commission to Study the Basis of a Just and Durable Peace, and in 1943, he 
fonnulated an ethical "Statement of Political Propositions" upon "which world order 
must be based.,,123 Reflecting Dulles's personal ideology and conviction that "Christians 
should, as citizens, seek to translate their beliefs into realities," the statement's 
"underlying premise was that 'disregard for moral law brings affliction,' and 'we must 
find a way to bring into ordered hannony the interdependent life of the nations.' Its 
underlying purpose was to outline 'six areas within which national interdependence is 
demonstrated, and where, accordingly, international collaboration needs to be 
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organized. ",124 Specifically, these "Six Pillars of Peace" were the culmination of his 
arguments in War, Peace, and Change, and included: (1) organized political 
collaboration (including regional pacts) between the Allies and subsequent regional 
others, (2) multilateral economic agreements based upon liberal trade principles, (3) a 
standing international body to adapt a global peace treaty to changing conditions, (4) the 
promotion ofthe ultimate autonomy of subject peoples, (5) international control of 
annaments, and (6) the international recognition of spiritual and intellectual liberty. 125 
That spring, Dulles presented the "Six Pillars" to President Roosevelt, who professed 
interest in making "some public reference" to it "at some near future date.,,126 Having 
hoped for an immediate endorsement, Dulles was disappointed, and privately railed 
against the Roosevelt administration's lack of "competence to deal with the problem of 
bringing this war to an acceptable end and making quick and orderly transition to some 
better post-war order." 127 
The newly elected Governor of New York also endorsed the principles of the Six 
Pillars, and believed Dulles's plan to be the best model for postwar international 
cooperation and the maintenance of the future peace. Writing to Alf Landon that June, 
Dewey worried (from a practical perspective) that Republicans were, on foreign policy, at 
least, emitting signals in all directions, and thus bewildering the American public. 128 
"From the people 1 see of all kinds all over the country," the Governor wrote, "I think 
there is a very unfortunate and yet genuine confusion about the position of the 
Republican Party in international affairs.,,129 It was time, he believed-ifthe GOP was to 
be competitive in the next year's presidential election-- for Republicans to unite and 
articulate a single, internationalist vision of postwar American foreign policy. 
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Democratic Politics 
The early 1940s marked a low point in the Roosevelt administration. The war was 
going badly, and on the home front the President seemed unable to effectively and 
efficiently handle domestic affairs. In a January 1943 Gallup survey, 60% responded that 
they were dissatisfied with the way the government had conducted the war effort at home 
the previous year. Complaints included: "Should have shown more foresight and acted 
sooner on rationing of scarce goods," "Should have tightened up government efficiency," 
"should have dealt more firmly with labor unions and strikes," and "should have given 
the public more information about war problems-less 'sugar coating' of bad news." 
Indeed, Roosevelt's efforts at mobilizing the economy for war-through the creation of 
new (and bickering) "alphabet agencies," and the implementation of wage restrictions 
and price controls-only alienated voters (especially farmers and industrial workers), and 
resulted in dramatic losses for his party in the 1942 midterm elections. "Everywhere we 
have gone," one reporter later observed, "the one complaint of the kindred souls that we 
find is that the Democratic organization is shot to hell, and that the caliber of the local 
candidates who are running as Democrats is slightly less than zero-zero. The day where 
they can ride in on Roosevelt's shirt-tails has gone ... I want to vote for Roosevelt [in 
1944], but ifhe is elected my recommendation is this: he ought to fire everybody below 
the rank of vice president and start again ... [T]here is too much dead wood around 
Washington after 12 years ... [I]fhe is going to secure his place in the history books at the 
page where he is in my book, he had damned well better clean house and get some new 
blood.,,13o 
64 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Though Democrats maintained their majorities in both houses of Congress, 
Republicans gained forty-seven seats in the House of Representatives (reducing the 
Democratic majority to only nine seats), and added seven seats in the Senate (leaving 
Democrats with a working majority of twenty-one). As the Seventy-Ninth Congress 
convened in January 1943, Roosevelt faced serious challenges to his leadership. The 
narrowness of Democratic majorities in the new Congress allowed Republicans and 
conservative southern Democrats (who filled more than half ofthe Democratic seats in 
Congress) to join forces and dominate the legislative agenda. Throughout 1943, 
Congress fiustrated and defeated much of the administration's domestic agenda. As 1944 
approached, the Democratic Party was becoming increasingly fragmented over both 
domestic and foreign policy concerns. The main lines of contention were drawn 
between Southern conservatives and Northern liberals over civil rights, war mobilization, 
the New Deal, postwar international order, and the power of organized labor and its role 
in the party. 
While Executive Order 8802 and the publication of What the Negro Wants and An 
American Dilemma buoyed African-American hopes (and encouraged them toward 
further activism), many white Democratic leaders in the South were angry and alanned. 
Then, in the summer of 1944, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. 
Allwright, that the Democratic white primary in the South was unconstitutional. 
Although the Constitution prohibited states from denying the vote on account of race, 
white southerners, since the end of Reconstruction in the 1870s, had advanced the theory 
that the Democratic Party was a private association, and as such, could discriminate in 
any way it chose. 131 Since there was no substantive Republican presence in the South, 
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the Democratic primary functioned as the election, and as a result, the Court ruled, was in 
violation ofthe Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Allwright, 
V.O. Key observed in 1949, "precipitated a crisis in southern politics." "It is obvious," 
fonner Alabama Governor Frank Dixon anxiously wrote his state party chainnan, "that 
the only thing that has held the Democratic Party together in the South for many years 
past has been the thing which caused its strength in the first place, namely, white 
supremacy ... [Now], through forced registration of negroes in this state, the Democratic 
Party will become anathema to white people in the South." In Arkansas, Governor 
Homer Adkins, reaffinned that the Democratic Party was a white man's party, and called 
upon the state party to change its rules in order to circumvent the Court's decision. 
Mississippi Congressman John Rankin, meanwhile, "warned legislators in his state to 
take action against the 'communistic drive ... to destroy white supremacy in the 
South.",132 Not surprisingly, one immediate impact of the Court's decision was an 
interjection of race into the political campaigns of I 944-especially among the 
Democrats who had been "progressive" in the past. Another impact was a short-lived 
challenge to FDR's nomination to a fourth tenn, as represented by the "Texas Regulars," 
who in the summer of 1944 temporarily took control of the state's Democratic 
organization. The Regulars not only resented Smith, but also (and more importantly) the 
administration's efforts at war mobilization, which, critics claimed, encouraged big 
government, higher taxes, and bureaucratic inefficiency and waste. Roosevelt, however, 
was too popular-with an 80% Gallup approval rating in the region in 1943-to lose the 
South. As a young navy pilot named George Bush observed in letter home to his family 
the following September, "The southern boys will support Roosevelt. The ones I've 
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talked with seem to think he's some sort of a god-I don't believe they look too closely 
at what the New Deal administration has done or has not done.,,]33 
Another area where Democrats were divided was in war mobilization. In the fall of 
1943, Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia published a small article in American Magazine 
entitled "Are We Losing Our Freedom?" In it, Byrd introduced three families 
representative of America at large: the Joneses, the Johnsons, and the Smiths. These 
families are patriotic, hawkish, and law-abiding, Byrd wrote, but "now they're becoming 
alarmed. .. They expected to find the war effort a well-oiled machine driven by 
competent operators, with a minimum of waste and bungling ... But almost every time 
they corne in contact with it-and that means almost every hour in the day-they 
discover that, as far as it applies to civilians, at least, the machine isn't well oiled, the 
cogwheels don't mesh, and it is being driven by a horde of experimenters all wanting to 
go in different directions.,,]34 Journalist David Hinshaw echoed the Virginia Senator in a 
book entitled The Home Front. Hinshaw argued that the President and his administration 
were to blame for the Democrats' losses in the 1942 midterms. Though Roosevelt was a 
great champion for democracy, and a gallant leader who gave of himself unsparingly, 
official indecision, incompetence, and poor organization combined to convince the 
people the neither he nor the officials closest to him knew a great deal about how to 
organize the nation for the war or how effectively to direct its war program, especially in 
the area of agriculture. According to Hinshaw, American farmers were hit hard by the 
war and by incompetent government bureaucrats, who suffered from a "surplus 
psychology," and who thus tied farmers' hands with limitations on labor and 
machinery-resulting, ultimately, in a limitation of farmers' capacity to produce. The 
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decline of farm labor was linked to a mass exodus from the farm to the factory, as a result 
of the administration's bargains with labor over higher salaries. The drafting of young 
farm boys into the service at incredibly high rates also dealt a significant blow to farm 
labor needs. Meanwhile, farmers felt undermined by a lack of farm equipment parts, 
which the administration failed to provide in a timely manner, and a lack of gasoline, 
which the government continued to ration, to run that equipment. 135 
Democrats (and the American Left, in general) were also divided in the area of foreign 
policy. Though, as discussed earlier, liberals were in general agreement on the war and 
internationalism-that is, they believed in the war effort and in an active role for America 
in the postwar era-they were becoming increasingly divided over what the world should 
like after the defeat of the Axis Powers. For example, to those on the left such as Henry 
Wallace and the editors of The Nation and The New Republic, the war offered America a 
chance to establish a New Deal for the world-an opportunity, as the Vice President 
described it in the spring of 1941, to organize the postwar world around "the eradication 
of human suffering and poverty.,,136 To others, such as Earl Browder, leader of the 
American Communist Party, the war-and especially FDR's "good will" statements at 
the Tehran Conference in November 1943-offered legitimacy for communists in the 
American political process. "Emerging from these friendly conferences [with the Soviet 
Union, China, and Great Britain]," Roosevelt declared at Tehran, "we look with 
confidence to the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by 
tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences. We carne here 
with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose." 1 37 
Browder, as he wrote in Teheran and America (1944), believed this communique meant 
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that the capitalist democracies had finally agreed "to accept the Soviet Union 'as a 
permanent member ofthe family of nations,' abandoning once and for all their hopes for 
its destruction.,,138 Furthermore, Browder saw it as an opportunity for the Marxist 
minority in the United States to be accepted, and to be allowed to collaborate actively 
with the democratic majorities in the country. "Our post-war plan," Browder wrote, "is 
national unity for the realization of the perspectives laid down in Teheran.,,139 The 1944 
presidential election provided the American Communists, they believed, with their first 
opportunity to partner with "progressives" as legitimate players in American politics. 
They were wrong. In fact, such misreading of the American mind led to a reaction of 
others also on the Left who viewed communists in general and the Soviet Union in 
particular, as the major threats to postwar peace and security. Once again, as the 1944 
elections approached, Republicans sensed an opportunity for gain. 
Then, during a press conference in December 1943, the President announced that the 
New Deal slogan was no longer relevant, and that what was needed was a "Dr. Win-the-
War." When pressed later by reporters to explain the comment, Roosevelt added that Dr. 
New Deal had treated an internally sick nation during the Depression. After Pearl 
Harbor, Dr. Win-the-War had to be consulted to fight a new crisis, a external infection 
that threatened the nation's very survival. 140 Liberals, though not entirely shocked, were 
outraged. Public reaction, meanwhile, was also less than enthusiastic. In a confidential 
report to Roosevelt in early 1944, Samuel Rosenman informed the President that most 
Americans supported a federal commitment of full employment and to expand social 
security programs. Furthermore, many in the administration believed that Democratic 
losses in the 1942 midterms were the result of lack of interest among Democratic voters, 
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and that an abandonment of the New Deal, even as a slogan, could generate greater 
electoral apathy in 1944. 
Roosevelt, however, was a very pragmatic politician, and not a starry-eyed theorist. 
He was, as he himself noted in his 1932 Looking Forward, interested in applying what 
worked to solve a particular problem at hand. In 1933, during the dark days of the Great 
Depression, the New Deal was his tool. By the early 1940s, however, the United States 
was not in an economic depression, but a global war, and "Dr. New Deal" was not 
equipped to handle that crisis. The Second World War required an all-out Allied victory, 
and thus the emergence of what Roosevelt called "Dr. Win-the-War," characterized by 
military construction, troop deployments, and wartime domestic controls. Though he 
never articulated it as such, Roosevelt implied-even in his December 1943 news 
conference-that once the war had been won, there would need to be a new Dr. to handle 
the postwar period-a "Dr. Keep-the-Peace," perhaps, to practice preventive health care 
within the international system. The New Deal was not dead during the war, just 
dormant, and by all indications, Roosevelt planned to incorporate it into a postwar 
atmosphere of peace. Indeed, in early 1944, during his State of the Union Address, he 
unveiled what one historian has called the "Second Bill of Rights." 
On 11 January 1944, President Roosevelt delivered his Eleventh Annual Message to 
Congress in absentia. For the first time since 1913, when Woodrow Wilson restored the 
practice of the President appearing before a joint session of Congress in person, the 
President did not deliver the State of the Union address in person. Roosevelt, struggling 
with the flu and under doctor's order's to stay in the White House, sent a paper copy to 
Capitol Hill instead. Then, at 9:00 p.m., the President-fearing that the newspapers 
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would not give the undelivered speech full attention - read his message to the nation over 
the radio. He was, the President explained to his listeners, under doctor's orders to rest 
and remain indoors. In what was perhaps the most radical speech his presidency, he 
argued that "true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and 
independence. 'Necessitous men are not free men,'" he said. "People who are hungry 
and out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are made." The President then 
articulated a "second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity 
can be established for all-regardless of station, race, or creed." It included the right to a 
useful and vital job; the right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation; the right of fanners to raise and sell their products for a decent return; the 
right of businessmen to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and 
domination by monopolies at home or abroad; the right of every family to a comfortable 
home; the right of all to adequate medical care; the right to adequate protection from the 
economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; and the right to a good 
education. These rights, he insisted, spelled security, and after the war must be 
implemented. "America's own rightful place in the world depends in large part upon 
how fully these and similar rights have been carried into practice for our citizens. For 
unless there is security here at home there cannot be lasting peace in the world.,,141 With 
this bold and high-minded speech, Roosevelt, subtly but surely, kicked off his bid for a 
fourth tenn. Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win-the-War had become one. 
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The Republican Party 
The Republican Party ofthe early 1940s was a party divided and in disarray. One 
problem facing the party as 1944 approached, was that it had not elected a national ticket 
for sixteen years~not since 1928 and Herbert Hoover's victory over Al Smith. Saddled 
with the blame for the Great Depression, and unable to articulate a clear and positive 
vision for economic recovery, Republicans witnessed their power and majority status 
diminish at all levels of government throughout the 1930s. The election of Democrat 
Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932 marked the end of decades of Republican 
electoral dominance, and the beginning of a Democratic majority that would last twenty 
years. Republicans were repudiated, disheartened, and divided. Writing in the New 
York Herald Tribune shortly before Roosevelt's landslide victory in the 1936 presidential 
election, Walter Lippmann observed: 'There are as yet no signs that the Republican party 
has found an issue on which it can unite. In fact, there are many signs which indicate that 
the schism which rent it in 1912, was healed in 1920, and broke out again in 1932, is 
deeper than ever.,,142 When the Seventy-fifth Congress convened in early 1937, only 
seventeen Republicans sat in the Senate, and eighty-nine in the House of 
Representatives. 143 Unfamiliar with minority status, frustrated Republican leaders often 
stumbled into political errors, further undermining both party morale and public support. 
Though the party had improved by the end of the decade, it was due less to its own 
political ingenuity than to Democratic blunders and infighting. 144 After all, the late 1930s 
were marked by Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan (1937), the "Roosevelt recession" 
(1937-1938), and the beginning of World War II in Europe (1939). Nevertheless, in 
72 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
those years of Democratic victories, many Republican voters had died and little effort had 
been made to acquaint new voters with the basic ideals of the party. In fact, as political 
scientist Samuel Lubell noted in the 1950s, Republicans had long been laboring on the 
wrong side of the national birthrate. During the 1930s, twenty-one million people 
reached voting age, the majority of whom were children of the immigrant poor. Their 
parents had come to the United States some twenty-eight million strong between 1890 
and 1914, and had settled in Atlantic seaboard cities and habitually voted Democratic. 
These urban minorities had received little support from Republicans in the 1920s, and 
when their children came of age-coupled with the Great Depression-assured the GOP 
a decade of political aridity. 145 
Another problem facing the GOP by the early 1940s was a lack of serious and popular 
direction. Out of power at all levels Republicans did not have a single leader or voice the 
way Democrats did in the person ofthe President ofthe United States, and thus they 
descended into factionalism with congressional leaders and presidential contenders all 
espousing rival agendas, both foreign and domestic. The only leader closely associated 
with the party was the nation's only living ex-president, the unpopular Herbert Hoover. 
Then there was the problem of Franklin Roosevelt himself. Roosevelt was one of the 
most talented politicians in American history. Republicans could not match his political 
wits, and they did not know how to deal with "That Man." He was elected with 57% of 
the vote in 1932; a record-breaking 60.8% in 1936; and 55% in his successful bid for an 
unprecedented third term in office in 1940. And it seemed as ifhe would never go away. 
Indeed, Roosevelt was seeking a fourth term in 1944. 
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Also, the United States was at war, and the American people-previously divided 
over whether or not the U.S. should support the Allies in the Second World War-rallied 
together with a total commitment to a "no end save victory" over Japan and its Axis 
partners. Republicans, then, faced the dilemma of being the opposition party in a time of 
war. That status required a delicate balance between the expression of patriotism and 
support of the war on the one hand, and the display of constructive criticism and political 
relevance on the other. After Pearl Harbor, many Republicans saw the war as a possible 
threat to their existence, and believed that the Democrats would try to use the patriotic 
and unified spirit across the country to their political advantage. A nationwide speech by 
the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Edward J. Flynn, in February 1942, 
seemed to confirm this suspicion. 
Flynn charged that Republicans were "not as much interested in the war as ... [in] 
controlling the House of Representatives." 146 "[M]y feeling," he continued, "is that this 
crisis having occurred during a Democratic administration ... is ours to direct ... to an 
ultimate and complete victory." Looking ahead to the November midterm elections, 
Flynn added: "I naturally feel that no misfortune except a major military defeat could 
befall this country to the extent involved in the election of a Congress hostile to the 
President. .. We have not forgotten the obstacles thrown in the path of President Wilson 
after the first World War and the ultimate victims were people.,,147 Republicans were 
outraged by Flynn's comments. Joe Martin, Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, accused the DNC chairman of "seeking a one-party system, and of wanting 
to 'liquidate' the Republican opposition.,,148 "Republicans," he said, "will continue to 
give President Roosevelt one hundred per cent support to win the war. We will continue 
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to put national safety above partisanship. Despite abuse or vilification ... we will stand 
by the American right to offer any constructive appraisal or suggestion.,,149 Four days 
after Flynn's speech, Roosevelt reprimanded the committee chairman, telling reporters: 
"When a country is at war we want Congressmen, regardless of party~get that~to back 
up the Government of the United States." 
Still, what should Republicans do? How far should their members of Congress accept 
blindly the measures presented and the powers and funds requested by the 
administration? How far should they surrender their own views to hasten any war 
program approved by the President? Speaking on the floor of the Senate a few days after 
Pearl Harbor, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, argued: "I believe there can be 
no doubt that criticism in time of war is essential to the maintenance of any kind of 
democratic government... Of course, that criticism should not give any information to 
the enemy. But too many people desire to suppress criticism simply because they think 
that it will give some comfort to the enemy to know that there is such criticism ... 
Congress does have the job of reasonable criticism. I think it has the job of criticizing the 
conduct of the war when it is properly subject to criticism. [For example], the surprise at 
Hawaii should, in my opinion, be investigated by committees of Congress, and not left 
entirely to the executive department." 150 A few months later, former President Herbert 
Hoover echoed Taft's sentiment in a speech before the Annual Assembly of the National 
Industrial Conference Board, Inc., in N ew York City. According to Hoover, "Criticism 
of the conduct of the war may rightly lead to criticism of public officials. In a democracy 
even the President is not immune from rightful criticism ... Patriotism is not devotion to 
public servant. It is devotion to our country and its right aims. No public servant can be 
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free of criticism if democracy is to continue to live.,,151 Hoover's speech was well-
received from many quarters, and was, at Senator Taft's initiative, printed in the 
Congressional Record. 152 
Finally, Republicans suffered from an identity crisis-particularly as it related to 
foreign policy. Though isolationism-- defined variously as "antipathy toward Europe and 
things European (particularly military alliances, power politics, and wars), belief in the 
invulnerability and suzerainty of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, [and] a 
fervidly nationalistic desire to preserve American freedom of action"-cut across party 
lines, it was most widely associated with the Republican Party.153 It had been 
Republicans who led the fight against Woodrow Wilson's beloved League of Nations 
after World War I, and it had been Republicans in the years immediately prior to Pearl 
Harbor, who were the most vocal "noninterventionists" and members of such 
"isolationist" organizations as America First. That did not mean, of course, that all, or 
even most, within the GOP were isolationists-they were not. Still, as with most other 
issues, Republicans were divided along several, fine lines when it came to foreign policy. 
First, there were the staunch isolationists-those like New York Congressman Hamilton 
Fish and New Mexico Congresswoman Ruth McCormick Simms-who opposed 
American involvement in world affairs on the grounds that national interconnections, if 
unordered by political authority, lead inevitably to war. Many isolationists, even after 
Pearl Harbor, never fully reconciled themselves to American military involvement in the 
Second World War. Furthermore, they were all opposed to any kind of revived or 
rejuvenated postwar "league of nations." 
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Second, there were those Republicans like former President Hoover, who favored 
American participation in world affairs-and who even before Pearl Harbor had begun 
considering "the kind of world organization toward which we should all work after the 
war"-but who had opposed American intervention into World War II before Pearl 
Harbor. This group of "noninterventionists" genuinely believed that the U.S. would be 
able to achieve greater influence on future peace if it remained out of the war. They were 
not isolationists in the strictest sense, and after Pearl Harbor, this group immediately 
expressed support for both the President and the war effort. As Michigan Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg, a symbol of "isolationism" in the U.S. Senate, later observed, "My 
convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took 
firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for 
1· ,.154 any rea 1St. . 
Finally, there were those within the party who, in early 1941, had endorsed 
Roosevelt's Lend-Lease plan for assisting the Allies, and accepted the growing likelihood 
that the United States would be required to enter the war. Furthermore, these Republican 
"internationalists" sought to "convince Americans to join a world peace organization and 
thereby promote equality among all peoples, regardless of race, color, or nationality." 1 55 
Specifically, most in this group advocated (1) the immediate creation of an Allied 
organization to address war problems, and (2) the transformation of that Allied 
organization into a world state to settle postwar problems, and to keep future peace. Led 
by Wendell Willkie, the party's unsuccessful nominee for President in 1940, they were 
described by their more conservative critics as "Republican Pollyannas who want to 
compete with Henry Wallace.,,156 Principled, ambitious, tactless, and a former Democrat, 
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Willkie alienated many Republicans in the spring of 1942, with his refusal to forgive past 
noninterventionist stands, and to categorize all Republicans who had disagreed with the 
Roosevelt foreign policy as "isolationists." Delivering the commencement address at 
Union College in May 1942, the Hoosier-with an eye toward the approaching midterm 
elections-called upon the graduates to "choose leaders who have principles and the 
courage to state them plainly. Not men who examine each shift of sentiment and watch 
the polls of public opinion to learn where they stand. I beg of you, vote for straight-out 
men-not wobblers.,,157 
Willkie was especially critical of New York gubernatorial candidate, Thomas E. 
Dewey, whom the above Union College remarks were no doubt directed toward. 
Willkie's dislike of Dewey was grounded in two things. First, he distrusted Dewey's 
recent conversion to internationalism, and believed the former District Attorney would 
become a rallying point for isolationists after the war. And second, Willkie wanted to 
become the Republican nominee for President in 1944, and he viewed Dewey as his chief 
rival. Like any other contender, he sought to discredit and eliminate possible threats to 
his candidacy. As a matter of fact, Willkie's foreign policy views were not that different 
from Dewey, Hoover, and Landon. Certainly, he was more of an idealist, but he was no 
more of an internationalist. Willkie genuinely wanted to reform the Republican Party, 
and he desperately wanted to become President. His passion, mixed with his ambition 
and his poor political skills, combined to distance him from those who were actually 
quite close to him on most issues. 
Thomas Dewey was a very cautious politician, whose views on foreign policy had in 
fact developed significantly since 1940. Yet, as one historian observed, "he was too 
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proud and too much a partisan to do public penance for past [isolationist] misjudgments. 
As well, he accurately assessed that discussion of foreign policy was still a perilous 
balancing act for any Republican with national ambitions. Because the GOP was a 
minority party, a politician could ill-afford alienating factions of the Party by speaking 
out on each facet of diplomacy as it emerged.,,158 Thus, he was annoyed by Willkie's 
constant sniping in the spring of 1942, and believed the Hoosier was attempting to comer 
him on the issues, and sabotage his gubernatorial campaign--if not blatantly challenge 
him for the office. 159 In fact, on 30 June 1942, Dewey composed an anonymous, and 
ultimately unsent, letter to Willkie, in which he "criticized the 1940 nominee for his 'dog 
in the manger' attitude toward Dewey. The letter warned that now Willkie was a 
candidate again, he would have to defend certain 'isolationist statements' made in 1940. 
'I think that most people would like to forget about the past,' the letter continued, 'but 
you have set the standard for looking backward.' The letter ended by urging Willkie to 
stay out of the New York race. 'Most of your real friends would deplore a contest 
between you and Mr. Dewey. You are working for the same ends ... unity in the war and 
the building of a better world after the victory. ",160 As it turned out, Willkie did not 
challenge Dewey for governor. Instead, the former party standard bearer in the fall of 
1942, departed the country on a fifty-day journey around the world. 
Most Republicans were noninterventionists, and after Pearl Harbor, they resented 
criticism from officials within the Roosevelt administration, as well as among Willkie 
Republicans, that they had been "isolationists." On 20 May 1942, Hoover, in his first 
major speech after U.S. entry into the war, warned against intolerance: 
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There are a number of varieties of intolerance. One cult 
undoubtedly believes that outside the obvious alien enemy agents 
and crackpots ... there is a group of Americans somewhere in some 
dark comer who want defeat. I have not heard a single sane 
American who wants defeat. They want victory. 
But the national gunning for this phantasmagoria has taken too 
much ground. The high priests of this cult have concluded that all 
those who were opposed to war before Pearl Harbor cannot 
possibly be patriotic Americans ever. Or at least they are under 
suspicion as being appeasers, compromisers, various obnoxious 
bipeds, reptiles, and Cliveden sets, Nazis sympathizers and Sixth 
Columnists. Yet 75 per cent of the American people were opposed 
to the war before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless this 75 
per cent who are now in outer darkness are willingly sacrificing 
their sons, their brothers, their husbands, and they are working and 
. . h ,,]6] paymg WIt out murmur. 
After the speech, Hoover privately observed that it had raised the hair of those who had 
organized for the midterm elections to defeat all Republican Representatives and 
Senators who had been pre-Pearl Harbor noninterventionists. "This group," Hoover 
complained, "is an unnatural combination of the reactionaries and the left-wingers who, 
for entirely different points of view, worked to get the country into war-and want a 
I f .. ,,]62 monopo yo patnotIsm now. 
Communicating closely with Hoover on party affairs, especially as it related to foreign 
policy, was AlfLandon of Kansas, the unsuccessful Republican nominee for President in 
1936. Like Hoover, the former Kansas Governor expressed concern over the "ridiculous 
charge that the Republican party is isolationist." In a nationally-broadcast Flag Day 
address in 1943, Landon sought to lay that accusation to rest. He called "for open 
discussion ofthe non-military aspects of United States foreign policy and congressional 
minority representation in the formulation ofthat policy.,,]63 More importantly, he 
outlined, in a very similar fashion to Hoover and Gibson, a "realistic" postwar plan for 
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peace. According to Landon, representatives of the Allies "should, for several years after 
the war, sit as 'an interim world council' to supervise punishment of war criminals, 
disarmament and political reconstruction of enemy countries, restoration of world-trade 
relations, and famine relief. Such a council should also set up commissions to consider 
plans for better international economic relations, for the government of undeveloped 
lands, for machinery to ensure a lasting peace, for world disarmament, and 'for 
international recognition of the principle of religious liberty and for the autonomy of 
nations.' He also urged that the United States soon recognize the desirability of some 
form of 'permanent international organization' ... for achieving ... the prevention of 
conflicts between nations.,,164 
Willkie, Hoover, and Landon, of course, were not the only Republicans speaking and 
writing about foreign policy in the early war years. Harold Stassen, Governor of 
Minnesota and presidential contender, unveiled, in March 1943, a plan that also 
embraced the creation of an association of sovereign nations. This body, Stassen 
proposed, should be organized as a single-house Parliament, and devoted to, among other 
things, establishing a world code of justice, and building a "United Nations Legion," 
consisting of air, naval, and land forces capable of enforcing the code of justice, 
supporting the administration of international areas, and insuring the continued 
disarmament of probationary areas. 165 Meanwhile, Clarence Budington Kelland, 
Republican National Committeeman from Arizona, outlined his own plan for postwar 
American security-a blueprint The Nation blasted as a "post-war America First."]66 
Kelland's so-called "Zones of Safety Plan" called for postwar regional pacts, a "concord 
among the victor nations" to maintain the peace, and the building of a five-ocean navy. 
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Though he spoke frequently of "international collaboration," Kelland nowhere mentioned 
or embraced the concept of world organization. 
With the GOP "emitting signals in all directions" on foreign policy issues, Harrison 
Spangler, the newly elected Republican National Committee Chairman, announced in 
May 1943, that a foreign policy conference was to be held that fall on Mackinac Island in 
Lake Michigan. 167 The origins ofthe Mackinac Conference were grounded in the 
formation, in May 1943, of a pro-Willkie, anti-isolationist, extra-party organization called 
the Republican Post-war Policy Association. Not wanting to be upstaged, and fearing 
disunity on foreign policy as the 1944 presidential election approached, Spangler-a 
friendly acquaintance of Dewey, who had been a compromise choice as chairman--
invited forty-nine Republican congressmen, governors (including Thomas Dewey), and 
RNC members. Wendell Willkie, who did not hold public office, was not invited, and 
neither were Senators Joseph Ball of Minnesota and Harold Burton of Ohio, both of 
whom had been advocating the creation of a United Nations Organization for months. 168 
The task of drafting a foreign policy model to be presented at Mackinac fell to Senator 
Vandenberg. "I am hunting for the middle ground," Vandenberg wrote a friend, 
"between those extremists at one end of the line who would cheerfully give America 
away and those extremists at the other end of the line who would attempt a total isolation 
which has come to be an impossibility." 169 Vandenberg's advance resolution was 
submitted to Dewey, and a few others, for review before the conference began in early 
September. Dewey carefully scrutinized the proposals, urging Vandenberg to "use more 
specific language when discussing Republican obligations toward future world peace.,,170 
Overall, Vandenberg's plan, approved by the Mackinac Conference on 8 September, 
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followed closely the Senator's own resolution then before the Senate. Overall, the 
Mackinac Declaration called for "responsible participation by the United States in a post-
war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and 
to offer permanent peace with organized justice in a free world [italics added].,,]7] 
Writing to Vandenberg after the conference, Dewey congratulated the Senator "on a great 
job of conciliating the divergent views not only of your committee but ofthe whole 
Council ... The Party should be grateful to you indeed for a major contribution to its 
welfare as well as that of the country.,,172 Even Willkie called it "a very distinct step in 
the right direction.,,173 The Republican Party was now on record, with the war still in 
progress, as supporting the principle of international organization. As historian Robert 
Divine noted in the early 1970s, "It was the most important step yet taken toward 
American involvement in a future international organization.,,]74 
The United Nations, the Holocaust, and Postwar Germany 
While Republicans articulated a postwar foreign policy at Mackinac in 1943, the 
Roosevelt administration continued to struggle with developing its own detailed and 
long-range plan for the postwar world. One obstacle to creating an early plan was the 
administration's fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union to the point that it made a separate 
peace with Germany. Another problem for the White House was public opinion, and the 
concern that any attempt to define a consistent and feasible pattern of war objectives 
might undermine domestic unity and the prosecution ofthe war. Shortly after Pearl 
Harbor, the State Department, led by Cordell Hull of Tennessee, was assigned the task of 
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developing concrete war aims-including considerations not only of world organization, 
but also treatment of the defeated Axis Powers. In regards to world organization, Hull, a 
neo-Wilsonian internationalist and sure-footed devotee to collective security who wanted 
to avoid the mistakes of 1919 and 1920, established in early 1942 the Advisory 
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to formulate a blueprint for peace and to help 
generate a public opinion favorable to the idea of world organization. It included 
representatives from the State, War, Navy, Treasury, and Agriculture Departments, the 
White House, the Board of Economic Warfare, the general public, and both Democrats 
and Republicans in Congress. Hull, however, continued to move cautiously, focusing 
not on specific plans, but on educating the American people on the merits of any such 
international body. 
Meanwhile, on 14 March 1943, Republican Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, 
introduced in the U.S. Senate the bipartisan Ball-Burton-Hatch-Hill Resolution 
("B2H2"), which called for "an organization of the United Nations" with authority "to 
provide for the assembly and maintenance of a United Nations military force and to 
suppress by immediate use of such force any future attempt at military aggression by any 
nation.,,175 Without input and leadership from the White House-Roosevelt was not as 
enthusiastic about collective security as Hull-and with both Democrats and Republicans 
divided along several ideological lines, the resolution soon stalled. Then, on 21 
September 1943, shortly after Republicans met at Mackinac, the U.S. House of 
Representatives overwhelmingly passed the Fulbright Resolution, named after freshman 
Arkansas Democrat, J. William Fulbright, expressing support for the creation of 
"appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a 
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just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring the participation of 
the United States therein. 176 In early November the Senate finally followed suit and 
passed a similar United Nations resolution, the Connally Resolution-- named after its 
sponsor, Democrat Tom Connally of Texas-that recognized "the necessity of there 
being established at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to 
membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.,,177 In both the House and Senate resolutions-as well as in the subsequent 
joint resolution-the supporters of B2H2 failed to secure explicit reference to military 
force. For his part, Ball was determined to make it a central issue in the upcoming 
presidential campaign. 
Franklin Roosevelt, though an "internationalist" and public supporter of collective 
security rhetoric, never had any intention of limiting U.S. freedom of action within the 
context of a postwar collective security organization. 178 According to political scientist 
Willard Range, Roosevelt held few deep convictions regarding the details or structure of 
the machinery of collective security. 179 His chief interest and goal was cooperative action 
by states for the maintenance of peace, and not the search for proper vehicles and method 
to apply that principle. He was, nevertheless, willing to accept almost anything in the 
way of machinery so long as it produced the desired end of cooperative action. Thus, he 
allowed Hull and Democrats in Congress to proceed with a United Nations plan in 1943 
and 1944. Roosevelt's own cooperative preference, however, remained traditional 
balance of power, spheres-of-interest, realpolitik. As he revealed publicly at Tehran in 
December 1943, the President wanted Big Power guardianship over not only the policing 
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of the defeated Axis Powers but also all important postwar decisions. Specifically, he 
envisioned the world divided into four spheres of influence each dominated and policed 
by its most powerful resident-Great Britain, China, the United States, and the Soviet 
Union. 
Another foreign policy problem facing the Roosevelt administration by 1944 was the 
question of postwar Germany. Would it, as Gerald Swope, president of General Electric 
and a friend ofFDR, suggested in aNew York Times article in September 1943, be 
broken up, slapped with economic controls, and purged of it "Prussian military clique"? 
Or, would it, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull envisioned, be unified and have a strong, 
self-supporting economy that would help "restore sanity to its society and empower the 
rebuilding of Europe"? Franklin Roosevelt believed himself to have a special 
understanding of German politics and psychology. As historian Michael Beschloss noted 
in a recent study on this subject, no other American President had had more early 
experience on German soil than FDR. As a youth, his family traveled to Germany 
frequently, even enrolling him in a local school to learn the language. In 1901, he and his 
mother had tea with Wilhelm II aboard the Kaiser's yacht. Then, in 1919, shortly after 
World War I, Roosevelt, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy once again returned to 
Germany, this time with his wife, Eleanor, to visit the ancient fortress at Ehrenbreitstein 
on the Rhine and Mosel Rivers. This "education" had deeply influenced the President. 
According to Beschloss, he believed that "the Germans were a 'misguided' people 
'subjected to the rule ofa [Prussian] military caste' and 'led along a path they could not 
understand. '" Like the author of Is Germany Incurable?, a popular book published in 
1943 by New York psychiatrist Richard Brickner, Roosevelt believed German society to 
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be "paranoid" and "megalomaniac." In late 1943, the President told Hull that Germany 
should be divided into three or more states with Prussia-which he incorrectly perceived 
to be great haven for Nazism-totally disarmed and completely isolated. Of those closest 
to President, Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, a secular Jew and longtime 
friend and Hyde Park neighbor ofFDR, had perhaps the most influence with the 
President-at least on this issue. 180 
In January 1944, after early indications of a Jewish Holocaust, Morgenthau had gone 
to the President requesting the creation of a War Refugee Board, "to forestall the plan of 
the Nazis to exterminate all Jews and other minorities." Roosevelt-- not wanting 
congressional hearings on government inaction, and fearful ofthe loss of the Jewish votes 
to an acceptable Republican such as Thomas Dewey of New York-- agreed. Now, a few 
months later, Morgenthau proposed another plan to the President, one for postwar 
Germany. Overall, the Morgenthau Plan called for all heavy German industry to be 
destroyed. Germany's plants and equipment, labor, and other assets would be given to 
the Soviet Union, and other Nazi victims. There would be no reparations, but the Allies 
would draw up a list of "arch-criminals of the war," and once apprehended, be "put to 
death forthwith by firing squads.,,181 Finally, reflecting the President's own views of 
Prussian militarism, all German aircraft, military uniforms, bands, and parades would be 
outlawed. The War Department was hostile to Morgenthau's proposal, considering it 
dangerous and naIve. The big question, however, was what FDR thought of the plan. 
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The Socialists 
In 1944, the Socialist Party of America rallied behind fifty-nine year-old Norman 
Thomas, a New York lecturer and writer, and party standard-bearer since 1928. Born in 
Ohio in 1884, Thomas graduated from Princeton University in 1905, where he studied 
history and political science under Woodrow Wilson. By 1911, Thomas, a Presbyterian 
pastor in East Harlem, had become a committed socialist and pacifist. In 1918, during 
the First World War, he founded and edited the socialist paper The World Tomorrow. 
Two years later, Thomas joined with Jane Addams, Upton Sinclair, and Elizabeth Gurley 
Flynn to establish the American Civil Liberties Union. In the early 1920s, he served as 
an associate editor of The Nation, and in 1924, he became the Socialist candidate for 
Governor of New York. Following the death Eugene Debs in the late 1920s, he became 
the Socialists' quadrennial candidate for president through 1948. 182 
During the early days of World War II, Thomas was a vocal critic of American 
intervention. In September 1940, he, along with Charles Lindberg and Burton Wheeler, 
formed the America First Committee, which quickly became the most powerful 
isolationist group in the United States. It advocated four principles: (1) that the United 
States must build an impregnable defense, (2) that no foreign power could successfully 
attack a prepared America, (3) that American democracy would be preserved only by 
staying out ofthe Second World War, and (4) that any "aid short of war" would weaken 
national defense at home, and threaten to involve the United States in the war abroad. 
After Pearl Harbor, Thomas, of course, changed his position on the war, and expressed 
his support ofthe U.S. war effort. However, he continued to be a very vocal critic of the 
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Roosevelt administration-especially as it related to the policy of "unconditional 
surrender. " 
On 4 June, Thomas accepted his party's presidential for the fifth time. Addressing 
supporters in Reading, Pennsylvania, he attacked the similarities between the Republican 
and Democratic Party platforms. "It is a sobering and even alarming prospect that 
confronts us," Thomas declared. "The campaign will be bitter. Emotions will be roused 
more or less along class lines. Democrats and Republicans will vie with each other in 
calling the name fascist. But actually and by design there will be a minimum of 
difference in the vague generalities the politicians will offer us-the choice between 
Tweddledum and Tweedlededee will scarcely be worth the cost." Thomas's own 
platform called for "an immediate political peace offensive based on the offer of an 
armistice to the peoples of the Axis nations." This "peace offensive" would consist of 
the Allied settlement of boundary disputes, the formation of regional federations of small 
nations, the offer of self-government to colonial lands, and worldwide disarmament. 
On the domestic front, meanwhile, Thomas he promised to rule the economic "heights." 
These heights of the modem economic order-natural resources, money, banking and 
credit, monopolies and semi-monopolies, and public utilities-must be, he declared, 
socially owned and controlled. In addition, a Socialist administration would "fight the 
handing over of the new 'public domain,' the war plants, to big business," and support 
public works projects (when necessary) and shorter hours to fight unemployment. 
Thomas's running-mate was forty-seven year-old Darlington Hoopes, a Reading attorney 
and former state legislator. 183 
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Chapter Three: 
The Republican Nomination 
There were a number of Republican contenders for the presidency in 1944. One name 
often mentioned by Washington insiders was "Mr. Republican," the son of former 
President William Howard Taft, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. Taft, aged fifty-five, 
was a freshman senator, elected in 1938, and the chief conservative spokesman within the 
Republican Party. Like Thomas Dewey, he had made a serious, and ultimately 
unsuccessful, run for the Republican nomination in 1940. A brilliant political analyst, 
Taft, as early as 1941, was contemplating another run for the presidency. By the end of 
1942, however, he was not optimistic about Republican chances in 1944, and decided 
against a presidential bid-making it official in December of that year. There were a 
number of reasons for Taft's decision not to run. First, President Roosevelt, whom most, 
including Taft, believed would seek a fourth term, was enjoying enormous popularity as 
"Dr. Win-the-War," and would be difficult to defeat in wartime. Second, Taft was up for 
reelection to the u.S. Senate in 1944, and by all accounts, would face stiff Democratic 
resistance. Ifhe tried for the presidency and failed, he might, he feared, lose his Senate 
seat. I And third, Ohio's other outspoken conservative Republican, Governor John W. 
Bricker, won reelection to a third term in 1942, and was already building a campaign 
organization. With Taft out of the race, conservatives, united in their opposition to 
Wendell Willkie, rallied behind the popular Ohio governor. 
John William Bricker wanted to be President of the United States, and in November 
1943, he announced his candidacy for the 1944 Republican nomination. Overall, Bricker 
was a contender with several political advantages. First, he was an attractive governor 
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from the Midwest. Ohio had produced seven Republican Presidents since the end of the 
Civil War, and Bricker-- the only Republican in Ohio's history to be elected to three 
terms as governor-had proven himself a natural vote-getter. Born in a cabin in 1893, 
the fifty-year-old Bricker had a reputation in Ohio as a "plain, homespun, common-sense 
fellow," who, as a youth, had attended a little red schoolhouse near Columbus, and 
helped his German-Scot-Irish father husk com. As Governor, he was "ruggedly honest, 
intensely sincere," and hardworking. "There is a saying," The American Mercury 
observed in May 1943, "that any man who can carry Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana can be 
elected President of the United States. If this is true, then John William Bricker could be 
elected today; for there seems little doubt that he could carry these states against 
Roosevelt. ,,2 
A second advantage for Bricker was his solid anti-New Deal, conservative credentials. 
On his first day as Governor in 1939, he had fired four thousand office holders in the 
state, and by the early 1940s could boast that in spite of greatly increased public services, 
Ohio had fewer state employees-22,000 in all-- than it did just a few short years ago. In 
contrast, he complained, "we've got 90,000 Federal employees in Ohio. What do they 
do? I ask you, what do they do? We haven't asked deferment for a single State 
employee, yet thousands of these Federal jobholders are being kept out of the Army!" A 
top priority in a Bricker presidency, he told a reporter, would be a drastic decrease in the 
number of federal employees. He wanted to be President, he said, not to save the world, 
but to "defeat that bunch of rascals" and "fumigate Washington.,,3 
Third, Bricker did not have a prewar "isolationist" record. In fact, he had been so 
busy "running Ohio" that he had not gotten involved in any of the postwar planning 
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debates. He did not have time for that fight, he once explained, but insisted that his first 
concern would be simply "to make America strong." 
Fourth, he had strong support in the South. In October 1943, former President Hoover 
advised Bricker-in an early instance of the "Southern strategy"-"that gaining the 
support of conservative states' rights southerners was a key to victory. He wrote to the 
governor: 'It seems to me our job is to secure the support of the Jeffersonian wing ofthe 
Democratic Party, not try for the New Dealers-whom we can never get.,,4 Bricker 
agreed, and in late 1943 traveled to the South and met with community leaders in several 
states, including the Virginia Chamber of Commerce. 
And fifth, Bricker was-aside from Willkie-the only Republican who had officially 
announced his candidacy. Other possibilities, including New York Governor Thomas 
Dewey, General Douglas MacArthur, and Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen (in service 
in the Pacific), all insisted that they neither wanted the nomination nor were seeking it. If 
Bricker was in fact the only conservative in the race, and the liberal Willkie, who had 
strong opposition within the party, could be outmaneuvered, the Ohio Governor had 
every reason to believe that his chances of becoming the party's nominee were very 
strong. 
If Bricker was a contender with many advantages-and he was-then he was also a 
candidate with many flaws-flaws that ultimately proved his undoing. One problem with 
Bricker was that he was a virtual unknown outside of the Midwest. Furthermore, he was 
perceived to be an intellectual lightweight, who was vague on most issues, especially 
those relating to foreign policy. That image was not helped the Governor, when in a 
response to a reporter's question, in the spring of 1943, on postwar planning, admitted: "I 
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don't know anything about how the postwar world should be organized. I have never 
been to Europe. How can I know where the boundary between Russia and Poland should 
be? How can I know what kind of government France should have? .. IfI should be 
elected President, I'll get the best advice I can from people who know something about 
the rest ofthe world, and I'll do the best I can."s While such statements were a part of 
the Governor's overall "down-home" appeal in Ohio, he was seeking to move from the 
Governor's Mansion to the White House, and as such, his remarks were shallow, naIve, 
and insufficient. Then, in March 1943, Bricker's "pre-candidacy" was dealt a serious 
blow, when the great Kansas journalist William Allen White dismissed the Governor as 
"an honest Harding," who, like the late president, "hopes to get by without saying 
anything, without getting on either side of the momentous questions of the hour-
domestic or foreign." He was, White continued, the candidate of "the same forces in the 
Republican Party that gathered around Taft in 1912 and that nominated Harding in a 
'smoke filled room' in 1920." Those forces must be resisted in 1944. The nation, he 
concluded, required a man with the leadership to "say who he is, what he is and why.,,6 
The harm inflicted by White's article was compounded by Bricker's failure to respond 
adequately.7 In early April 1943, just a few weeks after White's scathing piece, Bricker 
delivered what was supposed to be a major foreign policy address before the Political 
Science Academy in New York City. It was a dismal failure. According to Bricker 
biographer Richard O. Davies, "His speech amounted to nothing more than another set of 
familiar, if nonspecific, generalizations about the dangers to American freedom posed by 
an incursive federal bureaucracy. Not only was his speech lacking in specific policy 
statements and laden with trite generalizations, but he uncharacteristically suffered from a 
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first-class case of stage fright. His delivery was uncertain and tentative." His remarks 
"only reinforced the growing perception that he lacked a grasp of the major issues." 
Bricker did not help his case when, on 1 January 1944-in opening his official drive for 
the nomination-he delivered a nationally-broadcast radio address that, amazingly, failed 
to address any foreign policy issues. The Governor promised instead to focus upon 
"whether the place of the individual in society shall be strengthened or whether he shall 
become more and more dependent upon organized government."s 
Bricker was further disabled by his failure to build a strong organization capable of 
coordinating the multiple demands of a campaign. In late 1943, Bricker's campaign 
manager resigned after a dispute with his boss. Though a new manager was selected, the 
Bricker campaign continued to be perceived as loose, inefficient, and uncertain, and thus 
frightened away many potential financial supporters. In addition, complaints began to 
surface about mail going unanswered. John B. Hollister, a fonner Willkie supporter and 
advisor to Bricker, complained to the campaign in January 1944, that people-especially 
donors and National Committeemen-needed to be flattered, and that such "loose ends 
should be picked up." "[T]here is," he argued, "nothing more unflattering than failure to 
answer a letter.,,9 In the end, Bricker's star never rose. His campaign lacked depth, 
organization, momentum, and ultimately, popular support. He won only .3% of the total 
. h· 10 prImary vote t at sprIng. 
The problems with Bricker led many conservatives to rally behind General Douglas 
MacArthur, the sixty-four-year-old commander of the Southwest Pacific Area theater. 
MacArthur was an attractive presidential possibility for several reasons. First, he had an 
impressive military background and reputation. A 1903 graduate of West Point, he 
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subsequently served as a member of the Army's General Staff(1913-1917), Brigadier 
General ofthe 84th Infantry Brigade (1917-1918), Superintendent of West Point (1919-
1922), Army Chief of Staff (1930-1935), military advisor to the Philippines (1935-1941), 
and commander of all U.S. forces in East Asia (1941-1942). Since early 1942, 
MacArthur had been waging an offensive against Japanese forces in the southwest 
Pacific, using "highly successful 'leapfrog' flanking envelopments with combined air, 
land, and sea forces."]] From Australia, his base of operations, MacArthur had 
"leapfrogged" along the New Guinea coastline, and by the summer of 1944-following 
Admiral Chester Nimitz's victories in Saipan, Tinian, and Guam-- was poised to retake 
the Philippines. 
In addition, the Arkansas native was very popular-a Roper poll conducted for 
Fortune magazine in 1942, revealed that the General had an approval rating of57.3%. 
MacArthur's popularity was grounded not only in his military successes, but also in his 
public utterances and ability to control the news. For example, "in 1943, he said of 
Corregidor, the doomed Philippine fortress from which he had escaped by PT boat the 
year before: 'Until we lift our flag from its dust, we stand unredeemed before mankind. 
Until we claim again the ghastly remains of its last garrison, we can but stand humble 
supplicants before Almighty God. There lies our Holy Grail. ",]2 In addition, he granted 
interviews to only those reporters who agreed to depict his speech and actions in very 
favorable and extravagant terms. Altogether, this led many Republicans, including 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, to believe that he was the only Republican 
capable of defeating Roosevelt in a wartime presidential campaign. 
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At the same time, MacArthur had conservative credentials. Though never an 
isolationist, MacArthur's rout of the Bonus Army in Washington D.C., in 1932, as well 
as and his frequent clashes with President Roosevelt over Army appropriations in the mid 
1930s, endeared him to many conservatives. Equally important was the fact that he 
seemed to be willing to accept a draft for the Republican nomination. In the spring of 
1943, Senator Vandenberg met with two of MacArthur's aides in Washington, and 
expressed vigorous support for the general. To the Senator's surprise, he shortly 
thereafter received a confidential letter from MacArthur, dated 13 April 1943, which 
read: "I am most grateful to you for your complete attitude of friendship. I only hope that 
I can some day reciprocate. There is much that I would like to say to you which 
circumstances prevent. In the meanwhile I want you to know the absolute confidence I 
would feel in your experienced and wise mentorship. MacArthur.,,13 In his diary, 
Vandenberg expressed amazement at the message, and its potential historical worth, and 
concluded, 'Mac' certainly is not 'running away' from anything. It is typical of his 
forthright courage.,,14 
Vandenberg, independently from the General, then proceeded to quietly organize a 
draft movement for MacArthur-"quietly," he believed, being essential to success. 
Writing in his diary in September 1943, Vandenberg noted: 
I think it is desperately important that there should be no signs 
whatever of any centrally organized activity. It seems to me that 
the American people are rapidly coming to understand what the 
General is up against in the Far East [a reference to the Roosevelt-
Churchill decision to fight the war in Europe first and the 
subsequent shortage of men and materials in the Southwest 
Pacific]. These people can easily martyrize him into a completely 
irresistible figure. So it seems to me more important than ever that 
we should give our own 'commander-in-chief no possible excuse 
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upon which to hang his own political reprisals. It is obvious on 
every hand that the movement [ for MacArthur] is making solid 
headway in all directions ... 1 cling to the basic thought that if 
MacArthur can be nominated it will be as the result of a ground 
swell and not as the result of any ordinary preconvention political 
activities [italics added].ls 
As it turned out, prudence and subtlety were not characteristics of either MacArthur or 
many of his Congressional supporters. Against Vandenberg'S protests, the General, who 
had made no public statement expressing interest in the presidency, was entered into both 
the Wisconsin and New Hampshire primaries, where he performed poorly-even corning 
in last in New Hampshire. In Illinois, MacArthur supporters won their only primary 
victory, with their candidate, running unopposed, receiving 76% of the vote. 16 The result 
of all this visible draft activity was-just as Vandenberg had feared-increased scrutiny 
ofthe old soldier. Indeed, in January 1944, The American Mercury published a scathing 
article entitled, "General MacArthur: Fact and Legend" and which was subsequently 
printed in the Army Library Bulletin that February. The article identified the General 
with "Old Guard Republican" isolationists, and attempted to tear down-by separating 
"fact from fancy"-hero worship of MacArthur. 17 Then, in mid-April 1944, carne the 
death nail of MacArthur's unofficial candidacy. 
On 14 April, Republican Congressman A. L. Miller of Nebraska, a MacArthur 
supporter, disclosed that he had written to the general about the presidential race and had 
received a reply.18 He then released to the press his correspondence (two letters) with the 
Pacific commander. "I was shocked," Vandenberg later recalled, "that he should have 
ever written the letters which Miller made public.,,19 In Miller's first letter, the 
Congressman railed against the Roosevelt administration and asserted "that unless this 
97 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
New Deal can be stopped this time, our American way oflife is forever doomed." 
MacArthur replied, expressing his agreement "unreservedly," and Miller's arguments as 
"complete wisdom and statesmanship." In the second letter, which MacArthur called 
"scholarly," Miller warned that "a 'monarchy' was being established in the United States 
by 'left-wingers and New Dealism.",2o A few days later, on 29 April, MacArthur 
released a statement from his headquarters in New Guinea, requesting that "no action be 
taken that would link my name in any way to the nomination. I do not covet it nor would 
I accept it.,,21 "The MacArthur adventure," as Vandenberg described the draft 
movement, was over. 
Liberals in the Republican Party, meanwhile, placed their faith in Wendell Willkie, the 
party's unsuccessful nominee four years earlier. Willkie returned to the United States in 
late October 1942, and began working on One World, to be published early the next year. 
He then opened his drive the Republican nomination in the summer of 1943, while 
touring the country and promoting his book. That fall, he made appearances throughout 
the West and South, but with little impact. A poll taken among the party rank and file for 
The Republican magazine in early 1944, revealed that the '" average Republican leader' 
was willing to have the United States join a worldwide organization dedicated to keeping 
the peace and promoting economic cooperation. This average Republican, however, was 
against extensive disarmament after the war, the surrender of island outposts, and the 
'idea of Uncle Sam masquerading as an international Santa Claus. ,,,22 A Gallup poll in 
February showed Willkie a distant second to Dewey (45% to 21 %) among Republican 
voters. Then, in March, Dewey's lead in Gallup increased to 50%, while Willkie 
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remained in second place with a steady 21 %. The decline of Willkie' s political fortunes 
in early 1944, was related to two things. 
For one, he lacked political finesse, and as a result, was often perceived to be 
lecturing, rather than leading, the party. A former Democrat, he even on one occasion 
addressed his audience as "You Republicans." In November 1943, the Omaha World-
Herald observed that Republicans "mistrust [Willkie] as another 'big cock of the roost,' 
stubbornly bent on having his own way, with contempt for all others whether of high 
degree or low, if you are not as smart as he is." 23 Time magazine, meanwhile, referred 
to him as a "Moose on the Loose," and described his manner at a fall dinner for freshmen 
GOP Congressmen in Washington as "aggressive" and "truculent." According to the 
report, "Willkie told Congressmen he could have the Presidential nomination ifhe 
wanted it; he was ready to go over their heads to the people.,,24 In late February 1944, he 
entered the Wisconsin primary-not the most friendly place for Willkie to make his stand 
considering the state's isolationist background-and embarked on a grueling twelve-day, 
1 ,SOO-mile trek across the state. He made a number of mistakes in Wisconsin. As 
Willkie scholar, Donald Bruce Johnson observed: "He was not always cordial to party 
workers upon whom he was dependent; he was uncompromising in his charges that his 
opponents represented reaction in contrast to his brand of liberalism; and most important, 
he bitterly criticized his own party members. No matter how valid his comments may 
have been, they smacked to party regulars of disloyalty to the party as a whole.,,25 "Of 
course he was talking at the party from the outside," Dewey later remarked. "Gosh, you 
like to have a fellow who identifies himself with the party ifhe expects to be its 
spokesman, its leader. .. He'd been a Democrat until 1940, and had never got over it.,,26 
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And second, many Republicans, as polling data indicated, simply disagreed with the 
Hoosier on most issues. This was true not only in the area of foreign affairs, but also 
domestic issues. For example, on 3 February 1944, Willkie delivered a speech on "Our 
Domestic Economic, and Fiscal Policy in Relation to Our Well-Being at Home and 
Abroad," in which he advocated dramatic tax increases to help pay for the war while it 
was still being waged.27 The speech was originally written by a Willkie advisor named 
John W. Hanes, who, in the first draft, called for lower taxes. Willkie read the speech, 
and believing the "lower the taxes" theme was unrealistic, changed it to include a sixteen 
billion-dollar tax increase. Hanes protested that such a proposal would kill Willkie off 
politically-to which the Hoosier replied: "Johnny, you said this was the time for a 
speech on taxation, and I am making it.,,28 The speech was a disaster, and Willkie found 
himself roundly criticized by business Republicans who had supported him in 1940. 
The end of Wi Ilk ie's drive for the presidency came on 4 April, the day of the 
Wisconsin primary. Though he was the only candidate to personally campaign in the 
state, he came in last. Thomas Dewey, who insisted that he did not even want the 
nomination, smashed Willkie, receiving 17 delegates to Willkie's O. Speaking in Omaha, 
Nebraska, the following day, Willkie withdrew from the 1944 presidential race. "The 
result of the primary," he told a startled audience, "is naturally disappointing ... It is 
obvious now that I cannot be nominated. Therefore, I am asking my friends to desist 
from any activity toward that end and not to present my name at the convention. I 
earnestly hope," he concluded, "that the Republicans will nominate a candidate and write 
a platform which really represents the views which I have advocated and which I believe 
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are shared by millions of Americans.,,29 Willkie then shook the hands of well-wishers, 
boarded a train, and returned to New York. Six months later he was dead. 
The big winner of the 1942 midterm elections was Thomas Edmund Dewey, the 
newly elected Governor of New York. Today, Dewey's name does not generate much 
excitement, or for that matter, recognition. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, he was a 
major political force, and a young man on the rise. Born in Owosso, Michigan, on 24 
March 1902, Dewey came from a comfortable Midwestern home. His father, George, 
was a local newspaper editor and Republican leader, who instilled in his only child the 
value of hard work, and an interest in politics and writing. Dewey's mother, Annie, 
meanwhile, was an efficient manager of the family home, and a very powerful influence 
over her son. It was from his mother that Dewey learned thrift, tidiness, and 
perfectionism. Indeed, Dewey was a model boy. He had perfect attendance at school, 
went to church regularly, and was usually the first in the neighborhood to be called in at 
night. He was also very active, and always in motion, even naming his pet dog, 
"Pronto. ,,30 
In 1923, Dewey graduated from the University of Michigan, where he studied 
music, and in 1925, from the Columbia University School of Law. In June 1928, he 
married Frances Eileen Hutt, a young and pretty opera singer from Sapulpa, Oklahoma. 
After Columbia, Dewey decided to pursue a career in law in New York City. It was there 
in the 1930's that he built a national reputation for himself as a tough, racket-busting 
District Attorney-successfully prosecuting Lucky Luciano, Legs Diamond, and Jimmy 
Hines In 1937, he was even portrayed by Humphrey Bogart in the MGM film, The 
Marked Woman, which was loosely based upon the Luciano case. In 1938, he ran for 
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New York Governor, and narrowly lost to popular incumbent Herbert Lehman. Then, in 
1940, Dewey, aged thirty-eight, made his first of three attempts for the presidency, but 
his youth and inexperience-combined with the outbreak of World War II in Europe-
wrecked his candidacy, and the Republican nomination went instead to Wendell Willkie 
Finally, in 1942 Dewey achieved his first statewide electoral success, winning the New 
York gubernatorial race, and securing that office for Republicans for the first time in 
thirty years. As he addressed supporters in the lobby of the Roosevelt Hotel on Election 
Night, one enthusiastic partisan cheered: "This makes you the next President of the 
United States!" 31 
Throughout 1943 and early 1944, the New York Governor insisted that "I am not and 
shall not become a candidate for the Republican nomination. I have important work to do 
here in New York and I want to do it.,,32 Stil1, Dewey stood out from other possible 
contenders for a number of reasons. First, he was young-only forty-two in 1944-and 
energetic, and had a pleasing baritone voice that came across very effectively on radio. 
Second, he was the Governor New York, an office that seemed to breed presidential 
nominees. Indeed, over the course of the past one hundred years, eight governors of New 
York had won their party's nomination, and four had actually won the ultimate prize.33 
Dewey's mere occupancy ofthat office, then, made him a perpetual object of presidential 
consideration. Third, he was a proven vote-getter. Not only had he won the 
governorship in 1942, but also his choice for lieutenant governor was overwhelmingly 
elected in a highly charged special election in November 1943. Fourth, Dewey had a 
reputation for intelligence and efficiency, and getting things done. Herbert Brownell, 
Dewey's campaign manager, later recal1ed: "He assembled a first-rate staff about him 
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and always had a practical goal: getting someone convicted or a bill passed through the 
legislature. Although I would not describe him as a political visionary, he knew what 
needed to be done. He was a true refonner and not a self-interested politician, and he had 
the zeal and ability to sunnount opposition to his refonn efforts. This didn't make him 
popular with those people he had to deal with, but it did make him effective.,,34 Finally, 
he had an excellent "draft" organization led by three talented and trusted advisors: 
Herbert Brownell (liaison between Dewey and the national Republican organization and 
the party organizations of other states), Edwin F. Jaeckle (strategist), and J. Russell 
Sprague (party operator).35 This team, without any "official" support from Dewey-
Jaeckle later recalled, "He never gave a nod and he never gave me a no"-worked 
steadily behind the scenes, beginning in October 1943, to promote the Governor, and to 
engineer a draft.36 Their work paid off. A Gallup poll, taken in early 1944, indicated that 
Dewey led the Republican presidential field with 45% of support. Willkie, who had been 
openly campaigning for weeks, came in a distant second with 21 %.37 Writing to Dewey 
that winter, historian James Truslow Adams spoke for many Republicans when he 
admitted a change of heart from 1940: 
I did not want a President with a DA's mind but the governorship 
of New York is a different matter and as I look over the possible 
candidates ... I am beginning to feel that you might do the most to 
save the situation. I voted for Willkie last time.38 
As Adams's letter implied, a crucial part of Dewey's successful march to 1944 
presidential nomination was his public image as a moderate and experienced governor 
who could save the GOP from foreign policy extremists on both sides of the ideological 
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spectrum. The most candid foreign policy statement made by Dewey came in September 
1943, as he arrived at Mackinac. When asked by reporters during a press conference if 
he would favor a postwar alliance with Great Britain, Dewey responded in the 
affirmative, and added: 
We have had a defacto alliance with Great Britain ever since the 
War of 1812. In the two principal cases since when war was made 
on Great Britain, we went to her defense. The American people 
never before had such a shock as they had when they realized that 
Germany might capture the British fleet. You remember as well as 
I how everyone was chilled.39 
Furthermore, Dewey-echoing Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept-- "hoped" that the 
Soviet Union and China would join in this postwar partnership-which, he insisted, 
would never interfere with American sovereignty. Citing John Foster Dulles's "Six 
Pillars of Peace" as his inspiration, Dewey concluded that the "time had come ... for 
America to abandon selfish nationalism and assume new international obligations.,,4o 
The twenty-third Republican National Convention convened in Chicago on Monday 
morning, 26 June 1944, and lasted for three days, until Wednesday, 28 June. Chicago 
was designated as the convention city for both political parties that summer, and 
Republicans, numbering some 20,000 strong, met first in Chicago Stadium. It turned out 
to be a rather lackluster event with delegates and onlookers bored, unenthused, and 
unresponsive. For weeks prior to the start ofthe convention, party leaders talked of 
"tone"-the event, they said, must strike a solemn note in keeping with the gravity of the 
times. After all, the convention was meeting just three weeks after D-Day, and as 
Representative Joseph Martin of Massachusetts observed, "The battle of Normandy 
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subdued our conflicts at home. We took our cracks at New Deal 'collectivism' and 
Roosevelt's 'court-packing,' but they did not crackle the way they used to before the real 
guns were firing.,,41 Deliberately, then, partisan celebrations were held to a minimum; 
"speakers trimmed rabblerousing phrases in advance to make place for themes ofwar.,,42 
From beginning to end "solemnity was the keynote over a ground bass of moderation in 
attack.,,43 Another reason for the lackluster mood in Chicago was the virtual pre-
convention collapse of all candidacies except that of Governor Dewey. The outcome of 
the convention, then, seemed predictable and thus generated little excitement. In 
addition, there was a general spirit of defeatism among the party faithful concerning GOP 
chances in November. Party leaders and party organization had, due to Roosevelt's role 
as popular wartime leader, lost confidence in an Election Day victory and the pep 
necessary to win it.44 Finally and most importantly, the weather played a crucial role in 
the squelching Republican enthusiasm at Chicago. A blistering heat wave engulfed the 
Windy City, with the temperature inside the convention hall registering a sweltering 105 
degrees. James M. Bailey, a friend of Governor Dewey, filmed much of the convention 
with his silent, but colorized home movie camera. The film captured weary and hot 
convention goers fanning themselves, gulping soft drinks, and refusing to participate or 
react to the brass band music led by Chicago's famous song leader, Carl Craven. Of 
course, there were still rallies and floor demonstrations, but in the main, the crowd was 
largely lethargic. 
The Republican Party Platform of 1944 was a detailed and progressive statement of 
party goals for the future. On foreign policy, the GOP followed the Mackinac 
Declaration of 1943. In regard to civil rights, however, the platform was very bold. It 
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condemned racial and religious prejudice, and pledged the establishment of a permanent 
Fair Employment Practice Commission. Unlike the Democrats later that summer, 
Republicans proposed a Constitutional amendment abolishing the poll tax, and went on 
record favoring immediate legislation against lynching. Addressing the convention 
moments before the platform's adoption, D. H. Sims, Bishop of the African Methodist 
Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, observed that "Because we took the Negro for granted 
and neglected his voice crying in the American wilderness, the Democratic Party, being 
an opportunist party, took advantage of the situation. The New Deal captured the 
imagination of the Negro in 1932 and he took a sabbatical leave from the Republican 
Party." The present moment, he insisted, provided the party of Lincoln with an 
opportunity to restore lost confidence and lost votes: 
If the Party will castigate the poll tax, mob violence, 
discriminations in job opportunity, unfair employment practices in 
labor and industry, this will be a demonstration to the world in 
general and to the Negro in particular that we [Republicans] are 
placing the welfare of the whole American community above that 
of any special section of it. .. 
A Changing world has produced a changed Negro. He believes 
the Republican Party is a ship but that it has been badly battered by 
the social and political storms. We are here in dry dock. For 
God's sake and our own perpetuity, let us prepare for the 
dangerous, heavy sea which lies inevitably before us. If she is to 
carry the Negroes of America as passengers, they wish to be 
carried as first-class passengers with no outmoded life boats or life 
savers.45 
The GOP platform also called for lower taxes, a Constitutional amendment "providing 
equal rights for men and women" in the workplace, and the creation of a Department of 
Agriculture. Another interesting component of the Republican platform was its statement 
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on presidential tenure. Foreshadowing the ratification of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in 1951, Republicans favored a Constitutional amendment "providing that 
no person shall be President of the United States for more than two terms of four years 
each." The platform attacked the New Deal in only general terms, focusing mainly on 
the "selfish and partisan control over the functions of Government agencies where labor 
relationships are concerned," and a "bungled and inexcusable machinery program and 
confused, unreliable, impractical price and production administration." 46 
The most critical assessment of the New Deal, of course, fell under the platform's 
discussion oflabor. Specifically, Republicans charged the Democratic administration 
with "the perversion" of the Wagner Act, which, "menaces the purposes of the law and 
threatens to destroy collective bargaining completely and permanently," and the 
emasculation of the Department of Labor. In addition, the GOP condemned (1) "the 
conversion of administrative boards, ostensibly set up to settle industrial disputes, into 
instruments for putting into effect the financial and economic theories of the New Deal," 
(2) "the freezing of wage rates at arbitrary levels and the binding of men to their jobs as 
destructive to the advancement of a free people," and (3) "the repeal by Executive order 
ofthe laws secured by the Republican Party to abolish 'contract labor' and peonage." 
Another four years of New Deal polices, the platform concluded, "would centralize all 
power in the President, and would daily subject every act of every citizen to regulation by 
his henchmen; and this country could remain a Republic only in name.,,47 
Speakers at the convention included the popular Governor of California, Earl Warren, 
former President Herbert Hoover, and Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce of 
Connecticut. Warren delivered the keynote address on night one, and articulated the 
107 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
party's position: "This is our job: To get out boys back home again-victorious and with 
all speed. To open the door for all Americans; to open it, not just to jobs, but to 
opportunity! To make and guard the peace so wisely and so well that this time will be the 
last time that American homes are called to give their sons and daughters to the agony 
and tragedy of war." He then talked about the election campaign within the context of 
the war. "To get that job done is why we are here. This Convention and this election are 
not time out from the job of winning the war and the peace. This Convention and this 
election are part of that job. We are here to speed the cause; to help America to speed the 
cause for which our fighting men are giving their lives. We are here to make the road on 
which America can march toward victory toward opportunity, toward peace ... For so 
great a venture together, we must be together. Here and now, we can begin to get 
together. That is our purpose. It is the purpose of this Convention to put the public 
welfare above private self-interest; to put the nation above the party; to put the progress 
of the whole American community above special privilege for any part of it; to put 
indispensable principles, once and for all, above indispensable men." Warren offered 
few specifics, but that was his intent. He wanted to identify Republicans as supportive of 
the war effort, and as a party that was inclusive: "In those States where the people have 
returned to the Republican Party, government is not only for the people, but of and by the 
people. That means not some of the people, but all of the people. Their kind of 
representative government reaches from ocean to ocean and from border to border. It 
extends to both sides of the tracks. It includes every citizen. That is why the platform of 
this Convention will be one on which all of us can stand together-not divided by race or 
creed, not as minorities or majorities, but as fellow Americans." This war, he concluded, 
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"cannot be fought and won as Republicans or Democrats. This is an All-American War. 
There is a place for every American in it.,,48 
The second night of the convention began with the nation's only living ex-president, 
Herbert Hoover, speaking on "Freedom, the Job of the Youth." Alluding to Dewey, he 
said, "In every generation youth presses forward toward achievement. Each generation 
has the right to built its own world out of the materials of the past, cemented by the hopes 
of the future... This Convention is handing the leadership of the Republican Party to a 
new generation. And soon to support these younger men there will be an oncoming 
generation who will differ from all others.,,49 
The night closed with the fiery reporter, correspondent, playwright, and Member of 
Congress from Connecticut, Clare Booth Luce. Luce, the attractive wife of Time editor 
Henry Luce, was the Anne Coulter of her day. It was her job to throw red meat to the 
delegates. After distinguishing G.I. Joe (the American serviceman) from G.I. Jim (the 
pal, buddy, or brother of Joe who has already fallen in combat), Luce took a direct, and 
unfair, shot at Roosevelt. Conveniently ignoring Republican opposition to the President 
in Congress before Pearl Harbor, Luce asked: "Do we here in this Convention dare ask if 
Jim's heroic death in battle was historically inevitable? If this war might not have been 
averted? We know that this war was in the making everywhere in the world after 1918 ... 
Might not skillful and determined American statesmanship have helped to unmake it all 
through the '30s? Or, when it was clear to our Government that it was too late to avert 
war, might not truthful and fearless leadership have prepared us better for it in material 
and in morale, in arms and in aims?" Luce then unveiled her main criticism: "The last 
twelve years have not been Republican years," she said. "Maybe Republican Presidents 
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during the '20s were overconfident that sanity would prevail abroad. But it was not a 
Republican President who dealt with the visibly rising menaces of Hitler and Mussolini 
and Hirohito. Ours was not the Administration that promised young Jim's mother and 
father and neighbors and friends economic security and peace. Yes, peace. No 
Republican President gave these promises which were kept to their ears, but broken to 
their hearts. For this terrible truth cannot be denied: these promises, which were given by 
a Government that was elected again and again and again because it made them, lie quite 
as dead as young Jim lies now. Jim was the heroic heir of the unheroic Roosevelt decade: 
a decade of confusion and conflict that ended in war.,,50 
On the third and final day of the convention, Dewey's name was officially placed into 
nomination by Nebraska Governor Dwight Griswold, who described the New York 
Governor as "the spokesman of the future." A Dewey demonstration immediately broke 
out. "Delegates marched through the aisles holding aloft pictures of Dewey and placards 
bearing such inscriptions as 'Dewey Will Win!' 'America Wants Dewey!' 'Dewey, the 
People's Choice!' 'Win With Dewey!",Sl Less than an hour later, Ohio's Governor 
Bricker announced the withdrawal of his own candidacy, and called upon his supporters 
to vote for Dewey, whom Bricker described as "a great, a grand, a vigorous, a fighting 
young American-the noble, the dramatic and appealing Governor of the great State of 
New York ... ,,52 Following Bricker, Minnesota Senator Joseph H. Ball, Lieutenant 
Commander (and former Governor) Harold Stassen's representative at the convention, 
withdrew Stassen's name from consideration, and pledged support for Dewey. 
Congressman Everett Dirksen soon followed suit. The roll was then read. It was a 
Dewey sweep, with only one dissenting vote. Grant Ritter, a fifty-four-year-old diary 
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farmer from Wisconsin, protested, "I am a man, not a jellyfish," and then cast his one 
vote for General MacArthur. By 2:30 p.m. that Wednesday, it was all over, and Dewey 
was the nominee. Listening to the radio in Albany, Governor and Mrs. Dewey prepared 
to leave the Governor's Mansion and fly to Chicago. By 9:00 p.m. they were in the 
Windy City. 
While Dewey made his way to Chicago by plane, the convention, under the able 
leadership of his political team, selected Ohio Governor John Bricker for the second spot 
on the ticket. Dewey had wanted Governor Earl Warren of California to be his running 
mate, but the Governor had refused, citing his pledge in 1942 not to seek national 
office. 53 Dewey, who later referred to Warren as a "big, dumb Swede," then agreed on 
Bricker to balance out the ticket ideologically, and also to help bring the South into play 
in November. Under the advice of former President Hoover, who frequently counseled 
the Buckeye Governor, Bricker had begun in 1943 (during his unsuccessful drive for the 
presidential nomination) visiting with Southern business, party, and civic leaders. He had 
been generally well-received, and actually had some appeal in the South. Indeed, later in 
the campaign, Bricker traveled through Tennessee and Kentucky, writing to Dewey, "The 
crowd [in Kentucky] was responsive and everywhere Democrats came to me and said 
they are voting on our side this year." In Tennessee, meanwhile, Bricker did not express 
much hope in carrying the state in November, but added, "the benefit of going into 
Tennessee is the confidence it will give to some of the other [Southern] states and the 
hope that we might build up a two party system in other states to the benefit of the 
party.,,54 While Bricker was not Dewey's first choice-and thus often looked down upon 
by Team Dewey-he did enjoy Dewey's respect and friendship. Indeed, in a 
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conversation with journalist Raymond Moley in 1943, Dewey inquired about Bricker. 
Moley, who admired Bricker, praised the Ohio governor in generalities only to be 
interrupted by Dewey with the crack, "You haven't said a word that makes him any better 
than Harding." "This nettled me," Moley later recalled, "but ... I set out to work and for 
twenty minutes I expounded with ample detail about Bricker the administrator, the 
politician and the man. Dewey seemed better satisfied, and when I saw him next, he said, 
'I have grown to think Bricker is pretty good.' Then, possibly without knowing that he 
was giving my speech back to me, he elaborated on Bricker the administrator, the 
politician and the man."ss 
At Chicago Stadium, over 20,000 Republicans jammed into the hall to greet the 
presidential nominee. At approximately 9: 1 0, with the closing strains of "America," the 
Governor and Mrs. Dewey walked into the hall, and stepped out on the tongue extending 
from the platform to the podium, loud-speakers, and microphones. The room was 
adorned in American flags and ribbons of red, white, and blue. Positioned in front of the 
podium (at the end of the platform) was a giant golden eagle statue-with wings spread. 
Dressed in a grey pin-stripped suit with red tie, the Governor appeared dapper, calm, and 
confident. His wife, young, pretty and smiling, was wearing a black dress and an orchid 
corsage. "They were received with enthusiastic and prolonged applause, both bowing 
acknowledgement, first to those in front, then to right, left, and all round the great hall. A 
chair was provided for Mrs. Dewey on the platform's tongue, and she took the seat while 
the Governor stood at her side and continued bowing appreciation of the great acclaim."s6 
Finally, at 9:20 p.m.-as Dewey removed a handkerchief from his pants pocket and 
wiped the sweat from his face-- the Permanent Chairman of the Convention, 
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Congressman Martin of Massachusetts, struck the gavel, and declared: "I now have the 
honor to present to you the next President of the United States, Thomas E. Dewey.,,57 
Speaking over the cheering crowd, Dewey began his acceptance speech: "Mr. Chairman 
and fellow Americans: I am profoundly moved by the trust you have placed in me. I 
deeply feel the responsibility which goes with your nomination for President ofthe 
United States at this grave hour of our nation's history ... [and] I accept the 
nomination. ,,58 
Dewey's convention speech was relatively short and crisp, and aimed at expressing 
three main foreign policy themes: unity, continuity, and credibility. "To our Allies," he 
declared, "let us send from this Convention one message from our hearts: The American 
people are united with you to the limit of our resources and our manpower, devoted to the 
single task of victory and the establishment of a firm and lasting peace. To every 
member of the Axis powers let us send this message: By this political campaign, which 
you are unable to understand, our will to victory will be strengthened, and with every day 
you further delay surrender the consequences to you will be more severe." In addition, 
he insisted that "The military conduct of the war is outside this campaign. It is and must 
remain completely out of politics ... Let me make it crystal-clear that a change of 
administration next January cannot and will not involve any change in the military 
conduct of the war." Dewey also sought to identify the GOP as a credible and 
constructive participant in postwar planning. "There are," he said, "only a few, a very 
few, who really believe that American should try to remain aloof from the world. There 
are only a relative few who believe it would be practical for America or her Allies to 
renounce all sovereignty and join a superstate. I certainly would not deny those two 
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extremes the right to their opinions; but I stand firmly with the overwhelming majority of 
my fellow citizens in that great wide area of agreement. That agreement was clearly 
expressed by the Republican Mackinac Declaration and was adopted in the foreign policy 
I k f h· . .,S9 P an 0 t IS conventIOn. . 
Only a small part of the speech dealt with domestic policy. Overall, it included the 
usual criticisms ofthe New Deal-namely, that it had not solved the Depression, that it 
lacked faith in America, and that it was old and worn-out. Unveiling what would 
become a recurrent theme, Dewey pledged "that on January 20th next year our 
government will again have a cabinet of the ablest men and women to be found in 
America. Its members will expect and will receive full delegation of the powers of their 
offices. They will be capable of administering those powers. They will each be 
experienced in the task to be done and young enough to do it. This election will bring an 
end to one-man government in America." As the speech ended, the convention hall 
erupted into "thunderous applause." Dewey was then joined by Governor Bricker on the 
platform, the two shook hands, and "the great stadium resounded to the cheers of the 
multitude." "Dewey Snaps GOP From Coma," declared Newsweek. The presidential 
campaign of 1944 had officially begun. 6o 
Enthusiasm over Thomas Dewey's nomination was not universal, of course, 
particularly among members of the liberal press. Dewey had a very poor relationship 
with the news media dating back to his early days as a racketbuster. He had a reputation 
for secrecy and strict control of information, and as a result, he was often treated with 
disfavor by the media, which mocked him as short, inexperienced, humorless, and 
ambitious. One of the earliest critics of candidate Dewey was Benjamin Stolberg. 
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Writing in the American Mercury in the summer of 1940, Stolberg criticized the then 
District Attorney as ambitious, opportunistic, ignorant, immature, and arrogant. Dewey, 
he argued, suffered from an inferiority complex. He was a "little boy," Stolberg wrote, 
who acted the way he did because of his short stature and youth. From that 
generalization, Stolberg concluded that Dewey thus hated his father, who was slightly 
taller than Dewey, and sought the presidency only to make up for his inadequacies, 
particularly his height. "Nothing less than the presidency will make him feel as big and 
mature as papa." There were two main problems with this ridiculous and rather bizarre 
analysis. First, Stolberg, for all his psycho-babble, was neither a psychiatrist nor a 
Dewey intimate. And second, Dewey-though of a small physical frame-- was not that 
short. He was 5'8"-roughly the same height as the average American male at that time. 
Another critical, ifless fanciful, piece carne in early 1944 with Richard H. Rovere's 
article in Harper's Magazine entitled "Dewey: The Man in the Blue Serge Suit." 
According to Rovere Dewey--though alert and possessed of a highly disciplined mind--
lacked boldness. He was a cautious man, who stood "four-square and flat-footed in the 
middle" and refused to ever "say anything that has not been double-checked for safety 
and propriety." Indeed, the Governor-through the employing of professional pollsters--
had streamlined the old political practices of "sniffing the breeze, playing it safe, tapping 
the grass roots, or keeping the ear to the ground" into an exact science. He lacked 
conviction and vision, and had, Rovere insisted, refused-like a third-rate 
Congressman-to "face up to the real issues of our time." Furthermore, he was, Rovere 
argued, a "platitude king," piling up familiar phrases "so neatly and with such roundness 
of phrase that the listener or reader is sometimes deluded into thinking that he is 
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following a weighty argument." With his trained baritone voice and courtroom manner 
of presentation, Dewey made even such bromides as "We shall have our freedom so long 
as we are all free!" sound good. Finally, Rovere dismissed Dewey's reputation as an 
economic miracle-worker in New York as "poppycock." The real credit for the state's 
booming economy and sound fiscal situation belonged to (1) the war and (2) Dewey's 
Democratic predecessor, Herbert Lehman, who left the state in 1943 with a $40,000,000 
surplus. 
Washington correspondent I. F. Stone, writing in The Nation that summer and fall, 
was no more kind to the Republican hopeful. According to Stone, Dewey-while 
competent, courageous, and hardworking-was "extraordinary only in his drive, his 
singleness of purpose, the intensity of his ambition." The Governor was, he continued, 
"wholly self-seeking"-choosing "the law as a profession because he thought it offered 
the prospect of greater and more secure financial rewards than singing." Furthermore, his 
sensational stint as prosecutor in New York was opportunistic, a quick steeping-stone to 
the governorship (and the presidency), and "not the beginning of a job that he felt had to 
be completed in the interest of civic duty or clean government." In addition, Stone 
argued that Dewey-- rather than being wicked, sinister, dishonest, or fascist-- was simply 
"uninteresting," presenting no complexities, and deviating no way from type. "I can see 
nothing but the commonplace in his mind," he wrote. "I sense no lift of idealism in his 
spirit; his motivations seem to me wholly self-seeking." Finally, Stone complained that 
the Republican nominee reeked of self-assurance, and was completely void of human 
warmth. "He is not what we call a regular guy. There is nothing in him of Wi 11k ie's rich 
curiosity, human interest, or careless vitality. Dewey is small stuff and cold fish, 
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handsomer and physically robust but really a good deal like Coolidge, frugal spiritually, a 
man who does not give himselffreely.,,61 
Finally, there was The New Republic's "Dewey: The Man and His Record," printed in 
late September 1944. According to this twenty-page "Special Section," Dewey was 
neither a despondent, indecisive Hoover nor an easy-going, humorous FDR. Instead, he 
was a Calvin Coolidge "made vocal, equipped with overweening ambition, and not caring 
very much on whom he tramples, or how hard, in fulfilling that ambition.,,62 The piece 
went on to discredit Dewey's record as prosecutor and governor, and concluded with a 
consideration of "Dewey as President." The real guide to determining what to expect 
from a Dewey administration, the editors argued, was a careful appraisal of those upon 
whom the Governor relied heavily for advice. His "cronies," including laeckle 
(described as having "storm-trooper tactics"), Bell, and Brownell, were, in the main, 
"publicity men, political strategists, or ghost-writers rather than experts on economics, 
finance, or political science... Their function seems to have been to aid Mr. Dewey in his 
climbing the ladder of public office rather than to layout policies which they would like 
to see the nation follow." A President Dewey, the authors surmised with hyperbole, 
would never stand out against these, and other men (including isolationists and anti-New 
Dealers), and would thus "be a prisoner in the White House of the worst elements in the 
Republican Party, so far as concerns the two great objectives of our time: prosperity and 
peace.,,63 
The New Republic also included in its special section several disparaging jokes and 
quotes at the Governor's expense. For example, one reporter on seeing Dewey's Great 
Dane, "Canute," exclaimed-in an obvious reference to the Governor's height-- "Does he 
117 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ride it to work!" Another journalist, appropriating an old vaudeville joke, added that 
Dewey, "having drunk too much coffee, had spent the night pacing up and down under 
his bed." With great glee, the liberal weekly also quoted several Dewey associates, such 
as one woman who stated that "You have to know Mr. Dewey very well in order to 
dislike him," and another who asked, "How can you vote for a man who looks like a 
bridegroom on a wedding cake?,,64 Overall, these and other reports undermined 
Dewey's image, and build an inaccurate perception-which still lingers among many 
academics today-of Dewey as a small, inexperienced young man, quite vain and 
pompous, self-seeking and ambitious, and oblivious and/or contemptuous of the feelings 
and desires of others. 
Still, Dewey did get some favorable coverage, especially in the news magazines, 
including Time, Newsweek, Look, and The Saturday Evening Post. In addition, he 
enjoyed the publication of two campaign biographies. One, Rupert Hughes's authorized 
Attorneyfor the People: The Story o.fThomas E. Dewey, had been written in 1939, and 
was updated and re-released for the 1944 campaign. Hughes was very close to his 
subject, later declaring: "I believe with all my heart that ifhe is elected he will not only 
do more to carry us through the oncoming crisis of the peace than any other man could 
do, or would do; but that he will go down in history as one of the purest patriots and most 
noble statesmen our country has ever known.,,65 The book-though important today for 
historians due to its detail and input by Dewey-was not taken seriously at the time. 
Commenting on the work in The Nation, J.F. Stone tersely observed that Hughes "seems 
to have confused him with George Washington and Lucky Luciano with a cherry tree. ,,66 
The other, Stanley Walker's Dewey: An American of this Centwy, which the liberal 
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Nation described as "local-yokel," was typical campaign puffery. The book was folksy 
in nature, and in an attempt to humanize the Governor, detailed not only his career, but 
also his personal life, including his love of golf, cigarettes, and family. Amazingly, 
Walker, without intending to be humorous, spent an entire paragraph tracing the 
development of Dewey's mustache, which evidently began as a "tentative, unpromising 
wisp," while Dewey was on a bicycling trip in France in 1925, but was "soon full-blown 
and bristly.,,67 On the positive side, about a quarter of Walker's 350 pages consisted of 
the text of several Dewey speeches, dating back to 1937, and ending with the 1944 
speech of acceptance. Though it had become common by 1944 for candidates to write 
manifestos or autobiographies, Dewey, who had written a critique of the Roosevelt 
administration in 1940 entitled The Against the New Deal, did not publish any writings 
for 1944.68 Copies of his 1940 work, however, were still in circulation, and Dewey 
continued to stand by its sentiments. 
As the title suggested, The Case Against the New Deal dealt primarily with domestic 
concerns. In it, Dewey hammered home the theme-repeated in 1944--that Roosevelt 
encouraged defeatism at home. "At the root of the New Deal's failure to solve our 
economic problems," Dewey wrote, "has been its assumption that the United States had 
achieved a mature economy. This defeatist philosophy led inevitably to the conclusion 
that the system of free private enterprise had lost the power to sustain itself. It must, 
therefore, be supported, on the one hand, by government efforts to 'create purchasing 
power,' while, on the other, being restrained from unwise expansion through government 
regulation." The United States was in a crisis, Dewey warned, but it was a crisis of 
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faith~in ourselves, in our system, and in our own traditions. On the solution of that 
crisis, he insisted, was all around, in every state, in every city, and on every farm: 
Here in our own America we have the manpower, the wealth, the 
natural resources, and the genius to invent and create. We have the 
industrial skill to release that ever-flowing stream of new inventions and 
greater productivity wherein lies the future of our own America. I don't 
say to you, close your eyes and have faith~I say to you, open your eyes, 
look around you and be convinced.69 
Dewey also criticized Roosevelt for incompetence in government (namely, budget 
deficits), national disunity (i.e. government versus business, labor versus capital, labor 
versus labor, collectivism versus individualism, and defeatism versus optimism), 
dishonesty (specifically, party intimidation and coercion, illegal campaign finance, and 
agency corruption), and economic failure (including declines in national and farm 
income). Overall, Dewey's work was really a "case against" and not really a blueprint 
for anything in particular. It did, however, represent Dewey at his best, and that was as 
"Prosecutor." The closest he came to articulating a vision was in his brief discussion of 
foreign policy, which he linked to domestic policy. According to Dewey, "Any 
successful foreign policy must be broadly founded on a successful domestic policy." In 
the end, Dewey's chief focus was, as it would be in 1944, on change~i.e. change in 
national leadership. 
Dewey's only other publication up to that time was a 1939 essay in Religious Digest 
on the subject "Can Religion Save the U.S.A.?" Like many other conservatives, he 
insisted that religion~in this case Christianity~was essential to the maintenance of a 
free republic. Alluding to liberalism and the New Deal, he warned that "[N]o nation was 
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ever made good or strong by laws alone. The pretended strength of government is never 
a substitute for the real strength of the individual." Excessive reliance upon government, 
he continued, weakened the individual, reminding his readers that "The tower of a high 
building is no firmer than the weakest part of its foundations," and that likewise, society 
could not endure if government was "built on a mass of weakened individuals." America 
must not abandon religion. "For where material values are set above spiritual values, 
religion ceases to be vital. And where religion is no longer vital, pagan philosophies 
move in [italics added]." This "pagan philosophy" was a typical conservative reference 
to the liberal viewpoint that man is not self-controlling, and not responsible for his own 
acts. Conservatives believed that from this pagan view emerged a number of the Old 
World ideologies, including socialism and communism. Both rested on the same ideas: 
that the individual was nothing and that the strength of the party was the only thing that 
mattered. "We shall reject false gods of material philosophies," Dewey concluded. 
"When we have cleaned our own house, we shall keep it clean.,,7o 
Thomas Dewey was a formidable opponent. As historian Robert Ferrell observed, 
"His youth bespoke activity that the tired Roosevelt could not imitate, even in 
appearance; in reality, to be sure, the president was tired indeed. Dewey could claim to 
be a new broom after eleven years of the Democracy, wherein the party of Roosevelt had 
worn itself out in meeting the challenges ofthe Great Depression and now, World War II. 
Against those claims, in which there was more than a grain of truth, only 'the champ,' the 
Democrats' greatest vote-getter since President Andrew Jackson a century and more 
before, could have assured victory. No other Democrat could have stood against Dewey 
and won.,,7! That is not to suggest that Dewey was flawless. He was not. In fact, he 
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possessed many serious flaws as a candidate-flaws that undermined both his 1944 and 
1948 presidential bids. 
He was young and relatively inexperienced, especially in foreign affairs, at a time in 
which the nation was involved in global crisis. Dewey was also secretive and combative 
with the media, which often resulted in unfavorable news stories. In addition, he was 
very cool in personality (which probably stemmed from a genuine shyness and 
discomfort with popular politics). It was in 1944, for example, that a photographer 
shouted to Dewey, "Smile Governor," to which Dewey coolly replied, "I thought I was." 
Years later, Dewey's apprentice and admirer, Richard M. Nixon of California, recalled a 
Republican fundraiser in 1952 during which: 
[A] paying guest who had obviously had too much to drink 
came up ... [and] slapped Dewey on the back, told him he was the 
greatest governor in New York's history, and said he hoped he 
would run for reelection. As the man walked away, Dewey very 
deliberately knocked the ashes off his cigarette, which like FDR he 
smoked through a holder, turned to me, and said, 'Who was that 
fatuous ass?' In fact, the man happened to be the publisher of a 
string of weekly newspapers in New York State. Like many 
brilliant people, Dewey found it very difficult to tolerate fools. In 
politics, that is a fatal mistake for three reasons. First, the man 
might not be a fool. Second, even fools vote. And third, a fool 
might still have something worthwhile to say to you."n 
Dewey was also an artist (in this case a trained vocalist) and a perfectionist, and was 
thus very intense, focused, and ambitious. In his campaigns, the Governor had a very 
keen sense of production, was very performance-driven, and was fanatical about detail. 
For example, in early October 1944, Dewey wrote his national radio director, Henry 
Turnbell, complaining that "at the last two speeches it was almost impossible to read my 
manuscript. This is the most serious possible handicap in delivery of a speech and I hope 
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whatever radical steps may be necessary will be taken forthwith to see that in the future I 
can at least read my speeches." Revealing his sensitivity to applause, Dewey added: "I 
have an exceedingly bad impression of the way the applause has been handled in all of 
the speeches except Louisville and Oklahoma City, on the radio. I am sure this can be 
done very much better.,,73 In a memo to Brownell a few months earlier, one of Dewey's 
media consultants commented on the candidate's propensity for perfection: 
There is one thing I would say to the Governor about this question 
of pictures and that would be to quit worrying about it and just be 
himself. When there is something to smile about-smile, and 
when the occasion call for being serious-be serious. He is much 
too good to spoil the splendid effects he is getting by being too 
concerned about it. 74 
Ultimately, Dewey as presidential candidate was handicapped by fear-fear of his own 
good instincts and fear of making spectacular blunders. As journalist Raymond Moley 
observed in 1949, "In any analysis of the art of politics the significance of Thomas E. 
Dewey must be in the amazing fact that he went so far with so little natural political 
endowment.,,75 He was, Moley claimed, like Samuel Johnson's dog that walked on two 
legs: '''He doesn't do it very well but the amazing thing is that he can do it at all.",76 
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Chapter Four: 
The Democratic Nomination 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sixty-two years old in 1944, and in poor health. He 
had served as President of the United States for twelve years, and would be asking for 
another four. He was, without a doubt, one of the greatest politicians in American 
history. Born in 1882, Roosevelt enjoyed great privilege, traveling the world and being 
educated in schools like Groton and Harvard. When the Democrats carne to power in 
1913, under Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
a position his Republican cousin, Theodore, had once held. In 1920, he was selected to 
be the vice presidential candidate for Governor James Cox of Ohio. Of course, the 
Democratic ticket went down to defeat that year to Republicans Warren Harding and 
Calvin Coolidge, but Roosevelt was tabbed as a rising star. Then, in 1921, tragedy 
struck. In July, while vacationing in Campobello, Roosevelt was stricken with polio. He 
never walked again. Over the course of the 1920s, he worked to regain his health, and in 
1928, was elected Governor of New York. Four years later, in the midst of the Great 
Depression, he was elected President ofthe United States. He was reelected in 1936, 
and again in 1940 to an unprecedented third term. By the end of 1943, Roosevelt 
believed he would need a fourth term to win the war and to succeed where Woodrow 
Wilson had failed. "He hoped to be the architect of the postwar world and to do this it 
was necessary to win one more election."] "God knows I don't want to [run]," he told 
one advisor early in 1944, "but I may find it necessary." That spring he told Admiral 
Leahy, "I just hate to run again for election," and expressed the hope that progress in the 
124 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
war would make it unnecessary for him to be a candidate. Still, there was never any 
serious doubt that Roosevelt would not seek a fourth term in 1944. 
Several books were published about the President, as well as the New Deal, in 1944. 
The first was What Manner of Man?, a small biography written by Fortune writer Noel 
Busch. The book was part reportorial gossip, part history, and part psychoanalysis. 
Overall, Busch effectively detailed the White House life of the President, and gave 
behind the scenes glimpses ofthe Cairo and Teheran conferences-Roosevelt, for 
example, took with him fifty detective novels picked by the Library of Congress. He also 
criticized Roosevelt's "casual, illogical ways, his petulances, his taste for crises (which 
sometimes leads him to arrange a few when they do not occur naturally), and his 
occasional indulgence in grandiose administrative mismanagement.,,2 The weakest 
section of the book was Busch's attempt at what The Nation called "parlor 
psychoanalysis." For example, according to Busch, Roosevelt's 1937 battle to reorganize 
the U.S. Supreme Court "was really just a 'spoiled brat' who feels thwarted by legal 
authority.,,3 On the whole, however, Busch-whom historian Allan Nevins described as 
an excellent reporter, a mediocre historian, and a wretchedly unconvincing 
psychoanalysist-- inclined the balance in favor of Roosevelt, concluding that the 
President "still seems to be on his game, if not quite at the top of it." Another Roosevelt 
study from 1944 was Compton Mackenzie's overly sympathetic campaign biography, 
Mr. Roosevelt. The President also made an appearance in Upton Sinclair's novel, 
Presidential Agent, which was the fifth installment in Sinclair's Pulitzer Prize-winning 
Lanny Budd Series. Though Roosevelt did not write any books himself in 1944--as he 
did for the 1932 and 1936 campaigns-two collections of the President's speeches were 
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published: Rendezvous with Destiny, edited by J.B.S. Hardman, and Our American Way, 
edited by Dagobert D. Runes, and printed by the New York Philosophical Society. 
Though Roosevelt enjoyed great populatity -a Gallup poll from the summer of 1943 
revealed the President's approval at 80% in the South-- many southern Democratic 
politicians were displeased with the administration, especially over civil rights. Many 
Southerners, however, hoped there would be no need to bolt the party. They believed, 
especially after setbacks for Democrats in the elections of 1942 and 1943, Roosevelt 
could be forced to retire from politics in 1944. This faith was not confined to disaffected 
southerners. James Farley, an experienced and well-qualified observer, felt that Roosevelt 
would not run again, because public opinion had turned against him. Democrats, he 
believed, should form a "nucleus" to "organize a third party movement so strong that it 
will give these galloping wastrels so much food for thought that Mr. Roosevelt will 
voluntarily get out. Then we could nominate Harry Byrd and carry the Southern states." 
In late 1943, John U. Barr, a wealthy New Orleans manufacturer and vice president ofthe 
Southern States Industrial Council, formed the "Byrd for President Committee" which 
aimed to coordinate southern efforts to cast off the yoke of the New Deal and to place 
Virginia Senator in the White House. A serious Southern revolt, however, never 
materialized.4 
Henry A. Wallace was a problem for the President. Though he enjoyed widespread 
popularity among rank-and-file Democrats, the liberal Vice President was extremely 
unpopular with the senior leadership in the party. One strike against Wallace was his 
association with radical liberalism. As historian Robert Ferrell observed in a 1994 study 
on the Truman selection, 'The idea of liberalism still carried immense appeal, and if one 
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asked the man or woman in the street ifhe or she were a New Dealer the answer would 
have been yes. But liberalism as an ideology was losing its attraction, and by 1944 the 
good economic times of the war era made it seem almost unnecessary. Too, Wallace's 
supporters, labor unions and the small fringe of American radicals-socialists and a few 
communists-affronted the more moderate liberals, if one might so describe them; they 
did not like the militancy of wartime union leaders, nor the socialists-communists.,,5 
Furthermore, many party leaders feared Roosevelt would not live through a fourth term. 
Edwin Pauley, treasurer ofthe DNC, told party leaders in the spring of 1944, "You are 
not nominating a Vice-President ofthe United States, but a President." Indeed, Pauley, 
DNC Chairman Robert Hannegan, Bronx leader Edward Flynn, Chicago Mayor Ed 
Kelly, and Postmaster General Frank Walker-all non-Southemers-- were determined 
that Wallace would never be President of the United States. They decided to meet with 
FDR on 11 July, and convince him that Wallace must be dumped from the ticket. 
Roosevelt, who needed these men, ultimately agreed. Incidentally, his acquiescence to 
removing Wallace was also grounded in the fact that the Vice President was not very 
popular in the Senate in his role as President of that body. Wallace kept to himself, and 
had not built any strong friendships on Capitol Hill. According to historian Robert L. 
Messer, this was the death nail of Wallace's doomed candidacy. 'To avoid the problems 
of Woodrow Wilson after the first World War, Roosevelt wanted to do everything he 
could to assure Senate cooperation in the coming peacemaking.,,6 Wallace, then, had to 
go-and in fact had been approached about not running as early as May of that year. 
In the secret White House meeting with Hannegan, Walker, Pauley, Kelly, and Flynn 
on 11 July, the President discussed a number of vice presidential possibilities. The 
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consensus was that Wallace was out, and should be replaced by someone like Sam 
Rayburn of Texas, Alben Barkley of Kentucky, James Byrnes of South Carolina, or 
Harry Truman of Missouri. Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, was an 
attractive possibility, but the certification of an anti-Roosevelt slate of delegates from 
Texas to the DNC that summer demonstrated he could not control his own state. 
Rayburn's star quickly faded. Meanwhile, Barkley in the u.S. Senate was, at age sixty-
seven, deemed too old. Roosevelt's "deputy President" and close friend, James Bymes, 
was stricken from the short list due to his southern origins, racial attitudes, and poor 
relations with labor. It did not help matters for the South Carolinian that he had been 
born a Roman Catholic, but left the church upon his marriage to an Episcopalian. 
Roosevelt feared a backlash from millions of Irish Catholics in key Eastern cities. The 
President himself advocated Supreme Court Justice William o. Douglas. The associate 
justice was in his mid-forties, loved the Western outdoors, and delighted, as did FDR, in 
gossip and off-color stories. Roosevelt believed him to be a "wonderful fellow" who 
"looked and acted on occasions like a Boy Scout, and would have ... appeal at the polls-
and besides, played an interesting game of poker.,,7 Hannegan, however, insisted that 
Douglas was not a strong enough party man to have a following and would thus be 
unacceptable to state and local party leaders and their followers. Hannegan's own 
recommendation to the President was his old mentor, u.S. Senator Harry S. Truman. 
Truman, aged sixty, offered a number of positive qualities to the Democratic ticket. 
He was from Missouri, a border state-and thus had appeal in the South-and was 
considered a moderate on most issues, including race. In addition, he had served in the 
Senate for nearly ten years, and was well-known and well-liked. Whereas the ever-aloof 
128 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Wallace spent much of his time on trips abroad, "representing" FDR and ignoring 
Senators, Truman was a regular in Speaker Rayburn's private Capitol Hill hideaway, "the 
Board of Education." It was there (Room 9) that legislators-after all of the official 
business of the day had been completed-would meet for a "libation." According to 
Truman biographer David McCullough, to be invited to join Rayburn, even once or twice 
in a term, was considered a sign that one had arrived.8 More importantly, Truman was 
chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program 
(or the Truman Committee) charged with investigating wartime plants. He became very 
visible around the country, and earned a reputation for hard work, honesty, efficiency, 
and common sense. 
As the secret White House conference of 11 July drew to a close, Roosevelt declared: 
"Bob, I think you and everyone else want Truman! Ifthat's the case, it's Truman." As 
the group dispersed, Hannegan, fearing the President might change his mind, asked FDR 
to put his commitment to Truman in writing. Roosevelt agreed, writing on a scratch 
piece of paper: 
Dear Bob, 
You have written me about Harry Truman and Bill Douglas. I 
should of course, be glad to run with either of them and believe 
that either one of them would bring real strength to the ticket. 
Always sincerely, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt9 
"I know this makes you boys happy," Roosevelt said as he handed the letter to the 
chairman, "and you are the ones I am counting on to win this election. But I still think 
Douglas would have the greater public appeal." As Hannegan left the White House, he 
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looked at Walker, who had been waiting downstairs, and said "I've got it." Clearly, the 
DNC chief did not read the note. It was-with the noncommittal language and inclusion 
of Supreme Court Justice William Douglas-- not the clear statement he had requested. 
Furthermore, Roosevelt postdated it 19 July. Roosevelt, who could be cold, calculating, 
and shrewd, was also-as this episode demonstrated-in control. While older and in 
poor health, FDR was nevertheless-as he himselfunderstood-- "indispensable" to a 
Democratic victory in November, and he intended to keep his options for vice president 
open. lO 
Though Roosevelt remained noncommittal on Truman, it was clear that Wallace and 
Byrnes were out of the running. In fact, before the 11 July conference adjourned, the 
President, who disliked unpleasant tasks, instructed Walker and Hannegan to inform 
them as such. It would not be that easy. Both men were fighters, both understood 
themselves to be important to the President, and both were committed to securing the 
nomination for themselves. It did not help matters that FDR refused to confront people 
with information he knew to be disagreeable. "He always hopes to get things settled 
pleasantly," the First Lady once remarked, "and he won't realize that there are times 
when you have to do an unpleasant thing directly and perhaps unpleasantly."ll This was 
certainly the case with Wallace and Byrnes in 1944. Knowing that the "game was over," 
he nevertheless gave assurances to both men on the same day, 12 July, and only hours 
apart, that they had his support, and that they were sure to win the second spot on the 
ticket. In fact, on 10 July, when the Vice President-having been approached now a 
second time by Roosevelt intimates to withdraw from the vice presidency-- asked about 
the nomination, Roosevelt said that he was his choice, and agreed to write a letter to the 
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convention chairman indicating that "If I were a delegate to the convention I would vote 
for Henry Wallace." He cryptically added, however, that he could not bear to see 
Wallace rejected at the convention, and told the Vice President to think of his family and 
of "the catcalls and jeers and the definiteness of rejection." 12 Again, on 13 July the Vice 
President indicated that he would "withdraw at once" if Roosevelt felt him to be harmful 
to the ticket. Incredibly, Roosevelt, who had been trying to remove Wallace from the 
ticket for at least three months, replied that it was a "mighty sweet offer," but that he 
"could not think of accepting it." As Wallace later recalled, the President then drew him 
close, "turned on his full smile," and with a "very hearty handclasp" said, "While I 
cannot put it just that way in public, I hope it will be the same old team." Once again the 
President ended on a cryptic note: "Even though they do beat you out at Chicago, we will 
have a job for you in world economic affairs." It was now clear to Wallace that the 
President, despite an ambiguous presidential letter of "endorsement" to the DNC, 
"wanted to ditch me as noiselessly as possible." 13 However, as long as the President 
refused to tell him to drop out of the race, Wallace, with a 65% approval rating in the 
latest Gallup poll, planned to go to Chicago and fight for the nomination. 
James F. Byrnes, meanwhile, was an entirely different problem for Roosevelt. 
Byrnes, a former South Carolina Senator, was a close personal friend and longtime 
political ally. Ever ambitious, he had been a vice presidential hopeful four years earlier. 
After the selection of Wallace in 1940, Roosevelt nominated the disappointed Senator to 
the u.S. Supreme Court. To the surprise of many Washington insiders, Byrnes accepted 
the post, and took to the bench in June 1941. Shortly thereafter, of course, the United 
States entered World War II, and the once influential Senator began publicly complaining 
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that the cloistered atmosphere of the court gave him, as he described it, "ants in my 
pants.,,14 In early 1942, he resigned from the court and took up residence in a small 
office in the East Wing of the White House as director of the five-man Office of 
Economic Stabilization. As head ofOES, Byrnes was FDR's, "professional 'no' man" to 
all groups seeking higher wages, prices, or profits. ls In that position, it did not take him 
long to make enemies, especially within the leadership ranks of organized labor, and in 
1943, he asked to be relieved. Roosevelt then named him director ofthe Office of War 
Mobilization, in which he was responsible for presiding over "all manner of procurement, 
production, and allocation of goods and services related to the war effort." He was, one 
historian recently observed, czar over all the other wartime economic czars, and he soon 
became known in the media as "Assistant President for the home front,,16 In his role as 
"assistant" or "deputy" President, Byrnes enjoyed a free hand when it came to domestic 
concerns. "He could 'lay down the law' to cabinet officers and make independent 
decisions on priorities, personnel, and jurisdictional disputes, knowing in advance that the 
president would back him. Byrnes wanted the vice presidency, and announced through 
Hopkins that he planned to run if the president had no objections. 
On 13 July-two days after the secret leadership conference where FDR committed 
himself to either Truman or Douglas-Byrnes, unaware of that commitment, met with the 
President, who told him not to worry: "Everyone assures me that you will be nominated 
without any trouble." Byrnes, who knew the President well, was not convinced, and 
pushed the issue, turning a fifteen-minute appointment into an hour-long meeting, during 
which Roosevelt finally expressed reservations about a Byrnes candidacy. Party leaders, 
he said, "were afraid you would cost the ticket two or three hundred thousand Negro 
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votes." "Mr. President," the South Carolinian responded, "all I have heard around this 
White House for the last week is 'Negro.' 1 wonder if anybody ever thinks about the 
white people. Did you ever stop to think who could do the most for the Negro? This is a 
serious problem, but it will have to be solved by the white people of the South. IfMr. 
Wallace or Mr. Douglas says he is against the poll tax that is not news and they cannot 
change the views of southerners. But if I say I am against the poll tax that means 
something." Roosevelt agreed, but then proceeded to list a number of other disqualifying 
factors, including Byrnes's age (he was sixty-five, three years older than FDR). Waiting 
outside the Oval Office as Byrnes left was another presidential visitor, the vice president 
of the Congress ofIndustrial Organizations, Sidney Hillman. 17 
The next day over lunch with Postmaster General Frank Walker, Byrnes was informed 
about the secret leadership meeting of 11 July, and FDR's preference for either Truman 
or Douglas. "He was out," Crowley said. Byrnes, however, refused to accept defeat, and 
telephoned the President at Hyde Park. Once again, Roosevelt shamefully resorted to 
deception. "When we all went over the list," he said referring to the leadership meeting, 
"I did not say that I preferred anybody or that anybody would cost me votes, but they all 
agreed that Truman would cost fewer votes than anybody and probably Douglas second. 
This was the agreement they reached and I had nothing to do with it. I was asking 
questions. I did not express myself." Byrnes then read the President's statements to 
Hannegan, who was now confused. Still in the race (and now aware of a potential rival) 
an underhanded Byrnes called an unknowing Truman in Independence, Missouri, that 
same day, 14 July. "Harry," Byrnes said, "the President has given me the go sign for the 
Vice Presidency and 1 am calling up to ask if you will nominate me." Truman readily 
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agreed. Shortly thereafter, Byrnes left for Chicago prepared to force himself upon the 
convention. He, of course, did not. 18 
The fall of Byrnes's candidacy has been the subject of much speculation. In his 
excellent The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins 
of the Cold War (1982), historian Robert Messer made an interesting case that Byrnes 
was nothing more than Roosevelt's unacceptable anti-Wallace candidate-a pawn to 
make Truman, Roosevelt's real choice, seem more acceptable to horrified pro-Wallace 
liberals. Though Messer gave Roosevelt too much credit as a master strategist-glossing 
over the disarray in the White House that luly-- the President clearly did not want Byrnes 
as a running-mate. As in the case with Wallace, he was unwilling to be honest and injure 
feelings. The problem with Byrnes, however, was that he threatened to divide the anti-
Wallace vote with Truman, and thus allow Wallace, who in fact had strong delegate 
support, to walk away with the nomination. Truman, meanwhile, could not be discarded 
because he was acceptable to labor, while Byrnes was not. In 1943, the "assistant 
president" had clashed with labor over the latter's demands for increased pay due to 
higher costs ofliving caused by the raising of prices by manufacturers and of higher rents 
due to wartime housing shortages. Byrnes, however, insisted upon (and boldly declared) 
a policy of "hold the line." The President desperately needed the support of labor in this 
election. Dewey was a tough opponent, and besides, many Roosevelt voters were in the 
military serving overseas, while others were workers laboring in new localities, where 
voter registration could often be difficult, if not impossible. The CIO's Sidney Hillman, 
who had met with FDR in the Oval Office a few days before the DNC convened in 
Chicago, was "violently" opposed to Byrnes, but supportive of Truman. Byrnes was then 
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out ofthe running, and he was infonned as much on Monday, 17 July, the opening day of 
the convention. The reason-a convenient excuse that may have been planned by FDR 
all along-- given to Byrnes was that the President had stipulated that any vice presidential 
pick must be first cleared by CIO leaders, including Sidney Hillman, and that he (Byrnes) 
had failed to secure clearance. Though deeply bitter, Byrnes did not resign his White 
House position, nor did he bolt the party. Instead, he graciously released Truman from 
his pledge to nominate him, and then quietly left Chicago. He gave only one speech in 
support of the Democratic ticket that fall, however. 
On 19 July, Democrats arrived in Chicago to hold their twenty-ninth national 
convention. Unlike Republicans, who had met in the same place a few weeks earlier, 
Democrats were in a festive mood. The war was being won, the economy was booming, 
and Franklin Roosevelt had consented, once again, to be a candidate for reelection. 
Though sometimes fragmented along many different policy and ideological lines, 
Democrats rallied one last time behind their leader-a man they understood to be 
"indispensable" to both party unity and electoral victory. Delegates-equipped with red, 
white, and blue fluorescent victory "V's"-- were confident and enthusiastic, and very 
partisan. Chicago Stadium was decorated in a "grand manner," with thirty-eight life-size, 
highly colored cardboard cut-outs of service men and women in battle poses, and 
positioned toward the delegates' seats from every comer of the hall. In addition, large 
black and white portraits ofthe fourteen Democratic presidents from Thomas Jefferson to 
Franklin Roosevelt were placed over the balcony. An eight-foot colored image ofFDR's 
face, meanwhile, looked down on the convention floor from the highest point of the 
northwest girders. Often overshadowed by the vice presidential selection struggle, the 
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1944 Democratic National Convention was itself remarkable by its old-fashioned, 
peacetime, hardball, "politics as usual" tone. Two speeches, in particular, stood out as 
especially noteworthy-and harsh. 
The first was the Keynote Address delivered by Oklahoma Governor Robert S. Kerr, 
whom The Washington Post described as a "strapping and eloquent orator of the old 
school.,,19 Republicans, Kerr declared, were hateful, blind, and obstructionist, and their 
young presidential nominee a vague, inexperienced, and reactionary disciple of Herbert 
Hoover. "Who," he asked, "will represent the United States of America? An untried 
leader who has not even told his own people what his views are? Or the man who has 
from the start declared his position in clear and certain words, and who has the respect 
and esteem of all the United Nations as no other living American?" In addition, the 
Oklahoman took Dewey to task for characterizing, in his speech before the RNC, the 
Roosevelt administration as a group of "tired old men." "Let us examine the record," 
Kerr exclaimed. 
Shall we discard as a 'tired old man,' the fifty-nine year-old Admiral 
Nimitz? 
Shall we discard as a 'tired old man,' the Lion of the Pacific, sixty-two 
year-old Admiral Halsey? 
Shall we stop his onward sweep to redeem the Philippine Islands and 
discard as a 'tired old man,' sixty-four year-old General Douglas 
MacArthur? 
Shall we discard as a 'tired old man' the Chief of all our Naval Forces, 
sixty-six year-old Admiral King? 
Shall we discard as a 'tired old man,' the greatest military leader of our 
nation, sixty-four year-old General George C. Marshall? 
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No, Mr. Dewey, we know we are winning this war with these 'tired old 
men,' including the sixty-two year-old Franklin D. Roosevelt as their 
Commander-in-Chief!2o 
Convention delegates then broke out into a thirty-nine-minute demonstration. The 
Governor was not finished, however. Dewey, he charged, was an isolationist in 
disguise-another Harding-who sought to crucify FDR just as the Old Guard had done 
to the "great-hearted Woodrow Wilson" some twenty-five years previous. Then, in an 
obvious attempt to neutralize one of Dewey's more promising positions-i.e. that the 
next administration would be a peacetime one-Kerr argued that Republicans could not 
be trusted at home once the war was over. Reminding Americans of Hoover's "stupid 
and brutal" crushing of the Bonus Army in 1932, he declared that "When this war is won, 
a grateful nation will not forget, nor go back on its returning service men and women; nor 
will this nation go back to a Republican Administration that did go back on the returning 
servicemen of World War 1.,,21 
The most heated and controversial point of Kerr's speech, however, was a question he 
raised about midway through his text. Criticizing Republican isolationists in Congress 
prior to Pearl Harbor, he asked, "Shall we restore to power the party whose national 
leadership, under the domination of isolationists, scrapped and sank more of our fleet 
than was destroyed by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor? [italics added] Or can we fail to 
support the Democratic Administration under which America has become the greatest 
naval power on earth?,,22 Dewey, meeting with his cabinet in Albany, made no comment. 
Surprisingly, Kerr's speech motivated little public response. Among the nation's major 
newspapers, only the Republican-friendly Chicago Daily Tribune chimed in, observing, 
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"One thing we know: When we suffered the disgraceful defeat at Pearl Harbor the 
commander-in-chiefwas not a Republican.,,23 
The following day, Indiana Senator (and Permanent Chairman of the convention) 
Samuel Jackson described 1944 as a "fateful" election, and warned that "in the fiercest, 
most devastating war mankind has ever known" a Democratic defeat would mean 
battleships for Hirohito and legions for Hitler. "Frankly," Jackson continued, "could 
Goebbels do better himself to bolster Axis morale than the word that the American 
people had upset this administration ... ? We must not allow the American ballot box to 
be made Hitler's secret weapon!" 24 Jackson's speech was but one example of an aspect 
of the 1944 campaign often overlooked-Nazi-baiting by Democrats and other Roosevelt 
supporters. Throughout the fall, there were numerous references to Dewey's "Hitler 
mustache" in speeches and campaign literature. For example, one pro-Roosevelt leaflet, 
paid for by the Socialist Party of Oregon, read: 
Behind the mask of 'Tom Thumb' 'Double-Talk' Dewey and his 'Hitler 
Mustache' stands Hog-Joweled, Heartless Hoover, every Labor Union 
Wrecker, Ku Kluxer, Jew-Baiter, Poll-Taxer, Negro-Hater, Press 
Prostitute, Radio Rat, Putrid Pulpiteer and ghoulish War Profiteer! IF 
YOU'RE SCREWY ... VOTE FOR DEWEy!25 
Supporters of Dewey, including John Foster Dulles and Senator Gerald Nye, were also 
charged with being pro-Hitler. "U.S. Fascists Want. .. [Dewey] in the White House," 
declared a publication of the New York County American Labor Party. 
They Like Dewey-and Our Enemies Too 
December 6, 1941 ... Pro-Axis 
November 7, 1944 ... Pro-Dewey 
They Have Not Changed!26 
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The Democratic Party itself, as suggested by Jackson's speech, focused more on Hitler 
and morale. Late in the campaign, for example, the office of Roosevelt aide Harry 
Hopkins considered circulating a report that the German Chief of Staff had urged Hitler 
to seek an armistice. Hitler, however-the report claimed-- "rejected the proposal on the 
ground that an election was coming up in the United States and if Roosevelt was defeated 
and Dewey elected the unity ofthe United Nations might be shattered, especially in view 
of Dewey's statements with reference to Russia.,,27 Following Jackson's speech before 
the DNC, Dewey, once again-- fearful of igniting political passions, mobilizing the 
Democratic base, and splintering the Republican Party-- said nothing. 
The first night of the convention was also decision time for Truman. That day FDR's 
letter "endorsing" Wallace-written three days earlier-- was released. "I have been 
associated with Henry Wallace during his past four years as Vice President, for eight 
years earlier while he was Secretary of Agriculture, and well before that," Roosevelt 
informed Chairman Jackson. "I like him and 1 respect him and he is my personal friend. 
For these reasons 1 personally would vote for his nomination if! were a delegate to the 
convention. At the same time, 1 do not wish to appear in any way as dictating to the 
Convention. Obviously the Convention must to the deciding.,,28 While it appeared to 
some to be "the coolest and cruelest brushoff in all the long Roosevelt career," Wallace 
and his supporters were hopeful. At least-or so they thought-there candidate was the 
only one mentioned by the President in writing.29 
Unlike Wallace, Byrnes, and others, the Missouri senator did not want the nomination. 
On 13 July, just six days before the convention was to convene, Truman wrote to his wife 
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Bess from Kansas City about an exchange with a Kansas City Star reporter named Roy 
Roberts. "Just gave Mr. Roberts a tough interview saying I didn't want the Vice 
Presidency. Mr. Roberts says I have it in the bag if I don't say no-and I've said it as 
tough as I can.,,30 Indeed, Truman had pledged his support to Byrnes. In another 
exchange with reporters in Chicago on 19 July-- the opening day of the convention-- the 
Senator, responding to a reporter's remark that as Vice President he might "succeed to 
the throne," insisted, "Hell, I don't want to be president.,,3! "I'm satisfied with where I 
am," he told another.32 That night from Truman's room in Chicago's Stevens Hotel, 
Hannegan placed a call to Roosevelt on the West Coast. Roosevelt asked Hannegan, 
"Have you got that fellow lined up yet?" to which the Chairman replied he had not. 
"Well, tell the Senator," Roosevelt shouted, "that ifhe wants to break up the Democratic 
party by staying out, he can; but he knows as well as I what that might mean at this 
dangerous time in the world. Ifhe wants to do it, anyway, let him go ahead." The 
President then slammed down the phone. The Senator was stunned. "Well, if that's the 
situation," he told Hannegan, "I'll have to say yes. But why the hell didn't he tell me in 
the first placeT33 
The second day of the convention also witnessed the nominations for President. There 
was never any real doubt that Roosevelt would be granted a fourth campaign. On the 
evening of 20 July, the roll call began, and Roosevelt's name was placed in official 
nomination by Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, a feisty Democrat who had, on 
occasion, broken with the President on domestic issues. Roosevelt, Barkley declared, 
was "endowed with the intellectual boldness of Thomas Jefferson, the indomitable 
courage of Andrew Jackson, the faith and patience of Abraham Lincoln, the rugged 
140 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
integrity of Grover Cleveland, and the scholarly vision of Woodrow Wilson.,,34 A thirty-
minute floor demonstration followed Barkley's speech, and then Roosevelt's name was 
seconded by four others, including Vice President Wallace, who described the President 
as "the greatest liberal in the history of the U.S." and as "the most experienced military 
strategist" to ever occupy the presidency.35 Wallace's speech was preceded by one from 
Mrs. Fred T. Nooney, a delegate from Florida, who-without his knowledge or consent--
placed the name of Virginia Senator Harry Byrd into nomination. He was, Nooney said, 
a man of integrity and courage who fully believed "in the principles of democracy as laid 
down by our forefathers, those great lawmakers of our nation, who firmly and 
unswervingly believed that a President of these United States should serve no more than 
two terms in office." "I think it is time," she concluded, "to go back to Virginia, the 
cradle of Democracy, for a true Democratic President to lead us out of the maze of red 
tape and centralized bureaucratic governmental control.,,36 Byrd's nomination was 
shortly thereafter seconded by the Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia delegations. Byrd 
poised no serious challenge to the President, and Roosevelt, of course, easily won 
renomination on the first ballot. He received 1,086 votes to Byrd's 89.37 
That night, 20 July, Roosevelt delivered his acceptance speech to the Democratic 
National Convention. Unlike previously, he did not accept from the convention hall. 
Instead, he addressed enthusiastic Democrats live and over the radio from an undisclosed 
location. Six days earlier, he had departed Hyde Park, making his way by rail to Marine 
Base, San Diego, where, in a small, specially-equipped train car, he planned to officially 
accept his party's nomination before traveling, covertly, by cruiser to Pearl Harbor. 
Accompanying Roosevelt were Admiral McIntire (White House physician), Samuel 
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Rosenman (speechwriter), Elmer Davis (head of the Office of War Information), Dr. 
Howard Bruenn (heart specialist), and Grace Tully (the President's secretary), among a 
few others. As the President prepared to deliver his speech, moving-picture and still 
cameras and radio broadcasting equipment were brought into the tiny rail car to 
document the event. Meanwhile, on the convention floor in Chicago, delegates listened 
to writer Quentin Reynolds introduce the President. Reynolds, who had just returned 
from visiting with troops, spoke of soldiers' hopes for the future. "Your sons know this," 
he said. "[T]hey know that all of America has contributed to making the victory possible. 
But they also know one other thing. They know that this mighty achievement. .. was 
accomplished under the leadership of their Commander-in-Chief and ours-Franklin D. 
Roosevelt." Then, amidst thunderous applause, Chairman Jackson announced: "Ladies 
and gentlemen of the Convention: the President ofthe United States!,,38 
"Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Convention, My Friends," the President 
began. "I have already indicated to you why I accept the nomination that you offered 
me-in spite of my desire to retire to the quiet of private life. You in this Convention are 
aware of what we have sought to gain for the Nation, and you have asked me to 
continue." Roosevelt then announced that he would not campaign "in the usual sense." 
"In these days oftragic sorrow, I do not consider it fitting. And besides, in these days of 
global warfare, I shall not be able to find the time." He did, however, qualify the 
statement, adding that he would "feel free to report to the people the facts about matters 
of concern to them and especially to correct any misrepresentations.,,39 
Overall, Roosevelt's speech was nonpartisan in nature, and aimed at highlighting his 
role as commander-in-chief. Elegant and above the foray, the President told his listeners 
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that he was presently at a naval base perfonning his duty under the Constitution. "The 
war waits for no elections," he declared. "Decisions must be made-plans must be 
laid-strategy must be carried out. They do not concern merely a party or a group. They 
will affect the daily lives of Americans for generations to come." He then pledged 
himself to three goals: to win the war, to fonn an international organization with anned 
forces to prevent another war, and to provide returning veterans and all Americans with 
employment and decent standards ofliving.4o In a long series of "They will decide" 
sentences, he then cited his administration's record in both foreign and domestic policy. 
"They will decide on the record-the record written on the seas, on the land, in the skies. 
They will decide on the record of our domestic accomplishments in recovery and refonn 
since March 4, 1933, and they will decide on the record of our war production and food 
production-unparalleled in all history, in spite of the doubts and sneers of those in high 
places who said 'It can't be done.'" 
Roosevelt then ended his speech by doing two things that were very uncharacteristic 
for him-he admitted mistakes and he read a quote. In an attempt to preempt Republican 
attacks that he was unprepared for war in December 1941, Roosevelt admitted, "We have 
made mistakes. Who has not? Things have not always been perfect. Are they ever 
perfect in human affairs?" No, but the objective, he insisted, remained clear, and that 
was to win the war and secure a lasting peace for generations to come. The quote he read 
was from Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, delivered after the nation's last 
wartime election. Assuring voters that like Lincoln, he too looked forward to the coming 
peace, closed by reading: 
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with finnness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let 
us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the Nation's 
wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for 
his widow, and his orphan-to do all which may achieve and 
cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all 
nations. ,41 
The convention hall erupted in prolonged applause. Meanwhile, inside Roosevelt's 
special rail car, a photographer snapped what turned out to be a very unfortunate and 
unflattering picture of the President. With his mouth open-probably in mid-speech-
Roosevelt looked old, haggard, and ill. Not surprisingly, it soon made itself into 
circulation, and as one White House intimate observed, "started tongues wagging ... all 
through the United States.,,42 
After the President's speech, party leaders in Chicago prepared for the vice presidential 
vote the following day, Friday, 21 July. Their plan to put Truman over the top was two-
fold. One was to release Hannegan' s note from FDR (postdated 19 July) that stated he 
would "be very glad to run with either" Truman or Douglas. The letter was printed in the 
Friday morning (21 July) newspapers, and, of course, generated much excitement. The 
other was to spread the word, delegation to delegation, that Roosevelt was convinced 
Truman would cost him fewer votes than any other candidate. That evening-after the 
fonnal nominations of Wallace, Truman, and Barkley-roll call began. On the first 
ballot, Wallace received 429 )'i votes, just 160 votes short of the necessary 589. Truman 
came in second with a strong 319 )'i votes. On the second ballot, which occurred 
immediately after the first, Truman picked up support and secured the nomination, 
receiving 1,031 votes to Wallace's 105. Chainnan Jackson then announced, "Will the 
next Vice President of the United States come to the rostrum? Will Senator Truman 
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come?" Truman made his way to the stage, and reading from a sheet of paper, said: 
"Honor. I've never had a job I didn't do with all I have. I shall continue in the new 
capacity as I have in the u.s. Senate, to help the commander-in-chiefto win the war and 
save the peace. I have always been a supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt in domestic and 
foreign policy and I shall continue to do just that with everything I have as V.P.,,43 
Truman proved to be a good choice, but he too was not without some flaws. He was, 
for example, associated with the corrupt Kansas City boss, Tom Pendergast, and as such, 
was viewed by some as small, petty, and not especially bright. The Republican nominee 
had made his career on fighting corruption, and some Democrats feared that Truman 
would play into Dewey's "campaign story." Also, the Senator was a very dull fonnal 
speaker. He was at his best unscripted, but an unscripted Truman was an invitation to 
disaster. Listening to the Democratic convention from Albany, Thomas Dewey told a 
visitor that he was pleased with Roosevelt's selection of Truman. "Why, Herb [Brownell] 
ought to send him a check for that," Dewey joked. "Truman will help us more than he'll 
help Roosevelt. ,,44 
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Chapter Five: 
The Making of a Wartime Campaign 
The 1942 elections gave the Republicans reason for cautious optimism for the White 
House in 1944. The GOP could begin with a bedrock of support of about twenty million 
votes to offset Roosevelt's high wartime approval rating. If the GOP could add 
approximately ten million independent votes to its column in 1944, a Republican victory, 
party leaders believed, was very possible. Democrats, not surprisingly, interpreted the 
midterm results very differently. Their studies of the party's 1942 decline revealed that 
Democratic setbacks were the result not of Republican popularity, but of a fall-off in 
voter participation. Only twenty-eight million people voted in the 1942 elections, eight 
million fewer than in 1938, and nearly twenty-two million fewer than in 1940.1 This 
drop in participation, Democrats believed, reflected wartime social upheaval: "young 
men in the armed forces lacked the opportunity or incentive to cast absentee ballots, and 
war workers who had recently taken jobs in different states could not meet [one and 
sometimes two-year] residency requirements.,,2 Inconvenience and time away from work 
without pay were additional factors in the low participation levels of 1942. This decline 
in turnout hit Democrats, who relied heavily upon draft-age voters and the working 
classes, especially hard. "In district after district the Republican vote fell slightly or 
remained stable, but the Democratic vote dropped precipitously.,,3 Victory in the 1944 
presidential contest, Democrats concluded, depended primarily upon a high turnout of 
voters. 
Thomas Dewey waged a competent, efficient, centrist, and serious (if unsuccessful) 
campaign against "the Champ" in 1944. In fact, Dewey's campaign was unique to 
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presidential elections in at least four important ways. First, it began early-several 
weeks, in fact, before Labor Day, and the traditional start of the fall campaign. In July, 
immediately after the Republican convention in Chicago, Herbert Brownell, Dewey's 
campaign manager launched a media blitz that included the printing of one thousand 
posters bearing Dewey's image, the publication of campaign literature and songs, news 
reels, and the production of five million "Dewey for President" buttons and banners. 
Furthermore, Dewey's campaign was built around radio-a medium he as an attorney felt 
comfortable with. In this last campaign of the pre-television age, he delivered twenty-
four nationally broadcast addresses. Also, the Dewey campaign was oriented toward 
only two dozen northern, central, and western states, which controlled a majority in the 
Electoral College, and which, in 1944, had Republican governors. Realizing that 
elections were won in the precincts, and not in the newspaper headlines, Dewey carefully 
cultivated local leaders who were responsible for delivering votes in their areas. Thus, 
when he began personally campaigning by rail in September, he spent most of his time 
not at rallies and other public appearances, but behind closed doors with local Republican 
leaders. After his meetings with local leaders at various stops around the country, he held 
press conferences, repeating local complaints about the administration, but carefully 
refraining from endorsing it. This technique, one journalist following Dewey observed, 
"made him the sounding board for every complaint of disgruntled people.,,4 Lastly, 
Dewey's campaign was the first to rely heavily upon opinion polls in determining 
candidate messages, appearance schedules, and national strategies. He did not bother 
campaigning in the solidly Democratic South. 
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In a confidential memorandum to Stanley High, dated 5 September, Dewey articulated 
a number of basic themes to be emphasized in the campaign. "Each of these themes," 
Dewey wrote, "really ought to be in every speech. That is impossible, but that is the 
objective toward which I should like to attempt to go." One was that the next 
administration would be largely a peacetime administration. "This should be said over 
and over again," Dewey wrote. Another theme was that you could "change horses in 
mid-stream" and still be compatible with obtaining victory. Alluding to Prime Minister 
Neville Chamberlain's fall (and Winston Churchill's rise) in the spring of 1940, Dewey 
observed "The difference between us and the British is that the British did it [i.e. changed 
administrations] earlier [in the war]. We have changed governments [from Democratic to 
Republican] in most of the states [since 1941] and greatly strengthened the war effort and 
thereby speeded victory." Evoking the memory of Woodrow Wilson toward a far 
different conclusion than Democrats, Dewey insisted that Roosevelt and his 
administration were "tired, old men." As he had charged in a speech before the 
American Newspapers Publishers' Association that spring, the United States "must not 
repeat the tragic error of twenty-five years ago. The central error of our course in 1919 
was the false assumption that words could create peace ... Men everywhere wanted to feel 
that a treaty which proclaimed peace would suffice to assure it and that from there on 
they could relax ... Within a few years the reality of Germany bore no relation whatever 
to the word picture of Versailles. This was because those who drafted the treaty were 
tired war leaders. They could not find within themselves the physical and mental 
strength to make the peace a living reality [italics added].,,5 
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In addition, Dewey stressed that the New Deal was detennined to keep young men in 
the Anny after the war. "They have been saying for six months," he wrote, "that they 
intend to keep the young men in the Anny because there will be no jobs. We propose to 
bring them home to the earliest practical moment and leave occupation of our defeated 
enemies to volunteers." Then there was the theme of "jobs-jobs-jobs." According to 
the Republican nominee, he offered "competence in reconversion" over the New Deal's 
incompetent economic bungling-which, he stressed, had failed for eight years before the 
war to cure the Depression. Dewey also stressed that taxes under Roosevelt were 
"unendurable," and that small business, which had been choked by the New Deal, was 
the root of every big business, and the way the nation prospered. Finally, Dewey 
instructed his surrogates that the following be emphasized about himself: that he had 
administrative ability; was inclusive to "all races, creeds, color and shades of political 
opinion," and that he was optimistic about the future of America and had faith in a free 
society as against a regimented, totalitarian one. The catch-phrase for all of these themes 
was the message-which Dewey stressed should be "repeated and repeated"-- that "It is 
time for a change.,,6 
That same month, September, the RNC published a small pamphlet entitled What to 
Talk About to assist Republican leaders taking an active part in the Dewey-Bricker 
campaign. "Every speech should be an attack speech," the RNC declared. "We have to 
have hardhitting, down-to-earth, chapter-and-verse material showing how flagrantly ... 
the New Deal has failed." In addition, "Every speech ought to have some material 
deliberately designed to interest and appeal to women." The women's vote, the party 
recognized, would be decisive, with up to 60% of all votes cast by women. Speakers 
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should also, "somewhere, state the fact that the Dewey administration will be in office 
from January 20, 1945 to January 20, 1949," and that it would be not a war, but a 
peacetime administration. The chief problem for a President Dewey would not be what 
America requires to win the war, "but what America will require after the war is won." 
Another talking point emphasized by the RNC was optimism. "It cannot be said too 
often that what Thomas E. Dewey offers is a Get-up and Get-Going American Future ... 
[and] that this year we can end our wanderings in the New Deal's Defeatist Wilderness." 
Foreshadowing a theme made popular in the 1984 Ronald Reagan reelection campaign, 
the Republican committee added: "America is at the morning of her destiny!" Finally, 
the RNC emphasized the need for "a return to character and integrity in government and 
in the men who govern... This year the American people want a return to a leadership 
that has deep moral convictions and the faith of our forebears. These should be a great 
emphasis on those things which, on the deeper levels of life, really matter." The 
pamphlet also articulated for speakers "Our Three Basic Issues," including: "It's Time To 
Change," "Winning The War And The Peace," and "Jobs After Victory.,,7 
The Roosevelt strategy for the fall, meanwhile, was to distance the President from 
partisan politics, and stress instead his role as wartime commander-in-chief. During the 
Democratic National Convention in July, Roosevelt was conspicuously absent, inspecting 
naval and maritime bases in California-"too busy," it appeared, with his presidential 
duties to worry with politics and accept his party's nomination in person. In August, 
Roosevelt traveled to Hawaii to meet with General Douglas MacArthur, and in early 
September, he attended the Second Quebec Conference with British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill. The President's goal was to look "presidential," and emphasize his 
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role as commander-in-chief Meanwhile, Senator Truman would bear the burden of 
stumping the country. This "Rose Garden" strategy, however, was riddled with risks, 
including conforming to the Republican charge that Democrats were tired and 
disinterested in domestic affairs, and that the President himself was old, in poor health, 
and unable to wage a vigorous campaign, much less serve out a fourth term. With Dewey 
pulling ahead of RooseveIt in the polls in early September, Democratic leaders began 
pressuring Roosevelt to abandon his "Rose Garden" strategy and actually campaign. In 
late September, he agreed. 
Specifically, FDR-through surrogates, pamphlets, and radio advertising--
endeavored to win the election by presenting the to the American people a platform of 
experience and accomplishment, and the necessity of continuity in the war effort, First, 
Roosevelt stressed the legislative accomplishments of his administration versus the 
promises of Dewey. Typical of this line of argument was "For What the Hell Should We 
Apologize? ," a speech delivered by Mark Etheridge, publisher of the Courier-Journal 
and the Louisville Times, before the Oklahoma Democratic State Convention in May 
1944 (and published and distributed by the DNC that fall). Citing various pieces of 
alphabet legislation, Etheridge chided those Democrats, who occasionally spoke of the 
administration with a note of apology in their voices. "Is any Democrat ashamed that we 
took a banking structure which had had 5,770 failures in the four years of Hoover. .. and 
restored confidence, virtually eliminated failures and insured losses?," he asked. "Are we 
not proud that through housing projects all over this country, we have taken people out of 
the squalor and filth of rat-infested slums and given them a chance to breathe good air 
and their children a chance to be something better than gutter rats? ... Are we ashamed of 
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TVA and its twenty-one dams? .. Are we ashamed that we fed the poor and the 
unemployed? Are we ashamed that because of us, old people are drawing pensions all 
over the country ... ? Do we dare apologize for the fact that we have enlightened child 
labor laws, or minimum wage and maximum hours laws?"s 
Another talking point pushed by the administration was the argument that the political 
and economic preparation for international peace and postwar security should be left to 
those who had been waging the war and had been in constant association with the Allies. 9 
In addition, the President and his team implied that any fundamental change in the 
civilian government would imperil postwar security and give an opportunity, which the 
incumbents would not, to isolationists and economic "Tories" to tum back the clock of 
progress and invite World War 111. 10 The safe-as well as deserved-course was to give 
a "vote of confidence" to the Commander-in-Chief who had directed a successful war. II 
The Roosevelt campaign also kept a record of all of Dewey's public statements, 
searching them for misstatements and contradictions, in an effort to portray the New 
York Governor as inexperienced, uncertain, and opportunistic. Though Roosevelt 
enjoyed-as his campaign platform indicated-- enormous advantages, they were not 
sufficient by themselves to win the election. Victory required not only the right issues, 
but also organization and enthusiasm to inspire voters to the polls. 
There were several obstacles confronting Democrats in the area of voter turnout-
obstacles they had been unable to overcome in the midterm elections two years earlier. 
One problem was that many young voters were serving overseas in the armed forces. In 
the midst of a global war, these young citizen-soldiers often lacked the opportunity or 
incentive to request and then cast absentee ballots. Another problem was that many 
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wartime workers, as discussed earlier, were on the move in the search of work in various 
war industries. If workers crossed state lines~and many did~they were confronted with 
residency requirements which hindered voting. For example, in 1944, five states 
demanded two years of residency to vote, while thirty-two others insisted on at least one 
year. 12 Furthermore, workers who did meet residency requirements were often reluctant 
to forfeit wages by taking time off, and those working night shifts or overtime found 
voting an inconvenience. It did not help matters that many war plants were on the 
outskirts of towns, often requiring a timely and potentially costly commute. As the 1944 
campaign season approached, Democrats, who relied heavily upon younger and working 
class voters, were desperate to energize and activate eligible voters. DNC chairman 
Robert E. Hannegan, addressing the party's national convention that July, expressed this 
strategy publicly. "Our job," he said, "is to go to the people of America and lay the facts 
before them. It is to cite the record. It is to tell the simple truth. Our job is to see to it 
that our people are registered. It is to see to it that they vote. It is to work for as big a 
soldier vote as we can get. It is to go the American people, person-to-person.,,13 
Essential to a Democratic victory in 1944 was a heavy tum-out among soldiers. In 
1944, over nine million young men were in the U.S. armed services, five million of 
whom were stationed overseas. Since both Democrats and Republicans believed the 
presidential election would be close, the issue of soldier voting became very 
controversial, and raised several important questions. Could ballots reach soldiers 
fighting overseas in time? Who should be responsible for administering ballots, the states 
or the federal government? Would state and local elections be included on those ballots, 
or just the presidential contest? The Roosevelt administration-- perceiving that most 
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servicemen supported their commander-in-chief-- sought to make it as easy as possible 
for soldiers to cast a ballot. Thus, in June 1943, the administration's plan for soldier 
voting, the Green-Lucas Bill, was introduced in Congress. Overall, it aimed to simplify 
absentee voting by giving ballots to all servicemen in advance of federal elections, and 
allowing them to mark it at the appropriate time-instead of requiring each soldier to 
apply for a ballot, wait to receive it, and execute it weeks later. A special bipartisan War 
Ballot Commission (WBC) was also proposed to oversee the entire process. Republicans 
and southern Democrats immediately cried foul. Republicans expressed concern that the 
bill lacked proper safeguards against voter intimidation, and the appointment by the 
President of Republicans with "pink," New Deal tendencies to the WBC. Southern 
Democrats, meanwhile, "feared any proposal that might undermine state control of voting 
and enfranchise Negro servicemen.,,14 A common concern, however, was the bill's 
challenge to states' rights. Critics, such as Democrat John Rankin of Mississippi, 
complained that the bill would "create' a super-bureaucracy' and 'wipe out State laws 
and State qualifications for the electors in violation of the Constitution.' The sponsors, 
he added, had a 'wild desire to concentrate into the hands of the Federal Government all 
power over elections. '" 15 
In an effort to rectify some of those problems, Democratic Senators John McClellan of 
Arkansas, James Eastland of Mississippi, and Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, proposed 
a "state control" bill. The bill, which passed Congress in March 1944 and became law 
without a presidential signature, provided for a federal ballot only when a state expressly 
approved its use, and when a soldier had applied for and failed to receive an absentee 
ballot. 16 In Albany, meanwhile, Thomas Dewey led the nation in reforming absentee 
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voting procedures, pushing through the legislature in July 1944, the New York Soldier 
Vote Law. Under this law, every member of the anned forces from New York would be 
given a postcard. The soldier would then have to sign his name and his home and service 
address on that card and mail it to the War Ballot Commission at Albany. Should a 
soldier fail to receive a postcard, a simple letter or card to friends or family would serve 
the purpose if sent to the state capitol. The infonnation would then be processed, and the 
soldier shortly thereafter would receive a full ballot with the name of every state, local, 
and federal candidate for office printed on it. 17 Not all soldiers, of course, were for 
Roosevelt. One of those in the minority favoring Dewey was a young combat pilot from 
South Dakota named George S. McGovern. ''I'm going to be more than disgusted if 
Dewey doesn't win," the future Democratic nominee for President (1972) wrote a friend 
back home. "I really think we need a man like Dewey in there now! 1 like the vigor and 
efficiency that he has shown in the past and even in the way he is conducting his 
campaign. 1 think he'll do a lot toward clearing up all the dozen and one messes that the 
government is in now. For one thing he has a fairly definite attitude toward everything 
really vital and that's something the New Deal certainly hasn't had.,,18 
To get their messages out, the Dewey and Roosevelt campaigns relied upon a number 
of organizations and donors. The 1944 presidential election was one of the first to fall 
under the limits of campaign finance refonn. In 1939, Congress passed (and the 
President signed) the Hatch Act, which, among other things, limited the national 
committees to raising and spending no more than $3,000,000 per calendar year. Also, the 
act limited individual contributions to a national campaign to only $5,000 per year. With 
this act, the role of the national committees, which traditionally provided the leadership 
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and coordination of a national campaign(including getting voters to the polls, raising 
money, scheduling speakers, and getting the party message out via pamphlets, 
newspapers, and radio), forever changed; no longer would they play the dominant 
organizational role in a presidential campaign. Since the Hatch Act did not "apply to 
contributions made to or by a State or local committee or other State and local 
organization," money continued to pour into presidential campaigns-just not through 
the national committees. Individual donations over $5,000 could still be given, but not in 
one place (such as the national committee). Instead, individuals (and for that matter, 
corporations) would have to distribute their donations through various independent and 
auxiliary groups, which, of course, did not have raising or spending caps. For example, 
an individual wanting to financially support Dewey for President in 1944, could donate 
$5,000 to the Republican National Committee, as well as to numerous other state, local, 
and independent organizations, such as: Democrats for Dewey, the All-American 
Committee for Dewey and Bricker, the Aviation Committee for Dewey, the People's 
Committee to Defend Life Insurance and Savings, the Southern Anti-New Deal 
Association, the Girls Who Save Their Nickels to Elect a Republican President Club, the 
United Republican Finance Committee of Metropolitan New York, and the American 
Democratic National Committee-to name only a few. In all, Republican sate and 
finance committees spent more than nine million dollars in support of the Dewey-Bricker 
ticket. 
The American Democratic National Committee (ADNC) was one of the largest and 
more interesting independent groups to support Republicans in 1944. Like most 
independent groups, its name was meant to attract certain voters-in this case, 
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Democrats. The ADNC was founded in early 1944 by a group of conservative 
Democrats, including Roosevelt's former Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring, and 
former Missouri Senator James A. Reed. The purpose of this group was to oppose 
Roosevelt's fourth term bid, and in June, shortly before the Republican and Democratic 
national conventions, the ADNC held a convention in Chicago~attended by several of 
the "Texas Regulars"~and decided against the formation of a third party. They 
dedicated themselves instead to work to "defeat the Democratic candidate and to elect the 
candidate of the Republican Party." By November the ADNC had established state 
organizations in thirty-six states~all, of course, independent ofthe RNC. Like the 
"Democrats for Dewey"~a Republican-planned group that often affiliated with the 
ADNC~the ADNC believed Roosevelt had led their party from it traditional values. 
They were especially offended by the influence of Sidney Hillman's CIO and other 
"leftist" elements in the Democratic Party. 19 
Among pro-Roosevelt organizations, Sidney Hillman's CIO-PAC was the most 
important. Hillman, aged fifty-seven, was a Lithuanian-born Jew, who in 1944, was 
former head of the powerful labor federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO). As a young man he had been a member of the Socialist Party, had met and been 
captivated by Leon Trotsky, and had published a small book, entitled Reconstruction of 
Russia and the Task o.fLabor (1922), that was sympathetic toward the goals of the newly 
formed Soviet Union.2o In response to the Smith-Connolly Act of 1943, which prohibited 
campaign contributions from labor organizations, Hillman formed the Political Action 
Committee (PAC) in July of that same year. The PAC was not a political party, but an 
organization "to educate the people on their political rights and how to use them to 
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improve their own conditions and to help banish poverty and the fear of poverty from our 
land.,,2! It stood against every reactionary force, while standing for (1) a complete Allied 
victory over the Axis and the destruction of fascism, (2) all-out aid to returning 
servicemen, (3) full employment at fair wages, (4) good housing, medical care, and 
education for all, (5) equality of opportunity regardless of race or religion, (6) a just and 
adequate Social Security system, and (7) planning for a lasting peace.22 
The CIO-PAC was one of the first attempts in the United States to organize labor for 
political purposes on a national scale. It was an obvious attempt to circumvent the Smith-
Connolly Act, which, incidentally, had numerous loopholes. For example, money spent 
prior to the conventions was not restricted. Also, as Hillman soon discovered, the PAC 
did not have to draw on union treasuries or donate money directly to candidates (which 
the law forbade), but could instead solicit 'voluntary' contributions and put out its own 
material. In addition, Hillman "undertook the huge task of reclassifying union 
membership lists, which were arranged by shop rather than by ward or precinct, so that 
registration drives could be conducted and tabs kept on voter turnout." Toward this end, 
the former labor leader joined efforts with Earl Browder's American Communist Party-
which had dissolved as a political party, and reformed itself as the Communist Political 
Association-to find the necessary skilled and committed organizers to staff national and 
regional PAC offices. This connection with Browder and the Communists-along with 
the $1,000,000 raised and spent in support of the Roosevelt-Truman ticket-- became a 
major issue in the 1944 presidential election. Furthermore, labor's vital role in providing 
money and manpower for Roosevelt anticipated labor's importance for Democrats in 
later elections. 
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Both parties also invested heavily in radio advertising, with Republicans the more 
innovative. The Republican National Committee, for example, not only prepared a 
number of national broadcasts, including speeches by Dewey and Bricker, but also 
suggested to state and local organizations various radio activities, such as "Registration 
Recordings." The recordings were written from a non-partisan stance, and thus could be 
used by radio stations as a public service. Another type of recording was "Get Out the 
Vote," which were also non-partisan in nature, and thus free, encouraged people to 
actually go to the polls and vote. The next type was the "Special Recordings between 
Governor Dewey and other Republican Governors." The concept behind these 
recordings was quite interesting. The recordings were to be about fifteen minutes in 
length, and involved each governor welcoming Dewey to his state. Dewey would reply 
by endorsing the state ticket, "mentioning the names of the individual candidates for sate-
wide office" and then replying "to the individual governors in a short talk of seven or 
eight minutes, discussing the issues of special interest to the individual states." As a 
"Strictly Confidential" Radio bulletin from the RNC to the state committees, dated 15 
August, explained, "We believe a discussion of local issues by the candidate for the 
presidency will let the people of your state know that he is familiar with them and how he 
thinks on them." Finally, there were the "One Minute Spot Recordings." According to 
the RNC, the spots were aimed at the Roosevelt voter, "who has his mind set" and "is not 
likely to tune in our major speeches by our candidates. He is a closed book, unless we 
can catch him unawares.,,23 The spot campaign included four themes-the "Clear 
Everything with Sidney" series, the "41h Term" issue, the Vice Presidency (or Presidential 
health), and "Peacetime Years," which focused on a statement made by General Lewis 
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Hersey's statement from earlier that year indicating that the administration's postwar plan 
for employment was to keep American soldiers in the armed services. One Dewey spot 
read: 
If you are think 'you might as well' vote for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt again-stop and think! 
Has he ever relinquished willingly any power he has gained 
over you? Will he give up the greatest power of all-the 
presidency? Not while he can use an emergency as an excuse to 
continue in office. Do your American duty while there is still time. 
The only way you can save yourself from the continuing reign of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is to vote for Thomas E. Dewey.24 
Another one introduced for the first time a phrase that would repeatedly be used by 
Republicans against Democrats in subsequent campaigns: 
If you are thinking you 'might as well' vote for Franklin D. 
Roosevelt again-stop and think! 
His henchmen said, 'We will tax and tax and tax-and spend 
and spend and spend-and elect and elect and elect!' And they 
meant this, too! Any emergency-any excuse they will use to drag 
your vote into their net. The only way you can stop them is with 
your vote. Change while there is still time. Vote for Thomas E. 
Dewey for President!25 
Democrats, of course, responded in kind, with most spots (read by celebrities such as 
Orson Welles, Frank Sinatra, and Humphrey Bogart) emphasizing the "Hoover 
Depression": 
[Opens with traffic noise that slowly fades away and into a 
dialogue] 
Buy an apple, Mister? 
Yeah, give me a couple of ' em. 
160 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Okay, here you are ... Thanks very much [laughter] 
Just like 1930, isn't it? 
Buddy, this makes 1930 look like the good old days. This is really 
a depression. But what'ya expect? We never should have elected 
Dewey. But we don't seem to learn, do we? 
[Traffic noise, fade away, and then Announcer] 
This doesn't have to happen again, folks. It's just a case of 
keeping men with 1929 ideas out of office in 1944!26 
Both sides also used electronic media, including both news reels and radio. News reel 
coverage of the campaign during the late summer provided the two parties with more 
than enough material to release campaign films. That fall, the Republican National 
Committee released Dewey: Spokesman of the Future, a short film biography of the New 
York Governor that included footage of his wife and two young sons, his home at 
Pawling, New York, his years as New York's District Attorney, and his speeches as 
Governor and presidential candidate. The intent of the film was unmistakable-to 
create a public image of Dewey as "family man and competent, no-nonsense 
administrator.,,27 Democrats, meanwhile, released Lest We Forget, a chronicle in film of 
Roosevelt's twelve years as President. Not surprisingly, the film's goal was to portray 
FDR as a successful incumbent and victorious commander-in-chief. Throughout it, the 
President was in motion-- in action-from giving speeches, to signing legislation and 
meeting with foreign leaders.28 
Radio was another important campaign tool. Roosevelt, ever the extrovert, enjoyed 
speaking. He was informal, direct, and conversational. He was also a slow speaker, 
averaging 110 words per minute, which allowed the average listener to grasp (and be 
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impressed by) what had been said. Roosevelt's delivery rate was slightly lower than 
what the British Broadcasting Corporation recommended for its newscasters, 125 words a 
minute. In 1933, he had initiated the fireside chat as a new form of presidential 
communication, and in doing so, created an ideal vehicle to project his radio personality. 
According to James F. Bender, a consultant for the National Institute for Human 
Relations in 1944, Roosevelt's "gift of good speech and his lively sense of 
communication are inextricably bound up with his dominant personality trait, 
extroversion.,,29 Dewey's personality, meanwhile, was what Bender described as 
"ambiversion"-i.e. he was neither dominantly extroverted nor introverted, but, like most 
people, a mixture of both. More inhibited as an ambivert, Dewey's speeches were thus 
more formal, and delivered in the tradition of Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel 
Webster-fast (between 120 and 149 words per minute), projected, and clear. Of the 
two, Bender believed Dewey to have the more powerful voice. However, when it came 
to popular appeal, especially among women (a key constituency in 1944), Bender gave 
Roosevelt an edge. The reason: dialect. Dewey, originally from Michigan, pronounced 
his words in general American, the dialect that spread westward from Philadelphia, and 
was spoken by over 90,000,000 Americans and Canadians. Roosevelt, in contrast, spoke 
with a more British cast, New England dialect. While Dewey said "part" and "mother," 
Roosevelt pronounced them "pah-t" and "moth-uh.,,3o Roosevelt's speech, Bender 
concluded, was different from most Americans, and thus came across as charming and 
attractive. 
There were a number of similarities between the two leading candidates for President 
in 1944. Both, for example, were only children, and greatly attached to and influenced 
162 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
by their adoring and strong-willed mothers. Though the Roosevelt family was more 
affluent, both men enjoyed very secure and serene childhoods. Both were Episcopalians 
in name, but neither were greatly shaped by their faith. Both Roosevelt and Dewey had 
served as Governor of New York. Both lived in Dutchess County, New York, and were 
practically neighbors. 31 Incidentally, this was the only time in American history that two 
candidates for the presidency came from the same county. Both also liked farming, 
though neither were genuine farmers. Neither were they heavy readers. In fact, both 
enjoyed reading mystery novels. Both were manipulative, delighted in keeping people 
unsure of their intentions, and enjoyed pushing people around. Robert Taft once 
described Dewey as "very arrogant and bossy"-a man who moved with the political 
winds and kept his own council.32 Harry Truman once remarked that FDR was an 
"enormous egotist," while Roosevelt's daughter, Anna, wrote a friend that her father was 
"cold, calculating and shrewd and you can't tell what he will do.,,33 
While there were similarities, there were also important differences. Roosevelt could 
make fun of himself; Dewey could not. FDR was very outgoing and "people friendly," 
and Dewey, again, was not. Indeed, while Roosevelt "always greeted verbal information 
with smiles of appreciation and unnecessary 'yessing,' Dewey, one contemporary 
observed, came back with questions. "He 'frisks' the mind of a visitor with penetrating 
inquiry. He makes him prove things, which is generally embarrassing to people who 
never bother to verify what they say. This habit of Dewey's disturbs people who do not 
know him well. It makes them feel foolish or unwanted or intrusive.,,34 
163 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Six: 
The Fall Campaign 
In late summer, Dewey-instead ofvacationing-- worked quietly behind the scenes 
laying the organization and foundation for the fall campaign, as well as fulfilling his 
official duties as Governor. On lJuly, upon his return from the Republican National 
Convention, he stressed unity in the war effort, telling a welcoming reception in Albany 
that America had the greatest political system in the world, and that all nations would 
soon recognize it to be-despite campaign differences and debates-- the most united 
country in the world. While Dewey genuinely had a very high regard for public office, 
especially the presidency, he nevertheless wanted to give his candidacy legitimacy by 
emphasizing it within the context of America's democratic strength. "We can risk an 
election," he continued, "because to us that means we are free men and women. We are 
going to keep the things we are fighting for and strengthen them by having an election in 
these times ... As a result of this campaign we will prove that in the process of fighting a 
total war this country can preserve its sacred free processes and become stronger as a 
result of an election."l A few days later, in speech before the Empire Girls' State, Dewey 
added another component of his campaign-platform. The government, he insisted, had 
become disconnected from the people. One reason was that the Federal Government 
considered itself apart from and superior to the other branches of the government, and 
above the people. The other was the growing aggressiveness of pressure groups and 
special interests who pushed their various claims so vigorously that they acted as a wedge 
between the government and the broad interests of the American people. "One of the big 
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tasks of the next few years," he concluded, "will be to bring government closer to the 
people and to bring the people closer to the practice of self-government.,,2 
One of Dewey's first major acts of the post-convention season, however, carne in late 
July and early August. On 26 July, running-mate John Bricker met with Dewey at the 
Governor's Mansion in Albany, and afterwards took questions from reporters. While 
Dewey was relaxed and affable, Bricker-- well aware that Team Dewey held him in low 
regard and had preferred Earl Warren-- seemed uncomfortable. He snapped irritably at 
the press, and in a response to a reporter's question, he stumbled, allowing that he would 
welcome the support of anyone interested in defeating Roosevelt. '''That's how elections 
are won,' he casually explained. Asked ifthat view extended to the extreme racist Gerald 
L. K. Smith of Shreveport, who was in the process of organizing his own presidential 
campaign, Bricker responded affirmatively, adding that Smith's vote would 'count like 
all the rest. ",3 A few days later, Smith announced that Bricker would be his vice 
presidential running mate. "1 had paid little attention to Gerald L. K. Smith or his 
movement until last night, when he associated my name with him and his movement," 
Bricker told reporters in St. Louis. "1 shall not have my name used in any such 
connection. 1 hate demagoguery, religious intolerance and racial prejudice. They can 
destroy our free government as they have around the world. 1 shall fight them as long as 
I am in public office and as long as 1 live.,,4 Similarly, Dewey issued a statement 
characterizing Smith as "one of those rabble rousers who, like Adolf Hitler, makes racial 
prejudice his stock-in-trade. His contemptible attempt to associate himself with 
Governor Bricker is a sinister effort to smear the Republican candidate for Vice 
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President." Following the Smith debacle Bricker began stumping throughout most of the 
forty-eight states. 
Two days after the Bricker incident, Dewey issued a bold statement concerning 
Republican Representative Hamilton Fish of New York. Fish was a staunch isolationist 
and fierce critic ofFDR, who, before Pearl Harbor, was very sympathetic toward Hitler's 
Germany. In 1933, for example, he had signed his name as a sponsor to a Nazi 
propaganda book entitled Communism in Germany, which argued Hitler had saved 
Germany from a communist takeover. Five years later, he was a main speaker at a 
German Day Rally in Madison Square Garden, where the swastika was displayed, the 
Nazi "Horst Wessel" sang, and the Hitler salute given. The following year, on the eve of 
World War II, Fish was rumored to have flown around Europe, at Germany's request and 
expense, urging its leaders to further appease Hitler. Then, in the summer of 1944, Fish 
remarked to reporters that Jews were "unfortunately" for Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
and that Dewey would not carry a single predominately Jewish district in New York City. 
That was, he said, not an attack against Jews, but "the plain truth." In response, on 28 
July, Dewey reminded the public that he had publicly opposed Fish's reelection two years 
earlier, and that he was doing so again in 1944. "Anyone who injects a racial or religious 
issue into a political campaign is guilty of a disgraceful, un-American act," Dewey said. 
"I have fought that kind ofthing all my life and always will regardless of partisan 
considerations. I have never accepted the support of any such individual and I never 
shall."s Despite the Governor's best efforts, Roosevelt supporters continued to identify 
Dewey with Fish. The Congressman, for his part, did not help matters. A few days after 
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Dewey's denunciation, Fish told reporters he would still support the Governor for 
President. 
Another important post-convention campaign move made by Dewey was his 
convening of a two-day GOP Governors Conference in St. Louis beginning on 2 August. 
Dewey, accompanied by his wife, staff, and forty reporters and photographers, left 
Albany by train on 30 July. His first stop was in Pittsburgh, where about 2,500 people 
gathered at the rail station to get a glimpse ofthe candidate. With an eight-piece band 
playing "Anchors Aweigh" and "Hail to the Chief," Dewey-in adherence to his wartime 
strategy of working the party organization and not the public-avoided speech-making, 
and instead met with local party, business, labor, and agriculture leaders in a downtown 
hotel. There was pomp, however. Escorted by motorcycle and mounted police, he 
traveled through town in an open car in parade-like fashion. Along the motorcade route 
people gathered and held up signs reading "Welcome Governor Dewey." The Governor 
acknowledged their cheers by removing his hat and waving. 
The stop in Pittsburgh was strategic. Roosevelt had carried Pennsylvania in 1940 by 
only 281,000 votes, 104,000 of which came from Allegheny County, which included 
Pittsburgh. In a morning press conference-the only media event of the day-Dewey 
unveiled a campaign message that would quickly become a constant: that the next 
president would take office in January 1945, and would be concerned mainly with 
postwar, domestic affairs, including reconversion. "Pittsburgh," Dewey declared, 
"produces one-quarter of the steel ofthe whole United States. The State produces one-
quarter of the coal. While the reconversion of facilities will perhaps not be as great here 
as in war factories, where they must have new equipment to change back to making 
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automobiles and refrigerators, the employment problem will be perhaps even more 
acutely affected, with the tapering-off of production as we come closer to the end of the 
war." Though the nation was making great progress in fighting the war, the 
administration, he charged, was "making no progress in preparation for what will 
follow." The United States could not stand another "Roosevelt depression which lasted 
for eight years, with more than 10,000,000 unemployed continuously from 1933 to 1940, 
inclusive." He offered no specifics of his own. Dewey also used the occasion to take 
aim at the President and his argument that the country should not "trade horses in 
midstream." "That argument," he told reporters, alluding to the dropping of Wallace a 
few days before, "was demolished in Chicago when they changed one-half of the horse.,,6 
The Republican Governors Conference, made up of twenty-six state executives, was a 
brilliant move by Dewey. It helped him organize the other governors into an effective 
political unit for the campaign. After all, Republican governors represented three-fourths 
of the American people, and 314 electoral votes-more than enough to win the 
presidency. As Herbert Brownell later remembered, "Each [governor] ... was really the 
active head of the Republican campaign effort, and sometimes the state people disregard 
the national campaign and spend most of their time trying to elect the state ticket. .. We 
also wanted them to see Governor Dewey in action. Many of them didn't know him very 
well personally. We thought ifthey could see him at close range, see his dynamic 
qualities, see how he was organizing the campaign, that they'd have more of a personal 
interest in seeing him succeed.,,7 In addition, the conference helped to inject the conflict 
between state and federal governments into the campaign on the theory that most people 
believed their state governments had done better jobs in recent years than the federal 
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government. 8 As Dewey noted at the close of the conference, "During the past twelve 
years the Governors of the states have never once been permitted to exchange views with 
the President of the United States, and entire regions of our country have been without 
representation in the National Government.,,9 Furthermore, the conference enabled him 
to distance himself from congressional Republicans and other "Washington insiders," and 
identify more with popular and "progressive" state and local governments. 
The specific purpose of the Governors Conference, however, was to articulate a 
Republican vision for postwar domestic concerns. The result was a detailed statement of 
policy on reconversion and postwar jobs, veterans, affairs, highways, public works, 
public lands, the National Guard, agriculture, unemployment compensation, and 
insurance. In the area of jobs, the governors argued that the Roosevelt administration 
was listless, negligent, and void ofleadership. Comprehensive and immediate action by 
the national government was imperative, Republicans agreed, to provide for a smooth 
transition from war to peacetime production. Not only should industry be enabled to 
make that conversion, but also employers should be informed of the federal government's 
policies so to be prepared for reconversion. Central to any federal policy on jobs, they 
added, was the promotion of private (especially small) business under an enterprise 
system, and the recognition that the states shared responsibility in encouraging 
"commerce, industry, and agriculture in order to stimulate full employment at good 
wages and the profitable use of all our production facilities." In addition, the governors 
announced support for (a) the G.I. Bill of Rights, which was described as "sound 
legislation, (b) a federal highway program, ( c) public works projects in times of national 
economic crisis, (d) the retention of the National Guard as a state force and as a reserve 
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component ofthe United States Anny, (e) a "free agriculture" supported by a federal 
government devoted to disposition of surpluses and fair market prices, (f) state regulation 
and control over insurance businesses, and (g) a state-led improvement and extension of 
unemployment compensation. Republicans also called for-consistent with military 
needs-the prompt return to private ownership of Western lands acquired for war 
purposes. Furthennore, the acquisition of Western lands for the establishment of national 
parks, monuments, and wildlife refugees, should be filtered through regard for local 
problems and congressional controls. "If, under the guise of conservation," GOP leaders 
warned, "this acquisition and encroachment program [of the Roosevelt administration] 
continues, we shall soon find ownership of our lands lodged in the Federal Government 
sufficient to threaten seriously the very existence of many of our States and the loss of 
local self-government to millions of free American citizens."IO Though it was not 
published in book fonn-like the Clinton-Gore Putting People First (1992) or Dole-
Kemp Trusting the People (1996) campaign treatises of recent years-the GOP 
governors program did represent the Dewey-Bricker plan for America in 1944. 
The chief domestic strategy of the Dewey campaign was to attack bureaucratic 
inefficiency and wrangling in Washington, while stressing that government wartime 
controls in fanning and industry could lead to an administrative dictatorship in the United 
States. In addition to attracting the general protest voter, Dewey sought to win 
independents and Democrats by delivering a series of sober policy speeches that 
embraced (and even expanded upon) the more positive features of the New Deal. His 
chief strategy in the realm of foreign affairs was to emphasize that the next four years 
would likely be peace years, and that the new era needed to be shaped by a new team. 
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The Roosevelt administration, he repeatedly asserted, was tired, worn-out, and old. "It's 
time for change" was his constant message. To assist in making that message resonate 
with the American public, Republicans released a Dewey-Bricker Songsheet, which 
included "The Republican Battle Hymn" (set to the tune of "The Battle Hymn of the 
Republic"): 
They say to change your horse while in the middle of the stream, 
Is not the smartest thing to do, but this can plain be seen, 
A horse that's run twelve years should be retired to pastures green, 
So vote Republican. 
Vote for Dewey and for Bricker, 
Win the war and do it quicker, 
Vote for Dewey and for Bricker, 
And keep our Country free. 
They both are honest, capable, and men of proven worth, 
Their heads are clear, their minds are strong, their feet are on the 
earth, 
They're trained to guide our destiny, they'll put our country first, 
So vote Republican. 11 
To the delight of Republicans, the Democratic National Convention provided Dewey 
with material to reinforce his themes. A few days after the Democrats met in Chicago, 
Dewey campaign manager (and RNC chairman) Herbert Brownell, told reporters in 
Washington that "As Mr. Roosevelt sets out to seek a fourth term as President, his 
candidacy must be considered against the backdrop" of his party's convention. "In 
twelve years," Brownell argued, "his party has failed to produce a single leader to 
succeed him. It has labeled itself a one-man party." Furthermore, Democrats, in 
repudiating FDR's choice for vice president (i.e. Wallace), "has proved one of the chief 
contentions of the Republican Party: it's time to change horses." Finally, Brownell 
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observed, the convention revealed Democrats to be controlled by two elements-"the 
bosses of the corrupt big-city machines and the radical left wingers who are closer to 
communism than to any other political philosophy.,,12 Speaking at RNC headquarters at 
the Roosevelt Hotel in New York on 10 August, Brownell added "We can't speak of 
them as a party any more because they have been so split by factionalism." Specifically, 
the chairman spoke ofthose more ardent supporters ofFDR who were now convinced 
they had been used as pawns by "the Browder-Hillman group, the Wallace faction, and 
the so-called 'Boss' clique dominated by the Hague, Kelly and Pendergast machines.,,13 
The "Browder-Hillman group" mentioned by Brownell was the subject of much 
controversy, and one of the major issues of the 1944 presidential campaign. On 25 July 
1944, just four days after the Democrats ended their meeting in Chicago, Arthur Krock of 
the New York Times wrote an article entitled "The Inflammatory Use of a National 
Chairman." In the piece, he quoted FDR at a private meeting with party leaders 
discussing the vice presidential nomination. According to Krock, Roosevelt, convinced 
he would live forever, casually instructed Hannegan and the others to "clear everything 
with Sidney [Hillman].,,14 The DNC immediately (and falsely) issued a denial: "No such 
thing was ever said by the President... [I]t was never uttered." I 5 Though he had some of 
the facts wrong-apparently Roosevelt said "Clear it with Sidney"-- and did not know 
the maneuvering that accompanied the preliminaries to and course of the convention, 
Krock was right about the role labor (in the person of Hillman) played in the vice 
presidential pick, and what it did to Byrnes's candidacy. Ford Bond, director of the 
Republican Radio Campaign, seized on the story at once, and quickly released a one-
minute "spot" announcement denouncing the CIO-PAC's "stranglehold on the New Deal 
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party." Cartoons and jingles were also prepared for publication. One cartoon, for 
example, was entitled "In His Side Pocket," and depicted a smiling Hillman-- dressed in a 
suit decorated with dollar signs-- placing a donkey in his front left coat pocket. A 
Republican jingle set to the tune of "Good Night, Ladies," meanwhile, declared: 
Good night, Perkins, 
Good night, Ickes, 
Good night, Browder 
You're leaving us at last. 
Pack you grip and roll along, 
Roll along, roll along, 
Pack you grip and roll along, 
And clearing with Sidney is past! 16 
Opening his vice president campaign in French Lick, Indiana, in early September, John 
W. Bricker charged that the CIO-P AC, "including its communistic adherents," was 
seeking to "buy" a fourth term for Roosevelt "with money extracted from the honest and 
patriotic workers of this country." Once again, he declared, the New Deal had "the 
sinister support of notoriously corrupt political machines."] 7 
The "Clear Everything with Sidney" controversy erupted while Roosevelt was 
attending the secret "Hawaii Conference" (26-28 July) with his top Pacific commanders, 
including General MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the 
Pacific Fleet and of the Central Pacific Area. Shortly after midnight on the morning of 
21 July, the President left San Diego, where a few hours earlier he had accepted his 
party's nomination for president, and embarked for Pearl Harbor aboard the cruiser 
Baltimore. The cruiser was preceded by six destroyers, and had complete air cover. 
Since the President was "nearly all the time ... within easy reach of enemy action," the 
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news media agreed to observe a twenty-one day "blackout" on his actions and 
whereabouts. After an uneventful voyage, Roosevelt arrived at Pearl Harbor on 26 July, 
and immediately set out with his commanders to discuss Pacific strategy. 
Specifically, the meeting was convened to settle a dispute between Nimitz and 
MacArthur, and to determine where to go next in the Pacific theatre. Nimitz, 
representing the interests of the navy, argued for a move on Formosa (at the expense of 
the Philippines) en route to Japan, while MacArthur, representing the army's wishes, 
insisted upon the liberation ofthe Philippines. The navy's argument for Formosa was 
that the island was closer to Japan and would thus enable direct aerial intervention against 
the Japanese in China, strengthening Chiang Kai-shek, and adding to the American 
potential for inflicting damage on the Japanese. 18 The army disagreed, arguing that a 
Formosa campaign would involve an extensive land war (and would thus have to be 
delayed until after the war in Europe), and that it would be extremely hazardous with the 
Japanese still in control of the Philippines. In contrast, MacArthur added, the Philippines 
was a less risky target and "the repossession of American territory, the fulfillment of a 
promise to the Filipinos, and the liberation of many thousands of American prisoners." 
Furthermore, in any move against the Philippines, the United States could expect the help 
from those within the island chain who had been loyal friends, while in Formosa, which 
had been under Japanese control for fifty years, no such support could be expected. In 
his Reminiscences, MacArthur claimed that he then privately warned FDR: "If your 
decision be to bypass the Philippines and leave its millions of wards ofthe United States 
and thousands of internees to languish in agony and despair-I dare to say that the 
American people would be so aroused that they would register most complete resentment 
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against you at the polls this fall. ,,]9 Roosevelt, of course, decided in favor of the 
Philippines, but he did so not out of electoral concern, but because MacArthur had the 
better strategic arguments, and because it was the intelligent analysis of detached 
commanders. 
The following day, 27 July, Roosevelt, MacArthur, Nimitz, and Admiral William D. 
Leahy toured the island of Oahu. According to speechwriter Samuel Rosenman, who 
accompanied Roosevelt, "the streets of the cities and villages were lined with residents of 
the island. I thought that this was taking unnecessary risks. Many of the inhabitants were 
pure Japanese or descended from mixed marriage of Japanese. The President, however, 
insisted on riding through the crowds-and in an open car... Following behind the 
procession I could not help thinking how dreadful a toll one well-placed bomb would 
take. The Secret Service men were worried to distraction." After the island tour, 
Roosevelt on 28 July visited a military hospital, where he asked to be wheeled slowly 
through all the wards where someone had lost an ann or leg. Near tears, he smiled and 
spoke to several of the injured soldiers. It "affected us all very deeply," Rosenman later 
recalled. Later that same day, Roosevelt and his staff boarded the Baltimore and began 
their journey home with a scheduled stop in Alaska. 
On 12 August, Roosevelt arrived at Bremerton Naval Yard in Washington State. 
There, he decided to give a report to the nation on his trip to Pearl Harbor and Alaska. 
FDR wrote the speech himself. His speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, had already 
returned to the states before the decision was made for the President to address-while 
standing on the deck of a destroyer and with Puget Sound as a backdrop-- 10,000 naval 
yard workers live and over nationwide radio. He had been neither seen nor heard from 
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by the people of the United States since 20 July, Rosenman later wrote, and they 
deserved more. "But the speech had nothing to say, and said it poorly.,,20 It was long, 
scattered, and "chatty." 
Roosevelt encountered several problems at Bremerton. One was discomfort, and 
involved his decision to deliver the speech standing, which required, of course, the use of 
leg braces. In the years before the war, the President had always insisted on wearing 
braces when appearing before an audience. As the stress of events increased, however--
and as his health deteriorated-- he neglected to wear them. Thus, as he stood to deliver 
his speech at Bremerton, it had been over a year since he had last worn braces. 
Furthermore, having lost weight due to sickness, the braces did not fit well and were 
uncomfortable. Another problem for Roosevelt was insecurity. He was standing on the 
curved deck of a destroyer, which made him feel unstable. Also, a strong wind was 
blowing, adding to his discomfort and fear of falling down. Then there was the problem 
of the audience. It was positioned far away from the President-too far to permit the 
necessary feeling of contact which he thrived upon, and which was so helpful to his 
delivery. More importantly, he had a heart problem. According to one the President's 
physicians, he may have sustained an attack of angina pectoris (chest pain) at the time of 
the speech. Although there were no changes on his EKG, Roosevelt reported 
experiencing pain underneath the sternum, and which extended to both shoulders and 
lasted for fifteen minutes. Together these things made him "hesitant, halting and 
indecisive.,,21 
"The speech at best was a rambling account of his journeys and experiences during the 
past month," Rosenman later recalled, "and he ad-libbed a great deal in a very ineffective 
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manner. It was a dismal failure." Listening to the speech over the radio, Rosenman "had 
a sinking sensation of concern that something must have happened to the President since 
I had left him in Hawaii. His voice and delivery seemed so different.,,22 That address, 
along with the unflattering photograph of Roosevelt in San Diego in late July, led many, 
Rosenman continued, to conclude "that 'the old man is through, finished.' His friends 
and supporters of many years shook their heads sorrowfully and said, 'It looks like the 
old master has lost his touch. His campaigning days must be over. It's going to look 
mighty sad when he begins to trade punches with young Dewey. ",23 
The speech was bad, but not as bad as Rosenman, who, writing in 1952, sought to use 
the speech as a foil for the famous Fala speech, indicated. Considering the President 
wrote the speech himself, and that he delivered it under the circumstances described 
above, it was quite good. In fact, the speech was even included in a 1946 collection of 
Roosevelt speeches entitled Nothing to Fear, and edited by B.D. Zevin. Zevin's 
introduction to the speech, published at the dawn of the Cold War, focused on 
Roosevelt's statements about Asia. Near the end ofthe address, Roosevelt warned that 
from a defense perspective, the United States must always control the Great Circle route 
from Puget Sound to Siberia and China. "The destinies of the peoples of the whole 
Pacific," he declared, "will for many years ahead be entwined with our own destiny." 
Furthermore, media reaction was not unkind. In fact, there were few damaging allusions 
to the speech in any of the nation's leading newspapers and magazines. Only the ardently 
pro-Dewey Time described the speech as a "rambling, folksy account," but added that the 
President looked "tan, gay, and relaxed." Writing from Algiers on 14 August, even 
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Charles de Gaulle infOlmed the President that he had "listened with great interest to the 
fine speech you have just made.,,24 
Though Republicans tried to raise health as an issue in the fall campaign, it never 
really caught the public's interest. A poll conducted in early September indicated that 
only 1.6% of those surveyed would switch to Dewey because of the President's health. 
In October, that number fell to .5%. The real controversy to emerge from Bremerton was 
not health but radio time. Socialist Nonnan Thomas attacked the Bremerton speech as 
"political," and demanded equal broadcast time for the other presidential candidates to 
address troops overseas. A few days later, on 25 August, the War Department announced 
that it was granting Thomas's request. Eight hours later, however, Assistant Secretary of 
War John J. McCloy retracted the statement, and declared that in fact FDR's speech was 
"not political" and that Thomas's request was now denied. Republicans immediately 
cried foul, insisting that the speech was political, and that the Anny's reversal was "due, 
without doubt, to White House pressure." The issue soon faded a few weeks later when 
the five contending parties (Democratic, Republican, Socialist, Prohibition, and Social 
Labor) reached an agreement with the anny concerning overseas broadcasts. The 
agreement allowed for the rebroadcasting of political speeches to soldiers overseas, 
beginning 18 September and ending 2 November. 
The Bremerton speech-though an opportunity for the President to highlight his role 
as commander-in-chief-was not political. He made no reference to the campaign, or to 
Republicans and Democrats. It was literally a report on his activities of the previous 
twenty-one days. The charge that the speech was "political" was grounded in the 
assumption that the entire Pacific trip itself was an elaborate part of Roosevelt's 
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reelection campaign. After all, the President could have settled the MacArthur-Nimitz 
dispute in Washington, and saved the country the expense of his dangerous journey into 
hostile waters. Perhaps-but he was still commander-in-chief, and as such had 
prerogative to make such a call. Although a Roosevelt apologist, Samuel Rosenman 
probably came the closest to understanding Roosevelt's desire to travel to the Pacific in 
July and August 1944-- and it did not involve the presidential politics. According to 
Rosenman, "the President found it useful to make these trips ... Preparations, laying out 
the routes on the map, figuring distances and fixing times of arrival and departure at 
various places-these were all given his personal, loving attention, no matter how busy 
he was. His visits to the training camps gave him a closer feel ofthe conduct ofthe war, 
and getting out of Washington, he said, always gave him a better perspective." 
Furthermore, he believed that visits to military installations in different parts ofthe world 
not only helped the morale of troops, but also gave assurances to family members back 
home that everything possible was being done for their loved one's safety at the front. 
Did making such a dangerous trip, and ending it with a national address on the deck of a 
destroyer in the Pacific help the image that his campaign team wanted to emphasize? Of 
course, but it was not overtly political; it was an inherent advantage of incumbency-he 
was the President ofthe United States, and the event was a natural reminder that the 
"other guy" was not. 
The war and postwar planning issues, as the President's Pacific trip demonstrated, 
were obvious disadvantages to the Governor of New York, who was not the commander-
in-chief, and who, furthermore, had no military experience. To offset this problem and 
even counter Roosevelt's expected strategy of concentrating on the war, Edwin Jaeckle, a 
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brilliant and candid senior member of Dewey's campaign staff, proposed in July (just 
shortly after the Republican convention) that the Governor travel abroad, visiting 
European battlefronts and conferring with other leaders of the Grand Alliance. Reluctant 
to do much that might focus attention to his non-military record (and alienate isolationists 
within his own party who might see any such tour as reminiscent ofWillkie), Dewey 
dismissed this advice, and moved instead-with the help of his chief foreign policy 
advisor, John Foster Dulles-toward moving postwar foreign policy (namely debate on a 
postwar world organization) completely out of the campaign. 
The backdrop for the implementation of this strategy was the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference, which was to meet in Washington that fall and make preliminary plans for a 
permanent postwar international organization (the future United Nations). On 16 August, 
Dewey issued a statement from Albany, expressing deep disturbance over recent reports 
indicating that conference members-the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and China-planned to "dominate the world by force and through individual agreements 
as to spheres of influence." That the Allies had developed overwhelming power over 
their enemies did not, he argued, "give us the right to organize the world so that we four 
will always be free to do what we please while the rest of the world is made subject to 
our coercion. That would be the rankest form of imperialism. Such a proposal would be 
rejected by the American people." A departure from his controversial comment to 
reporters at Mackinac the previous year-in which he spoke of a permanent postwar 
alliance with Great Britain-Dewey hoped to bridge the gap between himself and the 
defeated Wendell Willkie, whose One World concept was grounded in the idea of self-
determination, and who had yet to endorse the Governor. He also hoped to gamer 
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support among American voters with ethnic ties to "smaller" Eastern European nations 
like Poland. "The problem of future peace has two aspects," Dewey continued. One 
related to the defeat of Germany and Japan, and the other to the promotion of postwar 
peace. As to Germany and Japan, Dewey insisted that they must be "wholly and 
conclusively defeated. More than that, they must be rendered permanently powerless to 
renew tyranny and attack." The achievement of those goals, he acknowledged, rested in 
the unity and power of the four Allies. However, as to the promotion of postwar peace, 
the Allies must not sink into the abyss of power politics, but "rise to new high level of 
cooperation and joint effort among respected and sovereign nations to work for and to 
preserve the peace of the world through all the years to come, based on freedom, equality, 
d . . ,,25 an JustIce. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull was alarmed by Dewey's statement, and the following 
morning issued a statement of his own insisting that the Governor had misconstrued what 
was planned for Dumbarton Oaks. "Governor Dewey can rest assured that the fears 
which he expressed in his statement are utterly and completely unfounded." The purpose 
of the conference, the secretary said, was to discuss the most feasible and desirable 
methods of establishing the kind of organization envisaged in the Moscow Declaration 
and u.S. Senate resolution (the Connally Resolution). Furthermore, the conference was 
merely "preliminary to similar discussion and early conference among all the United 
Nations and other peace-loving nations, large and small." Responding to reporters' 
questions, Hull added that he would welcome a conference with the Republican nominee 
to "straighten out any points connected with the postwar organization and a nonpartisan 
h t ·t" 26 approac 01. 
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The following day, 18 August, Dewey sent a telegram to Hull, infonning the secretary 
that he was accepting the offer, and that he had designated John Foster Dulles as his 
representative. In addition, Dewey stated that he was "convinced that every effort to 
organize both temporarily and pennanently for the establishment oflasting peace should 
be accelerated," and that he was happy to extend his fullest cooperation to the end that 
the result should be wholly hi-partisan and should have the united support of the 
American people.27 Hull received Dewey's message while in a cabinet meeting at the 
White House. Roosevelt, the secretary later recalled, agreed that he should send a reply 
agreeing to meet with Dulles, but expressed skepticism regarding any nonpartisan 
agreement with leading Republicans.28 
After receiving Hull's reply on 19 August, Dewey and Dulles met with reporters in 
Albany, and elaborated on their views of world organization and postwar security. The 
looming question of the day, they said, was detennining whether the problem of 
controlling Gennany and Japan would be a world organization task, or a regional one. If 
it was a world organization task, Dulles explained, then "you almost necessarily have to 
have a Four Power control of that world organization, because the four great powers who 
win this victory are not going to take any chances with the fruits of victory, oflosing 
them through turning the control of Gennany and Japan over to a world organization 
which is so diffuse and general in its organization that there cannot be assurance that the 
tenns of the peace would be carried out." That scenario, they argued, was unacceptable 
because it would lead to the Four Powers controlling the world body for all of its 
purposes so as to keep all of the world under control. The positive alternative, they 
insisted, was for control of the defeated nations to be the task of the four big powers and 
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certain regional and liberated nations. For example, in the case of Germany, liberated 
countries like France, Belgium, Poland, and the Netherlands, partnering with the United 
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, would assume certain specific tasks in 
controlling the defeated Reich. Japan, meanwhile, would be controlled by China, the 
United States, and Great Britain. The Soviet Union might playa role there too should it 
join the war in the Pacific.29 
The meeting between Dulles and Hull took place in Washington the following 
Wednesday, 23 August. Dulles, suffering from a nerve ailment in his foot, was in 
excruciating pain, and on crutches. He was in such discomfort that he could not travel by 
train or plane. Accordingly, Dewey arranged for him to travel to Washington in a state 
vehicle-an act that was roundly criticized in the press. Washington columnist Drew 
Pearson, for example, chastised the Governor during a Sunday night broadcast for 
allowing Dulles, who literally had to be driven door to door wherever he went in 
Washington, to waste rationed gasoline. Pearson insisted that he had seen Dulles himself 
on the street and that he had looked quite fit. "The truth was," Dewey later recalled, "that 
Foster was in such bad shape that he was going on two crutches to every meeting, and 
when he got to the home of the friend he was staying with, he got into the house on his 
crutches and went upstairs on his knees ... He belonged in a hospital-where he was, 
before long. ,,30 
The Hull-Dulles discussions lasted for three days. In their first meeting Hull 
presented Dulles with the administration's latest draft of the proposed United Nations 
Charter, and a four-page memorandum summarizing the charter's provisions. Overall, 
the organization was open to membership of all peace-loving countries, large and small, 
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on the basis of their sovereign equality. All members were equally represented and voted 
as equals except in budgetary matters, where the vote would be proportioned to each 
nation's financial contributions. All members were likewise eligible to serve on the Four 
Powers-led Executive Council (a precursor to the Security Council), and participate in 
elections to the body. In fact, as to the make-up of the Executive Council, there were 
more small states than large ones. Although the "Big Four" had veto power in the use of 
force, they could not undertake any coercive action by themselves. Finally, all member 
nations were to contribute armed forces and facilities in accordance with their respective 
capacities to undertake any kind of joint action. Dulles read the draft and declared it to 
be "excellent and satisfactory as to the issue of the small nations. The secretary then 
reminded Dulles that all nations were interconnected, and that "we could not consider 
large nations in one compartment and small nation in another." 
In addition, both men were in agreement on the basic proposition that it was important 
to create a world organization that was supported by all Americans regardless of party. 
Also, they both agreed that such an effort would be unsuccessful if it had a partisan-in 
this case, Democratic-label attached to it. They disagreed, however, on what foreign 
policy matters-aside from the world organization-should be removed from partisan 
debate. Hull wanted an agreement broad enough to cover not only the creation of "the 
United Nations," but also all subjects relating to the future peace, including the 
controversial arrangements that might be made with the Soviet Union for the future of 
Poland. Dulles, of course, was adamantly opposed to any such broad agreement. For 
him and Dewey, the important issue was to forge a "bipartisan" approach solely to the 
creation ofthe United Nations. In the end, Hull and Dulles agreed to disagree (or at least 
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be vague) on this point. Their public statement released on their last day of meetings, 25 
August, read: 
The Secretary maintained the position that the American people 
consider the subject of future peace as a nonpartisan subject which 
must be kept entirely out of politics. 
Mr. Dulles, on behalf of Governor Dewey, stated that the 
Governor shared this view on the understanding, however, that it 
did not preclude full public nonpartisan discussion of the means of 
attaining a lasting peace. 31 
The word "nonpartisan" in the above statement was also the subject of great debate 
between the two leaders. Dulles preferred the use ofthe word "bipartisan," implying that 
both parties would be involved on a political basis in policy making toward the UN 
organization. Hull, believing this to be an attempt at gaining political advantage, insisted 
instead upon the more general "nonpartisan," meaning that neither party would be 
involved in that policy making on a political basis. In addition, Hull maintained that 
"under our constitutional structure, we could not have both parties sharing the 
responsibility. The party in power had the responsibility for the execution of foreign 
policy. This responsibility could not be delegated. The opposition party ... had the moral 
responsibility not to base its opposition, if any, to our proposals for the United Nations 
organization on partisan grounds.,,32 After several hours of discussion, Dulles finally 
agreed to the word "nonpartisan." 
The result ofthese discussions, Dewey wrote the Secretary of State on 25 August, 
"constituted a new attitude toward the problem of peace.,,33 Hull replied in agreement on 
4 September, adding that the discussions and his letter "constituted a heartening 
manifestation of national unity on the problem of establishing an international peace and 
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security organization." He then suggested to Dewey that they might make their exchange 
ofletters public "so that there might be fuller public understanding of our common 
ground on this important subject.,,34 Two days later, Dewey telephoned Hull, and agreed 
to give the letters to the press. He also suggested a few changes in the proposed UN 
charter. One was that the right to bring a question to the attention of the General 
Assembly or the Security Council be extended to any state, and not limited to member 
states. Another was that treaty conditions should be included in the subject matter that 
might be brought to the attention of the Assembly or the Council. Hull agreed to send 
them immediately to Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius at Dumbarton Oaks with 
the request that they be incorporated into the final document then being formulated. 
None of the parties at the conference objected, and Dewey's suggestions were written 
into the final draft. Throughout the rest of the campaign Hull continued-- through former 
German Ambassador Hugh Wilson-to maintain contact with Dewey and Dulles. 
Though he had to remind Dewey on a few occasions that he too had played a role in 
initiating the nonpartisan agreement, Hull later acknowledged that the Governor 
"uniformly rendered excellent service to the nonpartisan approach toward the United 
Nations. ,,35 
Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party candidate for President, was not impressed by the 
Hull-Dulles agreement. Writing in Human Events a couple weeks before Hull and Dulles 
met in the nation's capitol, Thomas argued that the campaign "unity" on world 
organization was nothing more than "an evasion of differences of opinion calculated to 
prevent discussion of the great issues upon which the prevention of a Third World War 
depends ... " This "verbal unity," he continued, was blocking the road to a democratic 
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mandate on peace, and clearing the way for FDR's "great design"-i.e. a revived League 
of Nations completely dominated by a cartel of imperial powers: the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union. China, meanwhile, was perceived as too weak and 
divided-subject, even, to civil war-to playa dominant role in the immediate postwar 
era. Like Dulles and Dewey, he believed such an arrangement to be potentially 
disastrous, opening the door to a revolt ofthe "colored nations" and races of the Far East. 
Unlike the two Republicans, however, Thomas anticipated an interconnected Soviet 
threat. "Sooner or later," he wrote, "the USSR ... is bound to forget its present alliance 
and to aid native revolt against white-predominately British-supremacy. If we fight 
again with and for Britain ... it will be a terrible and unsuccessful [third world] war. That 
war, or long sustained preparation for it, will doom our democracy." The sure way to 
secure a lasting peace, he concluded, was through inclusive international cooperation, 
self-government for all, and the end of imperial exploitation. Yet, neither Republicans 
nor Democrats offered anything new-just the same old "triple-alliance imperialism, 
masked by a phony and vindictive 'internationalism. ",36 
Thomas's complaint aside, the Hull-Dulles agreement to keep partisan politics out of 
the discussions on the creation of the United Nations was remarkable in several ways. It 
prevented the topic of the United Nations from being engulfed-as it had at the end of the 
First World War-- in furious Senate controversy and partisan attack. Hull did not want 
the Roosevelt administration to make the same mistakes as Woodrow Wilson twenty-five 
years earlier. Wilson had been very partisan-especially during the wartime midterm 
elections of 1918-and had, as the war drew to a close, ignored Republicans, and, to a 
most unfortunate end, excluded them from the peacemaking process. For his part, Dewey 
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did not want his party to once again play the roles of vengeful antagonist, isolationist, and 
obstructionist. He genuinely believed-as his comments since 1941 had indicated-that 
the United States must have an internationalist foreign policy, and that post-World War II 
isolationism would spell the doom ofthe Republican Party. 
From a campaign standpoint, the Hull-Dulles talks were remarkable in the political 
benefits they provided for the Dewey campaign. In one masterful stroke Dewey was able 
to (1) remove a divisive subject to his party from the political discourse, (2) center the 
campaign around his perceived strength, domestic policy, and (3), as Senator Vandenberg 
shrewdly observed, rob Roosevelt of his campaign argument that it would "break the 
continuity" of the peace negotiations if the President was defeated. As August gave way 
to September, Dewey was on the offensive, and enjoying a small lead in the Labor Day 
polls. "I shall not weep bitter tears if Dewey wins through a small vote coming out," a 
discouraged Roosevelt wrote to a friend in mid-August. "Neither you nor I have any real 
right to take on any more responsibilities." The President had not disliked his other 
challengers, Landon and Willkie-and, in fact, had a genuine respect for Willkie-- but 
"he really hates that Tom Dewey," one administration intimate observed. Inside the 
White House, meanwhile, aides worried if the President still had "that old campaign 
magic." He often seemed tired and depressed, and when Dewey's name entered a 
conversation, he often grew disinterested. At the end of August, Roosevelt told Margaret 
Suckley, his archivist at Hyde Park, that he would not be surprised if Dewey won in 
November. Democrats, he said, seemed too confident of success, and were thus "just not 
bothering to register for victory.,,37 
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While Dewey was working with Hull to forge a nonpartisan foreign policy, Roosevelt 
made one of his first campaign acts since the nomination. On 18 August, just a few days 
after his Bremerton speech, the President met with Senator Truman at the White House. 
"The encounter consisted oflittle more than genial pleasantries, the new nominee 
tendering his thanks and Roosevelt, as Truman recalled it, giving him 'a lot of hooey 
about what I could do to help the campaign.' They lunched in the open behind the White 
House under an enormous oak planted by Andrew Jackson more than a hundred years 
earlier. Not having seen FDR face-to-face from more than a year, he was shocked by 
Roosevelt's haggard appearance and the way his hands trembled as he attempted with 
little success to pour cream into his coffee.,,38 "The President looked fine and ate a 
bigger lunch than I did,' Truman told reporters afterward. "He's still the leader he's 
always been and don't let anybody kid you about it. He's keen as a briar.' Privately, 
however, he was shocked: "His hands were shaking and he talks with considerable 
difficulty ... It doesn't seem to be any mental lapse of any kind, but physically he's just 
going to pieces.,,39 On the night of 31 August, Truman delivered his first official speech 
of the campaign. Speaking in front of the old red-brick courthouse in his birthplace of 
Lamar, Missouri, the Senator declared-in an obvious reference to Dewey-that 
"Tomorrow's challenge is today's problem. The proven leadership of our successes must 
continue. The fortunes of the future for which our boys have fought, bled and died must 
not be endangered by entrusting them to inexperienced hands. There is no substitute for 
experience, which can be gained only through the years of application and service.,,4o 
This issue of experience and trusted leadership was a recurring theme, and its irony was 
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evidently lost on Truman-a man who was being groomed for the presidency and who 
had as about as little foreign policy experience as the Governor of New York. 
Following his official "Acceptance Speech" at Lamar, "party leaders soon developed a 
grueling campaign schedule in which Truman would be the workhorse, criss-crossing the 
country to rouse the troopS.,,41 He traveled by rail in an old combination sleeper and 
dining car called the Henry Stanley, and was accompanied by a small staff, including 
Hugh Fulton as campaign manager and speechwriter, young Matt Connelly, an 
investigator for the Truman Committee, who was recruited to be "an all-around 
arrangements man," and Paul A. Porter, a bright, young liberal from Kentucky, who was 
the DNC's publicity director, was taped to help with press relations.42 Beginning in early 
October and continuing through Election Day, Truman spoke in more than fifteen states, 
and over twenty large cities, including New Orleans, Los Angeles, Portland, Minneapolis, 
Milwaulkee, Akron, Boston, New York, and Pittsburgh. Though an unexciting speaker, 
Truman hit at Dewey and the Republicans with great energy and zeal. "It was a very 
enthusiastic tour," he later remembered. "I stopped at every little stop where the train 
stopped. It was the first whistle stop tour, but it wasn't referred to as a whistle stop tour 
. h d ,,43 III t ose ays.· 
With the start ofthe traditional fall campaign following Labor Day, Wendell 
Willkie-and the quest for his endorsement-- became a major campaign issue. Though 
the 1940 Republican nominee was not allowed to speak at the convention, he was vocal 
nonetheless that fall, publishing a small tract in September entitled An American 
Program. Willkie's work was a brief analysis and commentary on the convention 
platforms adopted by RepUblicans and Democrats that summer. According to Willkie, 
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the platforms were timid and evasive, and represented what he called the "Cowardice at 
Chicago." He was especially critical of the GOP, which he insisted missed an 
opportunity to take a clear stand on postwar foreign policy, and thus attract independent 
voters. The party platforms, he argued, "are read by the independent voter, who does not 
decide how he will vote before hearing the issues discussed. It is precisely this 
independent voter-the man who does not vote automatically for any candidate his party 
may nominate-who has determined most Presidential elections in the past 
generations.,,44 In addition, Willkie scolded both parties for failure to make serious and 
substantive statements on civil rights and social security. For Willkie, the equitable 
treatment of the black minority in America was essential to a just and lasting peace. 
Prejudice and discrimination, he wrote, must end-fighting the Nazis made that clear-
and the government must ensure it. Finally, he promoted insurance eligibility and 
coverage for all Americans, and the assurances of good food, education, adequate 
clothing, medical care, and a decent home for every child. 
Then, in early October 1944, Willkie suddenly died of a heart attack, without having 
endorsed either Dewey or Roosevelt. Years later, FDR aide, Samuel Rosenman wrote of 
a meeting with Willkie in June 1944, in which, he proposed joining with Roosevelt to 
forge a liberal and internationalist party in America. However, in his 1994 memoir, 
Advising Ike, Herbert Brownell insisted that Rosenman was wrong. According to 
Brownell, he and Henry Luce, editor of Time and a Willkie supporter in 1940, met with 
the Hoosier in a suite at New York's Waldorf Astoria Hotel in late summer 1944. "Over 
cocktails and at dinner," Brownell recalled, "Willkie criticized Dewey and his policies; 
the attack was vehement. Suddenly he said, 'And I want you to know, Brownell, that 
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your man is going to be defeated and I am going to run for president in 1948 and will be 
elected.' After a pause he added, 'But I like you, Brownell, and want you to be my 
campaign manager in '48. '" Recognizing an opening, Brownell replied that Willkie 
could not win the Republican nomination in 1948 ifhe did not endorse Dewey in 1944. 
Around midnight, he "got up and lumbered off," with Brownell and Luce agreeing "that 
maybe the important job had been done." Shortly thereafter Brownell learned that 
Willkie had telephoned Eugene Pulliam, an influential Indiana newspaper publisher (and 
grandfather of future Vice President Dan Quayle), asking him to set up time on a leading 
radio network so he could announce his support for Dewey. "Unfortunately," Brownell 
wrote, "a few days later, instead of listening to the planned speech, I was attending 
Willkie's funeral services.,,45 Still, Dewey felt slighted by his "fat little friend"~as he 
privately called Willkie. Reflecting upon that relationship, Dewey, years later, recalled: 
"[He] didn't [ support me] when I was nominated for President in 1944, after he had been 
so badly beaten in Wisconsin by delegates I didn't recognize and had asked to withdraw. 
I was finally nominated. He never supported me, and he never did anything but snipe, 
and finally he went to a hospital and died ofbitterness.,,46 
Another major issue in the presidential campaign of 1944 was the status of the 
President's health. From late 1943 to early 1944, Roosevelt was plagued with colds and 
bronchial infections, which ultimately led the President's physician, Ross T. McIntire, to 
schedule a thorough physical examination. On 28 March 1944, Howard G. Bruenn, a 
lieutenant commander in the Medical Corps and cardiology consultant to the Naval 
Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, examined Roosevelt~the first cardiologist to ever do 
so. Bruenn diagnosed the President as having hypertensive heart disease~FDR's blood 
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pressure at the time of exam was 18811 05 mm.Hg.-cardiac failure (left ventricular), and 
acute bronchitis.47 Breunn then advised McIntire that the President be placed on a 
regimen of bed rest, sedation, digitalization (treatment with digitalis to improve cardiac 
function), codeine for cough control, salt restriction, and weight loss. McIntire was 
shocked. "You can't do that," he said. "This is the President of the United States!,,48 
Eventually, McIntire relented, and Bruenn's recommendations (with some modifications) 
were implemented. Roosevelt's blood pressure, however, continued to rise. On 3 April it 
was 2101108. The next day it was 2261118, and on 5 April, 218/120.49 "He looked so 
tired and worn that I was shocked," declared one Roosevelt intimate after dining with the 
President in late March. Throughout the spring speculation mounted that FDR, poor in 
health, might not seek a fourth term. Benjamin V. Cohen, a Roosevelt advisor, suggested 
he should instead accept an invitation to preside over the emerging United Nations 
organization.5o Roosevelt, unaware ofthe seriousness of his condition, intended, 
however, to seek a fourth term, and made his decision public on 10 July. No physician 
ever advised him to not seek reelection. In fact, McIntire reportedly even told the 
President that "With proper care and strict adherence to rules ... [your] chances of 
winning through to 1948 ... [are] goOd.,,51 According to medical doctor Hugh Evans, in a 
recent and very thorough study on Roosevelt's health, "the medical culture of the time 
generally promoted a lack of candor in discussing serious diseases. Illness or its progress 
was not customarily discussed with patients, unless they failed to comply with doctor's 
orders. Presidential health matters were assumed to be private, rarely reported frankly or 
with clinical detail.,,52 Roosevelt never inquired, and neither Bruenn nor McIntire ever 
informed. 
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The President was not the only one unaware of the true status of his health. Neither 
were the American people. The White House-- wanting to portray the commander-in-
chief as alert and fit-consciously conducted a misinformation campaign. Staffer Joseph 
Daniels, for example, "selected and carefully edited the photographs of the president for 
distribution" while the ever-optimistic McIntire continued to insist that Roosevelt "was in 
better health than at any time since he entered the White House."S3 Even the President 
participated (unknowing or not) in the cover-up. Meeting with reporters after his first 
examination by Bruenn, Roosevelt said that he "had bronchitis, but was otherwise fine."s4 
He was not fine, of course. "Franklin seemed to feel miserable," the First Lady later 
wrote in her Autobiography, and in early April, "made up his mind that he would go 
down and stay with Bernard Baruch at his plantation, Hobcaw, in Georgetown, South 
Carolina."ss Though the month-long trip was relaxing, and he returned to the White 
House-- as the New York Times reported-"tanned, rested ... with an improved color and 
which some ofthe tired seams smoothed from his face," Roosevelt's blood pressure 
remained dangerously high (240/130 mm Hg. on 28 April).s6 Furthermore, the President 
could not keep his appointments. Then, in early August 1944, carne the speech at 
Bremerton Naval Base discussed earlier. Roosevelt, who probably experienced a mild 
heart attack during the speech, seemed distracted, unsure of himself, and 
uncharacteristically soft-spoken. s7 He also looked especially worn and fragile. This 
incident, along with the photograph of Roosevelt reading his Acceptance Speech, led 
many of the President's critics to declare before the campaign's end: "A Vote for FDR 
May be a Vote for Truman."s8 
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In his 1993 memoir, Advising Ike, Herbert Brownell recalled that "Although we did 
not fully know about the president's condition at the time ... we did know that the 
pictures of the president portrayed an ill and tired man." In light ofFDR's appearance 
and the rampant rumors about his health, Brownell's publicity director, Steve Hanigan, 
then "prepared an elaborate document for Governor Dewey's consideration, which made 
the president's failing health a major campaign issue and demanded full disclosure." 
Dewey considered it, but his advisors were divided on the issue. Congress was heavily 
Democratic, and so there would certainly be no congressional inquiry into the state of the 
president's health. Furthermore, the press seemed disinterested, and did not do any 
investigative reporting on the subject. In the end, Dewey decided not to tackle the health 
issue directly, fearing a backlash in the wartime atmosphere. Steve Hanigan resigned in 
protest. 59 
In early September, Roosevelt continued with his "Rose Garden" strategy, and on 11 
September traveled to Canada aboard the presidential train, Ferdinand Magellan, to meet 
with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Second Quebec (or Octagon) 
Conference. Though the official purpose of the meeting was to discuss military strategy, 
the real reasons were more political. Churchill came to the conference, for example, 
seeking to secure postwar Lend Lease aid for Great Britain, while Roosevelt came hoping 
to "settle all... questions" about Germany. The President was also well aware that such a 
meeting highlighted his role as commander-in-chief at a critically important political 
time. The German question was of vital importance, however. By the fall of 1944, 
Allied forces were fast approaching Germany's borders, and-- as Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson reminded the President in August-- General Dwight Eisenhower was still 
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without instructions on "vital points" of policy concerning German occupation and 
reconstruction. Roosevelt then convened a special Cabinet Committee on Germany that 
included Stimson, Hull, presidential aide Harry Hopkins, and Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau. The committee, like the administration at large, was riddled with 
internal rivalries, and, as the President departed for Quebec in September, had still not 
settled upon a policy to recommend. 
Considering himself to be an expert on Germany-and having recently been 
confronted by Morgenthau with the issue of Nazi death camps-Roosevelt favored a hard 
line against a defeated Reich. In addition, as Michael Beschloss has recently noted, "with 
various German anti-Hitler plotters having pressed both Stalin and the West to make a 
separate peace, the President wished to ensure that the Soviets stayed in the war to 
unconditional surrender.,,6o Conversely, he hoped to demonstrate to Stalin that the 
United States and Great Britain had no intention of making a separate deal with Hitler. 
Thus, FDR invited to Quebec not his Secretary of War or his Secretary of State, but his 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, a man who was "convinced of the inbred 
evil and compulsive bellicosity of the German people." On l3 September, Morgenthau 
presented his radical plan of "de-Nazification and deindustrialization of Germany" to 
Churchill. "I have never had such a verbal lashing in my life," the Treasury Secretary 
later wrote. He would not be "chained to a dead German," the British prime minister 
exclaimed. "I'm all for disarming Germany. But we ought not prevent her living 
decently ... You cannot indict a whole nation ... [Such measures] are unnatural, un-
Christian and unnecessary.,,61 Besides, he did "not want to be left alone in Europe with 
the Bear." Churchill also feared that the Morgenthau Plan, which the United States 
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pitched as a way for Britain (by replacing Germany as a supplier of sophisticated 
industrial products) to prosper economically, might be a substitute for American lend-
lease aid. FDR gave assurances otherwise, and explained that it was a tactical chip 
opposite Stalin. Churchill then announced that he had been "converted," and on 15 
September the two leaders solemnly endorsed the conversion of postwar Germany "into a 
country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.,,62 
In Washington, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was shocked. In the margins of his 
own copy of the Morgenthau Plan, Stimson wrote: "Childish follyL .. A beautiful Nazi 
program! ... This is to laugh!." He also privately described it as "Carthaginian." A few 
days later, on 23 September-the morning after FDR's famous Fala speech, in fact-- the 
Wall Street Journal, in a page one article entitled "Treasury Plan Calls for 
Dismemberment, Ban on Most Heavy Industry," revealed the contents of the Morgenthau 
Plan, describing it as "Carthaginian" (which, probably meant the leak came from War 
Department). In Berlin, Hitler's propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels announced in the 
Volkischer Beobachter that "Roosevelt and Churchill Agree to Jewish Murder Plan!" As 
U.S. forces were fighting to take their first major German city, Aachen, along the 
Belgian-Dutch border, German radio warned residents to avoid the fate of the 
Morgenthau Plan-a plan drafted by "spokesman of world Judaism" and FDR "bosom" 
friend, that pledged to "dismember Germany, destroy its industry, and 'exterminate forty-
three million Germans. ",63 
Roosevelt, meanwhile, refused to accept responsibility, insisting that he had no 
intention of turning Germany into an agrarian state. In a press conference on 29 
September, the President denied reports that his cabinet was "split" on the issue of 
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postwar Germany. "Every such story, he said, was "essentially untrue," and "I might 
emphasize the word essentially." Performing a complete "about-face" on the 
Morgenthau Plan, Roosevelt announced that he was now asking Leo Crowley, head of 
the Foreign Economic Administration, to advise him German postwar exports and trade. 
Privately, he told Hull that "No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation 
again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. 1 wish we could 
catch and chastise him." Then, on 3 October, Roosevelt explained to Stimson that he had 
merely wished to save some of the Ruhr's proceeds for Great Britain, which was "broke." 
"About this pastoral, agricultural Germany, that is just nonsense," the President said. "I 
have not approved of anything like that. 1 am sure I have not." Knowing otherwise, 
Stimson refused to let the issue drop, replying that the President should not say that 
publicly until "you have refreshed your memory with this paper, which 1 have in my 
pocket." The secretary then presented FDR with a copy of the signed Quebec 
memorandum with Churchill, initialed "O.K. FDR." "Flustered" and "perfectly 
staggered," Roosevelt looked at Stimson and said, "Henry, I have not the faintest 
recollection ofthis at all!,,64 
While Roosevelt laid low and appeared "presidential," Dewey launched a campaign 
swing around the country. He would not whistle stop. That, he said, would be 
inappropriate under the wartime conditions. Instead, he planned to bypass many of the 
larger towns, as well as the large crowds, and focus instead on planning with state and 
local machine Republicans. He dubbed it "the Listening Campaign." On 6 September, 
the Governor left Albany on a special train equipped with the latest technology in sound 
equipment. He was accompanied by the press (about seventy journalists in all) and his 
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staff.65 A Fortune poll released the day of his departure from New York showed the race 
very close, with Roosevelt enjoying a small lead of 52.6%. A Gallup poll, released the 
following day, however, reported Dewey with 51 % of support from those surveyed. On 
7 September, Dewey delivered his first fonnal speech of the fall campaign. Addressing a 
crowd of about 13,500 at the Convention Hall in Philadelphia, Dewey-against a 
backdrop of hanging American flags-- stressed that in all likelihood the next 
administration would be a peacetime one: 
Yes, we are proving that we can wage war. But what are the 
prospects of success as a nation at peace? The answer depends 
entirely on the outcome of this election. 
At the very outset I want to make one thing clear. This is not 
merely a campaign against an individual or a political party. It is 
not merely a campaign to displace a tired, exhausted, quarreling 
and bickering administration with a fresh and vigorous 
administration. It is a campaign against an administration which 
was conceived in defeatism, which failed for eight straight years to 
restore our domestic economy, which has been the most wasteful, 
extravagant and incompetent administration in the history of the 
Nation and worst of all, one which has lost faith in itself and in the 
American people.66 
The audience was made up mainly of women and young girls in bobby socks, and, on the 
whole, not responsive to Dewey's hard-hitting indictment of the Roosevelt 
administration. According to Tom Reynolds, a liberal journalist from the Chicago Sun, 
who was traveling with the campaign (and secretly reporting back to the White House), 
the word for this stop was "apathy": "The crowds on our arrival were hardly nonnal 
shopping crowds. Their chief salute was 'where'd you get the gas?' The crowds that did 
gather were notable for being about 70 per cent women. The men are away at war or 
working on war jobs. The city GOP machine didn't fill the Convention hall-I counted 
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15 empty tiers of seats in the back. Dewey, himself, didn't think he did so well-his 
voice was so complicated acoustically by the bounce offthose empty tiers.,,67 At a press 
conference with reporters at the White House the next day, Roosevelt laughed at Dewey's 
charge that his administration was "old, tired, and defeated." When asked ifhe was 
going to respond to the Governor, the President smiled, and lazily replied, that he had not 
heard the speech, and thus felt uninformed. 
The following day, Dewey turned out a "whooping, cheering crowd" in Louisville, 
Kentucky. He used the occasion to answer a letter printed in The Atlantic Monthly by 
famed writer and historian Gerald W. Johnson, who publicly asked the Governor, "What 
do you, as a Presidential candidate, offer me, as a voter, that Harding did not offer in 
1920?" Dewey's response was both clear and detailed. He endorsed Roosevelt's plans 
for world organization--<ieclaring it to be essential to "make secure the peace of the 
world"-- but emphasized that any such body "must be the work of many minds. No one 
man or two or three or four men can shape it. Some sixty nations all over the globe, great 
and small, must help to shape it, must believe in it, join it and make it work over all these 
years to come.,,68 On the whole, Dewey's remarks were met with approval in the media. 
"The Democrats, the Elmira Star Gazette concluded, "have found out that their perpetual 
candidate, Mr. Roosevelt, is not running against Hoover this time. Governor Dewey in 
his speeches in Philadelphia and Louisville made plain, blunt charges and accusations 
against the New Deal Party that will have to be answered; or the voters will be wondering 
why." 
A few days later, however, in Valentine, Nebraska, the usually cool and calculating 
Dewey blundered, charging-based upon an unsubstantiated INX dispatch from Quebec-
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- that the administration had shortchanged General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific 
because he posed a political threat to the President. The charge, of course, was ridiculous 
and false, and Dewey, when pressed by reporters for evidence, later admitted he had been 
misinfonned. He also-literally in the shadow of Roosevelt dams-- criticized the New 
Deal for neglecting the American West. On this leg ofthe tour, however, he did begin to 
relax. As biographer Richard Norton Smith observed, "The ban on rear platfonn talks 
was forgotten now. At places like Livingston, Montana, and Coeur d' Alene, Idaho, 
Dewey looked forward to developing the western half of America's continent. He 
accepted a ten-gallon hat at Sheridan, Wyoming, rode in a torchlight parade at Billings, 
Montana, and laughed at the memory of himself speaking to a full house in a blizzard 
four year previously, when a sudden gust blew open a door and he shouted in 
exasperation, 'Where the hell is that wind coming from?",69 During his stop in 
Valentine, he reportedly even shouted "Ride' em, cowboy" at a rodeo, and shared box of 
popcorn with a four-year-old admirer. 70 Problems were looming, however. His radio 
audience dropped from a Hooper rating of 20.3 at the beginning of his swing, to a 14.5 by 
Seattle on 18 September. Then there was the issue with money. His campaign was 
nearly broke, and Dewey began privately wondering ifhe had enough money to even 
complete his campaign swing and return to Albany. 
On 18 September Dewey was in Seattle, where he made a strong appeal to blue collar 
workers. The Civic Auditorium, seating 6,500, was full, and another 1000 people sat 
outside in ball park bleachers. The crowd, however, was largely non-labor. "We are 
adrift" in the field of labor, he declared. "There is no course, no chart, not even a 
compass. We move, when we move at all, to the shifting winds of the caprice of one 
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man." Furthennore, labor relations were "smothered under a welter of agencies, boards, 
commissions, and bureaus." Dewey reminded his audience that it had been a Republican 
President, William Howard Taft, who created the Department of Labor, and then outlined 
his program for change. As president, he would appoint, from the ranks of labor, an 
active and able Labor Secretary. In addition, he promised to abolish unnecessary bureaus 
and agencies, and put the functions oflabor back into the Department of Labor. Alluding 
to the CIO-PAC, he also vowed to put an end to special interest, and ensure that every 
worker stood equally in the department that was created to serve them, not rule them. 
"There is no question where we want to go during these peacetime years for which we are 
electing a new president," Dewey concluded. "We must establish equality between 
business, labor, and agriculture, we must have full employment. It must be at a high 
wage level. We must have protection of the individual from loss of his earning power 
through no fault of his own. We must have protection ofthe individual against the 
hazards of old age. We must have those things within the framework of free--- and I 
mean free-collective bargaining.,,71 
The next day, 19 September, the Dewey campaign crashed-- literally. At 11 :50 a.m. 
(PWT), Dewey's train-en route to Portland-- ploughed into the rear of a Great Northern 
passenger express near the small town of Castle Rock, Washington. Several passengers 
on both trains suffered minor injuries. The Governor and Mrs. Dewey were badly 
shaken, but otherwise fine. "The wreck was damned unpleasant," Tom Reynolds wrote 
Steve Early a few days later. "I've traveled a quarter of a million miles with your boss 
[FDR] and the worst I ever got was a hangover."n Dewey, meanwhile, pressed on to 
Portland, where that night he spoke to a crowd of7,000 in the city's Ice Arena. Oregon, 
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like Washington and the other states Dewey had visited during his "Listening 
Campaign," was "in a state of flux," and thus very much "on the fence.,,73 In the speech, 
which was both well-delivered and well-received, Dewey~countering Democratic 
arguments that the team fighting the war should also end it-- hit hard on "the 
indispensable man" theme, declaring: "Let's have no more ofthis pretense about 
indispensable men. There are no indispensable men. If our Republic after 150 years of 
self-government is dependent upon the endless continuance of one man in office, then the 
hopes which animated the men who fought for the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution have indeed come to nothing. The peace and prosperity of America and of 
the world can never depend on one man." 74 
From Portland the Dewey special traveled to San Francisco, where on 21 September, 
at Municipal Hall, Dewey, as one critic described it, "climbed into bed with the 
President" and endorsed the New Deal. The specific question addressed in this speech 
was could America have both political freedom and economic security. Dewey, of 
course, believed it could~ifthere was a change in administration. Overall, he promised 
to continue the best parts of the New Deal while incorporating old-fashioned Republican 
values, such as economic opportunity, and honest and efficient government. "Whether 
we like it or not, and regardless of the party in power, government," he declared, "is 
committed to some degree of economic direction. Certain government measures to 
influence broad economic conditions are both desirable and inevitable." For example, the 
postwar years would require the federal government to stabilize interest rates, ensure 
widespread job opportunities in private enterprise, and support farm prices against the 
menace of collapse. The old, pre-New Deal days were gone, he said, and would "never 
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come back again." Thus, he concluded, America needed "a new point of view toward 
the relationship between government and the people. The role of government cannot be 
the purely negative one of correcting abuse, of telling people what they mayor may not 
do. Government must be the means by which our people, working together, seek to meet 
the problems that are too big for anyone of us or any group of us to solve individually.,,75 
The crowd, caught totally unprepared for such a declaration, offered only minimal 
applause. In his report to the White House, journalist Tom Reynolds noted that "Hal 
Faust ofthe Chicago Tribune, Dick Lee of the N ew York News, Warren Francis of the 
Los Angeles Times, and a dozen others gagged when we got the text of the speech. I got 
a service message from my office the next night that said that the Tribune had played the 
Dewey speech on page I 0-' apparently under the impression it was Roosevelt 
talking. ",76 
The next day Dewey addressed a partisan crowd of93,000 in Los Angeles, where, 
standing under a fifty-two-foot American flag and accompanied by Hollywood celebrities 
such as Ginger Rogers, he bored his audience with a complex and high-minded speech on 
social security and unemployment insurance. 'My God, what was the matter with him?' 
Rupert Hughes overheard in the crowd.,,77 Indeed, supporters of Dewey began to 
complain that his speeches were dull and over the head of most Americans. He had done 
the same thing a few days earlier in Seattle, where instead oftearing away at the 
Roosevelt administration, he spoke on labor policy. Though a great speaker, his topics 
had a way of actually bringing an otherwise enthusiastic audience down. One journalist 
even thought Dewey might be intentionally trying to bore the nation into not voting. 
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As Dewey made his swing around the nation, the White House announced that the 
President would deliver an address to the Teamsters Union on 23 September. Those 
close to Roosevelt believed him to be too preoccupied by the war to fully appreciate 
Dewey's challenge. Several factors were at play for Democrats on the eve of the 
Teamsters Speech. First, there was the issue ofthe President's health. He needed to 
appear robust. The fact that he would be seated worried some. Second, there was the 
need to defend the administration's record, and to respond to Dewey's charges. And 
third, many Democrats believed Dewey was purposefully trying to bore the nation and 
thus drive turnout on Election Day to record lows. The President, it was believed in the 
White House, needed to shake things up, energize his base, and electrify the nation. He 
did not disappoint. Though he remained seated during the speech, he was energetic, 
conversational, witty, and extremely partisan. It was arguably the best political speech of 
his entire career. 
Roosevelt joked about his age (and by implication, his health), noting that he was 
actually four years older since the last election-a fact, he said, that seemed to annoy 
some people. He then masterfully incorporated mention of the Great Depression, adding 
that "in the mathematical field there are millions of Americans who are more than eleven 
years older than when we started to clear up the mess that was dumped in our laps in 
1933." Still, FDR wryly noted, Republicans seemed intend on criticizing him for prewar 
economic turmoil. "Now, there is an old and somewhat lugubrious adage which says: 
'Never speak of a rope in the house of a man who has been hanged.' In the same way, if 
I were a Republican leader speaking to a mixed audience, the last word in the whole 
dictionary that I think I would use is that word 'depression. '" He also denied several 
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"fantastic" charges made by Republicans, including one that the administration was 
planning to keep men in the armed services after the war was over for fear that their 
might be no jobs available for them at home. It was, he declared, a "callous and brazen 
falsehood" aimed at stimulating fear among American mothers, wives, and sweethearts. 
Furthermore, "it was hardly calculated to bolster the morale of our soldiers and sailors 
and airmen fighting our battles all over the world." Republicans, the President insisted, 
were attempting to distort his record and deceive the American voter. In fact, they had, 
he charged, already imported into the campaign the propaganda techniques of dictators. 
One technique "was all set out in Hitler's book-and it was copied by the aggressors of 
Italy and Japan. According to that technique, you should never use a small falsehood; 
always a big one, for its very fantastic nature will make it more credible-if only you 
keep repeating it over and over again." 
The highlight of the speech, however, was the President's mention of his dog, Fala. 
Republican leaders, he said, had not been content with attacks on him, or his wife, or on 
his sons. "No, not content with that, they now include my little dog Fala. Well, of 
course, I don't resent attacks, and my family doesn't resent attacks, but Fala does resent 
them." Earlier, Republicans in Congress had charged that while Roosevelt was in the 
Pacific in August, Fala had been left behind on an Aleutian Island, and that FDR had sent 
a destroyer back to find him, at a cost to the taxpayers of "two or three, or eight or twenty 
million dollars." 
You know-Fala's Scotch, and being a Scottie, as soon as he 
learned that the Republican fiction writers in Congress had out and 
concocted a story that I left him behind on an Aleutian Island and 
had sent a destroyer back to find him-at a cost to the taxpayers of 
two or three, or eight or twenty million dollars-his Scotch soul 
was furious. He has not been the same dog since. I am 
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accustomed to hearing malicious falsehoods about myself-such 
as that old, worm-eaten chestnut that I have represented myself as 
indispensable. But I think I have a right to resent, to object to 
libelous statements about my dog ... 78 
The audience reaction was enthusiastic at a minimum. One member of the audience beat 
a silver bread tray with a soup ladle, while another smashed glasses with wine bottles 
every time the President ridiculed Dewey.79 When he had finished speaking, Roosevelt 
reportedly turned to labor leader William Green and said, "They liked that, didn't 
they?"so Speechwriter Samuel Rosenman later recalled, "The applause and cheers when 
he finished were startling to those of us who had seen him out campaigning in 1932, 
1936, and 1940. Never had there been a demonstration equal to this in sincerity, 
admiration and affection. In the mind of every friend and supporter who stood and 
cheered and applauded in that large dining hall was the same thought: 'The old maestro is 
back again-the champ is now out on the road. The old boy has the same old fighting 
stuff and he just can't be licked.",sl 
Dewey, who listened to the speech over the state-of-the-art RCA radio system in his 
private rail car, was stunned and furious. Determined to respond in kind, he began 
planning for a major public response, and even signed bank notes to help raise the 
necessary $27,496.46 to expand network coverage from 164 to 288 radio stations 
nationwide.82 Covering Dewey on this swing, Chicago Sun reporter Torn Reynolds, in a 
"confidential" report to White House press secretary Steve Early, noted that following 
Roosevelt's speech, Republicans were disorganized and frantic. In Belen, New Mexico, 
Brownell, who for hours had been desperately trying to communicate with Dewey by 
phone, finally made contact. According to an unsympathetic Reynolds, "the little 
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governor" had to take Brownell's call "in a public booth before the eyes of all around." 
Even more humiliating, Henry Turnbull, Dewey's radio director, was also cramped in the 
telephone booth. The effect of Roosevelt's speech among the correspondents, Reynolds 
wrote, was "almost incredible. The Chicago Tribune and New York News crowd already 
were sour on Dewey, and when the President lifted him out of the water, they went even 
more sour. There wasn't a dissenting vote among the correspondents-Dewey was left in 
a position behind that he occupied when he left Pawling on Sept. 6. He must have felt it, 
too." For the first time in the campaign, he began receiving "boos" from the audiences. 
Meanwhile, as the Dewey Special pulled out New Mexico en route to Oklahoma City, 
where Dewey would respond publicly to Roosevelt's speech, somebody placed several 
red, white, and blue "Roosevelt" stickers on the windows of his train. 
In Oklahoma City on 25 September, Dewey rebutted Roosevelt's Fala speech before a 
crowd of over 15,000. His address was broadcast live over national radio, and was 
interrupted thirty-eight times by applause. "For two and a half weeks," Dewey began, "I 
have been laying before our people the program I believe we must adopt if we are to win 
here at home the things for which our American men are fighting abroad." In doing this, 
he explained, he had carefully considered the wartime circumstances of the campaign, 
and had consciously avoided inserting politics into the war effort. The President, despite 
a pledge to the contrary, was now engaging in mud-slinging, ridicule and wisecracks. He 
had, Dewey continued, plumbed to the depths of demagogy by dragging into the 
campaign the names of Hitler and Goebbels. "Let me make one thing perfectly clear. I 
shall not join my opponent in his descent to mud-slinging. Ifhe continues ... he will be 
alone." Dewey then proceeded to indict the administration on the prewar economy, 
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noting that ten million Americans were still unemployed in 1940 after seven years of the 
New Deal. "By waging relentless warfare against our job-making machinery, my 
opponent succeeded in keeping a depression going eleven long years-twice as long as 
any previous depression in our history, and the somber, tragic thing is that today he still 
has no better programs to offer. That is why the New Deal is afraid of peace, that's why 
it resorts to wisecracks and vilification-when our people want victory followed by 
lasting peace in the world-and jobs and opportunity at hope. That's why it's time for a 
change. ,,83 
Dewey concluded by employing another one of his campaign themes-i.e. Roosevelt 
was not the candidate ofthe average Democratic voter, but of special interests. "My 
opponent," he charged, "now announces his desire to be President for sixteen years. Yet 
in his speech ... he called it a 'malicious falsehood' that he had ever represented himself 
to be 'indispensable.' ... Lets get this straight. The man who wants to be President for 
sixteen years is, indeed, indispensable. He is indispensable to Harry Hopkins, to Mme. 
Perkins, to Harold Ickes ... to America's leading enemy of civil liberties-the mayor of 
Jersey City. He's indispensable to those infamous machines in Chicago, in the Bronx, 
and all the others. He's indispensable to Sidney Hillman and the Political Action 
Committee, he's indispensable to Earl Browder, the ex-convict and pardoned Communist 
leader. Shall we, the American people, perpetuate one man in office for sixteen years? 
Shall we do that to accommodate this motley crew?84 
"FDR Asked for It" ran the headline of the New York Telegram the next morning. 
Traveling through Minnesota a few days later, Governor Bricker wrote that "Everywhere 
I have heard nothing but words of praise for your Oklahoma speech. It has given greater 
209 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
impetus to Republicans than anything that has happened. They are ready to go to town-
raise money and get out the votes." From California, Dewey's campaign biographer, 
Rupert Hughes, wired that the speech was more than oratory-"it was an earthquake." 
u.s. News added that the country "was going to have an old-fashioned, free-swinging 
campaign after all." 
In 1995, historian Gil Troy argued that contrary to popular opinion, the Fala speech 
was a rare political miscalculation by Roosevelt. Examining White House mail and 
editorials and "Letters to the Editor" from newspapers around the country, Troy noted 
that "regular" or "mainstream" Democrats-the very type Dewey wanted to either attract 
or bore into staying at home on Election Day-were three to one against the speech. 
Most complained about either (1) the distasteful attempt to compare Dewey's tactics with 
Hitler's, or (2) the frivolous injection of a dog into the political discourse. "One citizen," 
for example, "reported to the Detroit News that 'Candidate Roosevelt's political speech 
filled me with a feeling of deep disgust and loathing.' When mothers are mourning and 
sons are dying, how can 'this man' think it 'fit to regale their ears with such insulting 
trash and triviality as the qualities and feelings of his dog!,,85 Many Americans still 
expected their president to remain above politics, and Roosevelt had disappointed. With 
his Oklahoma City speech, Dewey also disappointed and thus missed an important 
opportunity. Instead of rebutting and attacking Roosevelt, he should have, in hindsight, 
remained quiet, and let FDR get all the blame for being too partisan. Disgusted 
Democrats and independents would have either voted for Dewey or opted not to vote. 
By playing on FDR's terms, he nullified any possible benefits from Roosevelt's blunder. 
Dewey quickly realized his mistake. It was, he later recalled, "the worst damned speech I 
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ever made.,,86 In fact, the outrage over the Fala and Oklahoma City speeches had such an 
impact on Dewey that it shaped his lackluster 1948 campaign against Harry Truman. 
While campaigning in Tulsa, on 26 September, just one day after his Oklahoma City 
speech, Dewey was approached by Colonel Carter Clarke ofthe Army Special Branch, 
who handed the Governor a top-secret letter from the Army Chief of Staff himself, 
General George C. Marshall. The letter read: 
My Dear Governor: 
I am writing to you without the knowledge of any other person 
except Admiral King (who concurs) because we are approaching a 
grave dilemma in the political reactions of Congress regarding 
Pearl Harbor. What I have to tell you below is of such a highly 
secret nature that I feel compelled to ask you either to accept it on 
the basis of your not communicating its contents to any other 
person and returning this letter or not reading any further and 
returning the letter to the bearer.87 
Dewey stopped reading the letter. "Marshall does not do things like that," he told Clarke. 
"I am confident that Franklin Roosevelt is behind this whole thing. Now if this letter 
merely tells me that we were reading Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor and that at least 
two of them are still in current use, there is no point in my reading the letter because I 
already know that. .. and Franklin Roosevelt knows about it too. He knew what was 
happening before Pearl Harbor, and instead of being reelected he ought to be 
impeached."S8 Dewey then returned the letter and consented to meet secretly with Clarke 
once he returned to Albany. 
When later asked by a congressional panel why he decided to write Dewey, Marshall 
replied that he was worried about Pearl Harbor references from Republicans that were 
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"growing more pointed as the campaign became more violent." In addition, it had been 
suggested he go to FDR "for help," and that, the Army Chief of Staff believed, would not 
do. "I felt it absolutely necessary," Marshall recalled, "that Mr. Dewey feel sure that the 
President had no knowledge whatever of my action and that he feel sure that it was 
entirely non-political. That is the way, I understand, Governor Dewey accepted it.,,89 
Marshall was right to be worried. According to Dewey advisor Herbert Brownell, the 
campaign had decided early on to disclose "the truth about Pearl Harbor.,,9o 
The Pearl Harbor attack, and the administration's handling of military preparation in 
the weeks before, had been the subject of furious controversy in Washington for two 
years. Though the administration's official explanation for the attack was "slugged 
without warning," many critics of the President were less sure. According to Dewey 
biographer Richard Norton Smith, Washington cocktail parties were enlivened with talk 
that-as two service boards of inquiry were privately beginning to reveal in the summer 
of 1944-U.S. code breakers had broken Japanese war codes in the spring of 1941, and 
that the State, War, and Navy Departments, as early as that November, "had a reasonably 
complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions and were in a position to know 
their potential moves against the United States.,,91 Sensing an opportunity, Republicans 
went on the attack. "The primary responsibility for the Pearl Harbor catastrophe," 
Congressman Ralph Church of Illinois declared in early September, "was in Washington 
and not in the Pacific.,,92 A few days later, on 18 September, Indiana Republican Forest 
Harness introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for a committee 
to conduct a special study of the attack and report back within thirty days.93 Clare Booth 
Luce, meanwhile, charged that Roosevelt was "the only American President who ever 
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lied us into a war because he did not have the courage to lead us into it.,,94 On the 
campaign trail in late September, Governor Bricker described the President's handling of 
the episode as "disgraceful," while in the Senate, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, 
announced that Dewey himself was "gathering facts" that might sustain allegations of 
national scandal. 
On 28 September, Dewey, accompanied by trusted advisor Eliot Bell, met with Clarke 
about Pearl Harbor and the Japanese codes. The Governor, Clarke insisted, must not 
raise Pearl Harbor as a campaign issue. According to Clarke, the United States had in 
fact broken Japanese codes prior to Pearl Harbor, and they were still being used by the 
Japanese. If Dewey exposed this secret, the Colonel continued, the Japanese would 
change their codes, and the American war effort in the Pacific, would be undermined. 
Shaken and angry, Dewey "fumed that Roosevelt was 'a traitor' who had willingly or 
accidentally condemned more than a thousand men, and most of the Pacific fleet, to a 
watery grave." After repeated assurances from Clarke that Roosevelt had no knowledge 
of their meeting, Dewey instructed his aides to gather all the information thus far 
collected, and "put it away securely and forget it.,,95 Clarke then asked him ifhe wished 
to convey a message to Marshall, to which Dewey replied, "No message." Dewey's 
secretary, Lillian Rosse, later recalled the Governor "looked like a ghost.,,96 
In October, Dewey suffered another blow. On 9 October, the Roosevelt 
administration released the content of the postwar security proposals made by the United 
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. 
Overall, the conference called for the creation of an international organization similar to 
the League of Nations, with a general assembly of all member states, an eleven-seat 
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security council (on which the founders would have pennanent representation), and a 
world court ofjustice.97 The proposals, however, made no mention of voting procedures 
on the Security Council, and avoided designating an authority responsible for committing 
troops against an aggressor. Three days later, on 12 October, Republican Senator Joseph 
Ball of Minnesota-- an internationalist and a sponsor of a 1943 Senate resolution calling 
for the creation of a United Nations Organization-- released a public statement 
challenging the presidential candidates to address the question of "Should the vote of the 
United States' representative on the United Nations security council commit an agreed 
upon quota of our military forces to action ordered by the council to maintain peace 
without requiring further congressional approval?,,98 Ball was lukewann at best on 
Dewey, and the previous year had published a book entitled Collective Security, in which 
he argued that "the right to wage aggressive warfare is the only sovereign right which 
must be renounced. The only sovereign obligation to be assumed is to join in collective 
action against aggression, whether actual or threatened.,,99 Ball, like many other Willkie 
Republicans, wanted the representative of the Security Council to have real authority. 
On 18 October, Dewey delivered a major foreign policy speech before the New York 
Herald-Tribune Forum at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. In his speech, 
the Republican nominee spoke thoughtfully about America's new internationalist 
mission. "Japanese planes launched from a few aircraft on December 7, 1941, struck us a 
devastating blow at Pearl Harbor," he said. "If we fail to make secure the peace of the 
world, the next war will not begin by a surprise attack upon an outlying base. It will 
begin when robot bombs [intercontinental missiles] launched thousands of miles away 
suddenly rain death and destruction on our major cities." That threat, he explained, had 
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greatly reduced the size of the earth. "Ifthere should ever be a third World War, 
America would be in the front lines in the very first hour. That is not argument. It is a 
fact." Thus, the inescapable conclusion was that the United States must never again run 
the risk of permitting war to break out in the world. To this end, it must take the lead in 
establishing an international body to prevent future wars. 
Dewey spent most of his speech, however, attacking the various aspects of the 
Roosevelt administration's conduct of the war. For example, he criticized Roosevelt's 
"secret diplomacy" with Stalin over the future of Poland. "Poland," Dewey declared, 
"was the first nation to resist the oppression of Hitler. The restoration of a free Poland is 
the outstanding symbol of what we are fighting for." The differences between Poland 
and the Soviet Union were complex, he acknowledged. Yet the President had undertaken 
to handle this matter personally and secretly with Stalin. Neither Secretary of State Hull 
nor Under-Secretary of State Stettinius were present-- only former WP A head Harry 
Hopkins. And what had they gained? Nothing-not even Soviet recognition "of those 
whom we consider to be the true Government of Poland." Not content, Dewey next 
turned to Italy, where he complained reconstruction efforts were improvised and 
inefficient, and had, fifteen months after Italy's surrender, failed to prevent "mass 
unemployment, hunger, despair, degradation, delinquency, and painful disappointment." 
He then turned to administration relations with France, noting that Roosevelt's personal 
antipathy for General Charles DeGaulle, who was leading the only existing French 
government, had led to delay in official recognition of that government, and "chaos 
behind our lines at a critical period of the war." France, Dewey declared, deserved better. 
"We need France in our councils and we need her now." 100 
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Unfortunately for Dewey, most of this rather substantive and eloquent speech was 
overshadowed by the Ball question, which he-in what turned out to be a major blunder--
dodged. Believing the Hull-Dulles agreement of August disqualified him from making 
any specific statement on the United Nations, Dewey commented only blandly that "The 
world organization must be enabled, through the use of force, when necessary, to prevent 
or repel military aggression. It must be supplemented by a world court to deal with 
international disputes." The White House immediately sensed an opportunity. The 
President was scheduled to address the same forum three days later, and ifhe could, 
campaign strategists believed, answer Ball's collective security question in more detail, 
he might win an important Republican endorsement. In a very close election, aides 
believed, it might make the difference. 
Roosevelt used the New York event as an excuse to campaign in his home state, 
which was very much in "toss-up" status. He arrived in New York early, and in an 
attempt to curb rumors of failing health, toured the city in an open car during a cold rain. 
At Ebbets Field, the President-wearing his old gray campaign hat and navy cape-
addressed well-wishers at a rally for Democratic Senator Bob Wagner. From there, 
Roosevelt traveled to Queens, the Bronx, Harlem, and mid-Manhattan. 101 That evening, 
21 October, he spoke to the Foreign Policy Association, and, unlike Dewey, addressed 
Ball's concerns squarely. "Peace, like war," the President explained, "can succeed only 
where there is a will to enforce it, and where there is available power to enforce it. The 
Council of the United Nations must have the power to act quickly and decisively to keep 
the peace by force, if necessary. A policeman would not be a very effective policeman if, 
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when he saw a felon break into a house, he had to go to the Town Hall and call a town 
meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested.,,102 
Once again Dewey was shocked. Roosevelt's statements were, he believed, 
inappropriate and a violation of the nonpartisan agreement of 25 August. In a speech in 
Minneapolis on 24 October, Dewey tried to rebound, announcing that the US 
representative to the United Nations "must not be subject to a reservation that would 
require ... [him] to return to Congress for authority every time he had to make a decision. 
Obviously Congress, and only Congress, has Constitutional power to determine what 
quota of force it will make available and what discretion it will give our representative to 
use that force.,,103 It was too late. That same day, while speaking in Baltimore, Senator 
Ball formally endorsed Roosevelt for President. Dewey, he said, had failed to clarify his 
position. If Congress retained the right to decide on each occasion whether to supply 
troops for collective security, the United Nations would be nothing more than a debating 
society, lacking power to act, and "future aggressors will sneer at it just as Hitler sneered 
at the League ofNations."lo4 
Though the Dewey campaign dismissed Ball as an "insignificant voice," his defection 
hurt. The Minnesota Senator immediately became the new Willkie, appealing to both 
liberal Republicans and independents. In addition, Ball undermined Dewey in 
Minnesota, where on Election Day he narrowly lost the state (and its eleven electoral 
votes) by 60,000 votes. Also, it revived foreign policy as an issue-a weak point for 
Dewey anyway-and raised questions, if unfounded, about the sincerity of his 
commitment to internationalism. Announcing his support for FDR on 21 October, 
journalist Walter Lippmann, who had supported Willkie in 1940, wrote "I cannot feel that 
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Governor Dewey can be trusted now with responsibility in foreign affairs ... He has so 
much to learn.,,105 More importantly, the Ball episode as a whole resulted in the very 
thing Dewey wanted to avoid- it generated controversy (and thus interest in the 
campaign) and mobilized previously ambivalent Democrats to tum out on Election Day 
and vote for Roosevelt. For example, both the Nation and the New Republic, skeptical 
over Roosevelt's apparent abandonment of the New Deal, found the President's answer 
to Ball's question sufficient ground for endorsing a fourth term. Years later, Dewey 
himself acknowledged the impact ofthe affair, recalling that "In the last week of the 
campaign Roosevelt broke his commitment and said in a very deft way that the town hall 
didn't have any power unless it had a policeman, thereby satisfying a great many people 
who felt that there should be a United Nations army, about which I had a good many 
reservations. I have been proved right, and he won the election. Not that that [alone] was 
responsible for his winning the election, but I'm sure it contributed.,,106 
Throughout the month of October, Dewey was on the defensive-mainly as it related 
to a subject he thought he had removed from the campaign in August, foreign policy. 
Roosevelt, who enjoyed the advantage of already being President and thus capable of 
making news, repeatedly placed the former New York prosecutor in the uncomfortable 
position of being on the defensive. For example, Dewey repeatedly felt the need in his 
speeches to present overviews of past Republican foreign policies-- including those of 
Secretaries of State Hay, Root, Knox, Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson-- to point out that 
the GOP was not the natural home of isolationism. Also, on several occasions he would 
begin his speeches by saying "I had intended to talk tonight about. .. ," and then move into 
a rebuttal of something Roosevelt had said a day or two earlier. He could not stay 
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focused. Over the course of a couple of weeks in mid-October, he managed to give major 
addresses on the United Nations, honesty and efficiency in government, the communists, 
the economic failures of the New Deal, and agriculture. Furthermore, October witnessed 
positive news from the war front, reinforcing FDR's campaign image of the President as 
a competent and successful commander-in-chief. At the end of September, U.s. forces 
were in Germany, and on 20 October, MacArthur launched the invasion of Leyte Gulf, 
and began his dramatic recapture of the Philippines. While at first glance it might appear 
that this situation would have helped his candidacy-especially since he had been so 
adamant in calling the next administration a peacetime one-it did not, and for two 
reasons. First, Dewey's campaign "message of the day" often times could not compete in 
the media with war stories. His messages, then, were largely ignored. And second, 
euphoria over positive news from the war front translated into a "rallying effect" for 
Roosevelt. If the war had ended in August or September, there might have been enough 
of a time lapse between excitement and election, to have given Dewey victory.]07 
Instead, the anticipation of victory, which coincided with the election, generated short-
term euphoria and thus aided Roosevelt. As FDR biographer James MacGregor Bums in 
the early 1970s observed, Dewey, like his three Republican predecessors, "found it 
impossible to come to grips with his adversary. He had plenty of hard evidence for his 
charges of mismanagement and red tape and expediency-but words meant little in the 
face of MacArthur's and Eisenhower's triumphs abroad.,,]08 By the end of October, 
Dewey had lost his edge, and it was Roosevelt as commander-in-chiefwho was defining 
and dominating the campaign messages. 
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A key player in keeping Dewey on the defensive was FDR's feisty running-mate, 
Harry Truman. Truman's vice presidential "whistle stop" campaign began quietly in 
New Orleans on 11 October. The Senator toured local war plants, and delivered a speech 
before the Mississippi Valley Flood Association, where he declared that flood control 
"must be given a No.1 priority in any postwar program." Then, while en route from 
Louisiana to the West Coast, Truman's rhetoric-aimed primarily against Dewey-
steadily increased in fervor. In Texas a few days later, Truman insisted that "the Solid 
South could not go for a fellow like Dewey." The "only thing that could cause difficulty 
for the Democratic ticket in the South," he said at Beaumont, "would be public apathy." 
Speaking from the platform of his railcar at EI Paso, Texas, Truman turned up the heat, 
and referred to the New York Governor as "another Harding" that the nation could not 
afford. Harding, the Senator charged, '''made no stand on peace' and as a result 'we are 
now paying for that mistake in blood and treasure ... [We] must keep in the White House 
the man who knows where he is going and what he is doing.",]09 
The climax of Truman's speaking tour, however, came on Monday night, 16 October, 
in nationwide address delivered from Los Angeles. In his speech, Truman called Dewey 
a "doubting Thomas" (pun intended) and a "man of little confidence," who was "flirting 
with the isolationists and currying the political support of the Hearsts and the 
McCormicks." Truman revealed the increasing bitterness of the campaign early in his 
remarks when he asserted that an unknown number oflives would have been lost had 
Dewey been elected President in 1940. Quoting a statement made by Dewey in 1940, in 
which the Republican hopeful had had expressed skepticism over Roosevelt's request for 
the construction of 50,000 airplanes, Truman pointed out that the U.S. was now-in 
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contrast to Dewey's prediction that it would take four years to build 50,000-producing 
100,000 planes a year. "Under a President like the Republican candidate," Truman 
purported, "we would have set our sights too low, and you can imagine the effect on the 
war effort. No one can even estimate how many lives of our young men that would have 
meant. Do you want that kind of opposition in the prosecution of the war against 
Japan?"]]O From Los Angeles, the Senator traveled north to Oregon and Washington, and 
then east through the Midwest. 
His message in the America heartland focused more on domestic issues, particularly 
fann concerns, where some politicos believed the President was vulnerable. In Peoria, 
Illinois, on 25 October, Truman defended the President's record, and contrasted it with 
the dark days of Hoover's Depression: 
You may remember when one of the key speakers at that 
[Republican] convention solemnly pronounced that under the 
Democratic administration the fanner works all day and keeps 
books all night. He did not choose to remind the American fanner 
that under the administration of Hoover a fanner worked all day-
worked all night and had no books to keep. 
This war has brought hardship to every American. The fanner 
has had to make his own personal sacrifices. He has to overcome 
many handicaps. That he has done with courage and with skill. 
Yes, he now keeps books at night and in those books are the entries 
of cancelled mortgages, saving deposits, war bond purchases, and 
an income three times greater than in 1932 when the Hoover 
administration was the doctor at his bedside.'" 
By the end of the month, he was back East, with speaking engagements in Boston, 
Pittsburgh, and New York City. All over, his message was essentially the same: "We 
must re-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President ofthe United States!" 
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Like his Republican counterpart, Truman endured his own fair share of controversy 
and embarrassment. On 27 September-unwittingly conforming to the GOP's message 
that he was a machine crony-- he told reporters, "I am a Jackson County organization 
Democrat and I'm proud ofthat. That's the way I got to be judge, a senator and the 
candidate for Vice President. A statesman is only a dead politician. I never want to be a 
statesman.,,]]2 Then, in late October, while in Peoria-and shortly before his scheduled 
visit to Boston, where the Irish-Catholic vote was at stake-- the Truman campaign was 
rocked by Hearst news reports claiming: "Senator Took [Ku Klux Klan] Oath in 1922." 
The story, spread by an old enemy of the Senator's from Missouri, was false. The 
charge, which Truman denounced as a lie, was easily put down, though the candidate and 
his staff did fail to disclose that he had once paid a $10 initiation fee. Meanwhile, it was 
reported, correctly, that the Senator's wife, Bess, was on the Senate payroll. Truman was 
embarrassed, and was roundly criticized. Republican Clare Booth Luce, whom the 
Senator despised, began referring to Mrs. Truman as "Payroll Bess." The 
Congresswoman also declared that "If, as Truman had said, his mother didn't bring him 
up to be a statesman, then she would not be disappointed.,,]l3 Angry at the attack on his 
wife, Truman privately commented that Luce should spell her last name "L-O-O-S-E.,,]]4 
As the campaign drew to close, the role of labor and the influence of the Communist 
Party in American government took its place. On 5 October, in response to Dewey's 
Oklahoma City speech (as well as Bricker's "acceptance speech" in French Lick, 
Indiana), Roosevelt addressed the nation from the White House, and spurned "ism" 
support. It marked the first time in the history of American presidential campaigns that a 
president used the White House as a backdrop for a campaign speech. "I have never 
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sought," the President said, "and I do not welcome the support of any person or group 
committed to Communism, or Fascism, or any other foreign ideology which would 
undermine the American system of government or the American system of free enterprise 
and private property." However, that would not, he insisted, "interfere with the firm and 
friendly relationship which this nation has in the war, and will, I hope, continue to have 
with the Soviet Union. The kind of economy that suits the Russian people is their own 
affair." The President also warned oflow voter tum-out. "The continuing health and 
vigor of our democratic system," he said, "depends on the public spirit and devotion of its 
citizens which find expression in the ballot box." He then rather boldly added that "The 
right to vote must be open to our citizens irrespective of race, color, or creed-without 
tax or artificial restriction of any kind. The sooner we get to that basis of political 
equality, the better it will be for the country as a whole." The most controversial part of 
the speech, however, involved soldier voting. After decrying the fact that "many 
millions" of American servicemen would find it "difficult in many cases-and 
impossible in some cases-to register and vote," Roosevelt-in a subtle barb at Dewey 
and the Republicans-prophesied that the American people would know whom to blame, 
"for they know that during this past year there were politicians who quite openly worked 
to restrict the use of the ballot in this election, hoping selfishly for a small vote.,,115 
Sensing voter movement toward the President, Rupert Hughes reported to Dewey the 
same week as FDR's White House address that "The closing rounds of the contest 
demand the body punches and head-rocking that nobody can put over better than yoU.,,116 
Thus, the last month of the 1944 campaigned witnessed a rapid decline from "solemn to 
silly. " 
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Speaking in Charleston, West Virginia, on 7 October, Dewey-in his first major 
campaign appearance since Oklahoma City-- launched a scathing attack against 
Roosevelt and incompetence in Washington. As was typical with most of Dewey's 
speeches, he began by countering FDR's latest statements-in this case, voter turn-out 
and the spurning of support from the Communists. Dewey reminded voters that in his 
home state of New York, 77% of all eligible servicemen had already been mailed ballots. 
"Despite my opponent's attempt to play politics with the soldier vote," Dewey argued, 
"every evidence indicates that we will have an ever larger percentage of soldier votes 
than we will of civilians. Let's have no more ofthis political pretense on a matter so 
important to us all." He was not finished. The President, Dewey charged, was "relying 
for his main support upon a solid block of votes in states where millions of American 
citizens are deprived of their right to vote by the poll tax and by intimidation. Not once 
in twelve years has my opponent lifted a finger to correct this and his platform is 
cynically silent on the subject." On Roosevelt's denial of welcoming the support of 
Communists, Dewey feigned surprise. "Now, that is news," he said mockingly. "But 
doesn't this soft disclaimer come a little late?" The week before, he noted, Earl Browder, 
head of the Communist Party of America, had told 15,000 cheering supporters in 
Madison Square Garden that the reelection of Roosevelt was essential to his aims. This 
was the same Earl Browder who had been convicted as a draft-dodger in World War I, 
and who had been convicted again and imprisoned for perjury. Pardoned by FDR in time 
to organize a fourth-term campaign, he was, Dewey complained, "now such a patriot." 
Dewey was not simply and wildly making charges. He usually had a point, and in this 
speech it was that Browder and his ilk were eager for Roosevelt's reelection because they 
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sought the continuation of a failed New Deal. "They love to fish in troubled waters," 
Dewey explained. "Their aims can best be served by unemployment and discontent." He 
then spent the rest of his speech chronicling how "this tired administration bungled" in 
preparing the nation for war, and how it was currently failing to adequately plan for 
peace. 1 17 
A few days later, on 16 October, before a crowd in St. Louis, Missouri, Dewey once 
again spoke on the need for competent leadership in postwar America. Government, he 
said, should meet three simple tests: Was it honest? Were the people who operated it 
competent to do their jobs? Did it have faith in the future of America, and "a 
wholehearted determination to make our system work?" By such standards, he charged, 
the Roosevelt administration-"the most spectacular collection of incompetent people 
who ever held public office" -- was a miserable failure. He then went on to describe the 
"constant bickering, quarreling, and back-biting" within the White House, including 
squabbles between Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins over money for PW A and WP A, 
Ickes and Leon Henderson over the title "gasoline czar," and Henry Wallace and 
Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones over the Vice President's "disgraceful" accusation 
that Jones had "done much to harass the ... effort to help shorten this war. .. " Central to 
all this quarrelling and confusion, he continued, was the President's own "consistent 
practice of evading responsibility" and passing the buck to his assistants. "What kind of 
government is this," Dewey demanded, "that even a war cannot make it sober down and 
go to work?" 1 18 The administration, he concluded, had degenerated into "little men 
rattling around in big jobs," capable of nothing more than "planned, noisy chaos, and 
bungling." 119 
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Socialist candidate Nonnan Thomas, meanwhile, assailed both Roosevelt and Dewey, 
insisting that he had never seen a campaign conducted at a lower level. "Most of the 
discussion has been on personalities, he declared. "One would think we were electing a 
dictator who is under no compulsion to outline policies except in the vaguest tenns." 
"The policies of both" he predicted in New York on 12 October, "are leading us along the 
road to a hell of chronic depression and new wars. It doesn't matter which one is 
driving." According to Thomas, unemployment, racial tensions, national debt, and 
"Communist Machiavellianism" would characterize America's postwar years and lead to 
the emergence of a strong fascist movement within the United States by the end of the 
1950s. The only positive alternative, he concluded, was "democratic socialism.,,120 
In an effort to energize his organizational support (and to curb rumors about his 
health), Roosevelt, on 21 October, toured New York City in an open car during a cold 
rain. That evening, as discussed earlier, he spoke to 2,000 members of the Foreign Policy 
Association at Park Avenue's Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where he attacked congressional 
Republicans for their pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist voting, extolled liberal and 
internationalist Republicans~such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who appeared on 
the dais with Roosevelt~and warned that the conservative "likes of Joe Martin and 
Hamilton Fish would have controlling power in Congress if the Republicans won.,,121 It 
was in this speech too (as mentioned above) that Roosevelt addressed the issue of 
peacekeeping in the United Nations. After the speech Roosevelt returned to Hyde Park, 
where he would rest until the following week's campaign appearances in Wilmington, 
Delaware, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
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Dewey, meanwhile, frantically searched for some other issue with which to attack 
Roosevelt. At Chicago Stadium on 25 October, he revealed information concerning a 
Democratic fund-raising organization called the One Thousand Club. "1 have here a 
letter written ... last Monday," Dewey dramatically announced. "It is written on the 
letter-head of the National Democratic Campaign Headquarters, Little Rock, Arkansas, 
and signed by H. L. McAlister and Sam J. Watkins, State Finance Directors." The letter 
he then read was an invitation to Democratic donors to join the "One Thousand Club." It 
revealed that the idea for such a club originated with FDR, who said "1 think it would be 
a good idea to have a list of one thousand persons banded together from all over the 
United States to act as a liaison to see that facts relating to the public interest are 
presented factually to the President and members of Congress." Donations and rewards, 
of course, were linked to this concept. Members of the One Thousand Club would be 
"granted special privilege and prestige by party leaders." Furthermore, members would 
be called into conference on occasion to "discuss matters of national importance and to 
assist in the formulation of administration policies." Most importantly, to be a member 
one had to donate $1000 to the Democratic National Campaign Fund. "There, in crude 
unblushing words," Dewey declared, "is the ultimate expression of New Deal politics by 
the theory of 'Who gets what, when, and why. '" To his great disappointment, the story 
c ·1 d . 122 1al e to generate any excItement. 
Two days later, FDR addressed a Navy Day crowd in Philadelphia, site of one the 
country's largest naval bases. A week earlier, MacArthur had waded ashore the 
Philippines, and on 25 October, Admiral William F. Halsey, commander ofthe U.S. 
Third Fleet, informed Nimitz that the naval battle of Leyte Gulfwas over, and that "The 
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Japanese Navy has been beaten and routed and broken ... " Roosevelt happily relayed that 
information to the American people the following day. Standing in Philadelphia's Shibe 
Park on 27 October, he evoked the memory of his late cousin, TR, who would have been 
eighty-six that day. "I think that Theodore Roosevelt would be happy and proud to know 
that our American fleet today is greater than all the other navies of the world put 
together," he declared. "And when I say all the navies I am including what was-until 
three days ago--the Japanese fleet." The crowd erupted in tremendous applause. The 
President then reminded the audience of his administration's preparedness for war before 
Pearl Harbor. "The record will show," he insisted, "that when we were attacked in 
December, 1941, we had already made tremendous progress toward building the greatest 
war machine the world has ever known." There were those who scoffed, however. "Less 
than three months before Hitler launched his murderous assault [in 1939], the 
Republicans in the House of Representatives voted 144-8 in favor of cutting the 
appropriations for the Army Air Corps. I often think how Hitler and Hirohito must have 
laughed in those days. But they are not laughing now.,,]23 
Speaking from Washington on 30 October, James Byrnes, in his only major 
appearance of the fall campaign, asserted that the election of Thomas Dewey would delay 
victory in the war, and put peace in jeopardy. A change in administrations, he argued, 
would cause cost precious time for the Allies to learn to what extent Dewey would carry 
out the policies of his predecessor. "Will it not take time," Byrnes asked, "to convince 
Stalin that he can work with a man who, as late as 1940, denounced the recognition of 
Russia by our Government and who is now criticizing the efforts of our Government to 
bring about a friendly accord between Russia and Poland, on which depend the peace of 
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Europe and the existence of a free and strong Poland?" If America changed presidents, 
he continued, our Allies will believe America has changed. Also, if defeated, FDR would 
remain in office until 20 January, during which time "Allied statesmen would pay little 
attention to the man who had been rejected as our spokesman." This, Byrnes concluded, 
was exactly what Hitler and Hirohito desired-something to disturb the existing unity 
and harmony of the Grand Alliance: "[Y]ou and I know the defeat of Roosevelt would 
revive their fading hopes, stiffen their opposition and delay the end of the war.,,124 
That same day, in Detroit, Michigan, vice presidential hopeful John W. Bricker 
attacked "foreign influence" within the Roosevelt administration-- and named names. 
"Today, as never before, a foreign influence of the most subversive kind is trying to take 
over our American government by boring from within." Specifically, Bricker recited 
"facts" submitted to a House committee (the Dies Committee) investigating un-American 
activities which, he said, "conclusively prove that FDR and the New Deal are in the 
hands of the radicals and the Communists." Evidence presented to the Dies Committee, 
he declared, "showed that at least 82 leaders of PAC have been affiliated with 
organizations listed by Attorney General Biddle as Communist Front Organizations." 
For the first time in the history of the nation, Bricker concluded, "A foreign fifth column 
[alluding to Communist Russia] ... is trying to swing a Presidential election. The all-out 
Communist support for the fourth term admits of no other interpretation. There has never 
been anything like this before because no American party or group has been willing to 
live as the obedient instrument ofthe policies of a foreign power." 125 
On 31 October, RNC Chairman Brownell-still trying to find someway to use Pearl 
Harbor-criticized the Roosevelt and Democrats for failing to launch a public 
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investigation into the disaster. "I do not know and the American people do not know 
who was the Commander-in-Chief at Pearl Harbor," he declared. "I only know that every 
New Dealer in Congress has fought bitterly to prevent the court martial which would fix 
the responsibility wherever it belongs. Long ago the time passed when there was no 
reason of secrecy to prevent the trial yet the truth is still concealed.,,126 At a Washington 
press luncheon, meanwhile, Sidney Hillman defended the CIO-P AC, declaring "Some 
people think that if the Communist Party is for something we should oppose it. The 
Communist Party is for the war effort now and was not for it before. I do not feel called 
upon to oppose the war effort because the Communists are for it." Hillman also denied 
the "Clear Everything with Sidney" phrase, stating "there was nothing to it" and that it 
was "based on pure imagination." He added that FDR's opponents were making 
"bigotry" an issue, and asserted that the election of the "red-baiting and Jew-baiting" 
Dewey would be "a national catastrophe.,,127 
The following day in Boston, Dewey delivered the harshest speech of his entire career. 
The subject was "Factions and Power-Seeking Groups Which Support the New Deal," 
and, of course, it included a major attack on Hillman and the CIO-PAC. Overall, Dewey 
charged that to perpetuate himself in office for sixteen years, Roosevelt had put the 
Democratic Party on the auction block, for sale to the highest bidder, and the highest 
bidders were the PAC and the Communist Party. "In this campaign," he declared, "the 
New Dealers attempt to smother discussion of their Communist alliance ... They insinuate 
that Americans must love Communism or offend our fighting ally, Russia. But not even 
the gullible believe that. In Russia, a Communist is a man who supports his government. 
In America, a Communist is a man who supports the Fourth Term so our form of 
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government may more easily be changed [italics added]." The question of Communism 
in the United States, he continued, had nothing to do with where a man was born. "Every 
American-everyone of us-traces his ancestry to some foreign land." The proof that 
Communism was not related national origin was the "fact that Earl Browder, the avowed 
leader of Communism in America, was born in Kansas." Dewey's main target, however, 
was Sidney Hillman-a New Dealer, he insisted, who, with the help of the Communists, 
had taken over the American Labor Party in New York, and was now endorsing 
Roosevelt's fourth term bid. The CIO leader, he continued, was the biggest political boss 
in America, and a "Front for the Communists." As chairman of the CIO-PAC, "he stalks 
the country squeezing dollars" for FDR out of the hard working men and women of 
America, "under threat that if they do not give the dollar, they will lose their jobs." 
Hillman and the Communists, he warned, were attempting to seize control of the New 
Deal, through which they aim to control the whole of American government. "Nazism 
and Fascism are dying in the world," Dewey soberly concluded. "But the totalitarian idea 
is very much alive and we must not slip to its other form-Communism. All of these 
concepts are enemies of freedom and we must equally reject all of them. They would 
make the State supreme, give political power only to those who deny the supremacy of 
God and use that power to force all men to become cogs in a great materialistic 
machine.,,]28 
Dewey's Boston speech was well-written, hard, accusatory, and true. The CIO-PAC 
and the Communists were, in fact, working closely together in states like New York, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania to raise money, educate voters, and get out the vote. Still, 
the Communist Party, and not the CIO, was very much the subordinate partner. 
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Furthennore, while the Communists were strong in some CIO unions, they were not a 
major factor (or presence) in all CIO unions. Dewey's speech was a mistake. As one 
Dewey advisor noted at the time, "You're speaking in Boston and everybody will know 
you're trying to get the Irish Catholic vote. It's going to look like a cheap play at a time 
when the Jews in this country are terribly sensitive, when they feel terribly threatened, 
they don't even know ifthey'll survive this war. .. and to a group they believe is largely 
unsympathetic, ifnot anti-Semitic, you've got this stuff.,,]29 He was right, and Dewey, of 
course, was roundly criticized for the speech-even his wife dismissed it as something 
Bricker could have written. Addressing a full "Everybody for Roosevelt" crowd at 
Madison Square Garden the following night, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 
charged that "this Dewey smear campaign of hate and prejudice follows the pattern 
contrived by Adolf Hitler and the unspeakable Goebbels." Meanwhile, in the White 
House, Roosevelt "fumed that this was the meanest campaign he'd ever been in, and 
promised retribution for some of the below-the-belt punches after Election Day.,,]30 
Having successfully drawn Dewey into extreme rhetoric, Roosevelt, during "infonnal" 
remarks at Bridgeport, Connecticut, on 2 November, appeared-in an obvious appeal to 
independents-serious and "above the fray." Alluding to Dewey's angry speech of the 
previous day, the President told his audience that "In this campaign, of course, all things 
taken together, I can't talk about my opponent the way I would like to sometimes, 
because I try to think that I am a Christian. I try to think that some day I will go to 
Heaven, and I don't believe there is anything to be gained in saying dreadful things about 
other people in any campaign." Two days later, in a speech at Fenway Park in Boston, 
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Roosevelt stepped up his criticism of Dewey, while directly confronting the Governor's 
Communist accusations: 
Speaking here in Boston, a Republican candidate said-and 
pardon me if I quote him correctly-that happens to be an old habit 
of mine-he said, that quote, 'the Communists are seizing control 
of the New Deal, through which they aim to control the 
Government of the United States.' Unquote. 
However, on that very same day, that very same candidate had 
spoken in Worcester, and he said that with Republican victory in 
November, quote, 'we can end one-man government, and we can 
forever remove the threat of monarchy in the United States.' 
Now, really-which is it-Communism or monarchy? 
I don't think that we could have both in this country, even if we 
wanted either, which we do not. 
No, we want neither Communism nor monarchy. We want to 
live under our Constitution which has served pretty well for and 
hundred and fifty-five years ... 
The President then reminded his audience that he had been reluctant to run again for the 
presidency, but that since the campaign developed, he was "most anxious to win-- and I 
say that for the reason that never before in my lifetime has a campaign been filled with 
such misrepresentation, distortion, and falsehood. Never since 1928 have there been so 
many attempts to stimulate in America racial or religious intolerance." When any 
politician, he concluded, says that the U.S. government could be sold out to the 
Communists, "then I say that that candidate reveals-and I'll be polite-a shocking lack 
oftrust in America. 131 
Dewey's last major attack on Roosevelt came on 4 November during an address at 
Madison Square Garden. He had first alluded to the Morgenthau Plan during the media 
"hubbub" oflate September and early October. In his speech at the New York Herald-
Tribune Forum on 18 October, he then had asked, "Did Mr. Roosevelt take the Secretary 
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of War or the Secretary of State to the [Quebec] conference? As usual, he took neither. 
Instead, he took with him the Secretary of the Treasury, whose qualifications as an expert 
on military and international affairs are still unknown ... Germany's propaganda Minister 
Goebbels has seized upon the episode to terrify the Germans into fanatical resistance. On 
the basis ofthe Treasury Department's ill-conceived proposals, the German people were 
told that a program of destruction was in store for them if they surrender ... We are 
paying in blood for our failure to have ready an intelligent program for dealing with 
invaded Germany." Now in his last major speech of the campaign-- and still desperate 
for an issue to hang Roosevelt upon-spoke out directly and forcefully against the plan. 
It had, he declared, "been as useful to Hitler 'as ten fresh German divisions. It put fight 
back into the German army. It stiffened the will of the German nation to resist. Almost 
overnight the headlong retreat of the Germans stopped. They stood and fought 
fanatically.' The 'blood of our fighting men' was being shed for Roosevelt's 
'impoverished meddling. ",132 Considering that the Dewey campaign was daily being 
attacked as "fascist," and that polls showed a majority of Americans favored a hard peace 
for the Axis Powers, this speech too invited last minute criticism. Roosevelt shrewdly 
ignored both him and the issue. 
On Election Eve, 6 November, the candidates made one last appeal to voters. The 
final Gallup poll reported a race too close to call, with Roosevelt enjoying a slight lead, 
51 %, to Dewey's 49%. In a radio address from Hyde Park, Roosevelt distanced himself 
from partisan politics, speaking instead on "Our Task Now Is to Face the Future as a 
Militant and a United People." Roosevelt purposefully did not use all of his allotted radio 
time, and so, the networks, unable to preempt paid time, had to play slow classical music 
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(played on an organ) for thirteen minutes, until it was Dewey's time (11 :00 p.m.) to 
speak. The Democrats believed voters would tum off their radios and go to bed. They 
may have been right. The Republican program that began at 11 :00 was "monotonous and 
deadly." Roosevelt listened from his home in Dutchess County, and noticing Fala asleep 
at his feet, remarked, "They even put my dog to sleep."l33 At the end of the program, 
Dewey, live and from the Executive Mansion in Albany, delivered his last speech of the 
1944 presidential campaign. The election, he said, might be the most fateful in American 
history. "These years 1945 to 1949 will be important, difficult years. They will require 
vigorous, hard-working, harmonious leadership, with abiding faith in America. But there 
has arisen in this campaign an argument that the people dare not change administrations 
because our country is in the midst of a great ordeal. Of course, there is nothing new in 
that argument. It was used four years ago, when we were at peace. In other countries, 
this same argument has been the pretext upon which men, originally voted into power by 
the people, have suspended popular government and maintained themselves indefinitely 
in power." Dewey then concluded with "three simple tests that must govern the decision 
of every American tomorrow." In the secrecy of the polling booth, he said, ask yourself 
these questions: 
How can I help shorten the war? 
How can I help secure lasting peace? 
How can I help give us jobs and opportunity in the years that lie 
beyond our victory? 
He was confident that if the American people soberly reflected upon those questions a 
D · . 134 ewey VIctory was certam. 
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Election Day 1944, clear and mild throughout the country, witnessed a near record 
turnout at the polls (over 48 million people in total). Roosevelt received 53% of the 
popular vote (and 432 electoral votes) to Dewey's 47% (and 99 electoral votes). Dewey 
won twelve states, and carried the West North Central section of the country, as well as 
the Mid-Atlantic region. He tied FDR in the East North Central section. Incidentally, the 
Mid-Atlantic region (with Dewey won) and the East North Central section (with was a 
tie) constituted 51 % ofthe total national vote. The biggest improvement for Republicans 
came in the county votes. In Roosevelt's first presidential election, 1932, he carried 
2,721 counties-more than any other candidate for President up to that time. The 
incumbent, Herbert Hoover carried only 372. In 1944, Roosevelt's last election, 
Republicans won 1,344. While Democrats still held a majority of the nation's counties 
(1,750), most of them came from the Solid South. Outside the South and Mountain 
(where Republicans tied Democrats) sections, Democrats carried only 390 counties. J35 
Overall, the President carried a majority of the women's vote, which was the largest 
voting block in the country, as well as the black and city votes. Dewey was favored more 
by men and rural populations. Dewey also carried the towns of Hyde Park, New York, 
and Independence, Missouri. In the House of Representatives, Republicans lost twenty-
two seats, and in the Senate gained one. Of those elected for the first time to the Senate 
was Democratic Congressman J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, who would, before his 
defeat thirty years later, become a leading opponent of the Vietnam War, and a mentor of 
President Bill Clinton. 
According to the National Opinion Research Center, which conducted a national 
election study in conjunction with the Psychology Department of Harvard University, the 
236 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
leading causes for voting for FDR included: "Because of the war-we should not change 
during the war, best man at this time," "Because of his past-record-better man for the 
job, more experienced," and "Because he is for the common man." Those who supported 
Dewey, meanwhile, emphasized: "We need a change-four terms is too much-we are 
heading toward a dictatorship, tired ofthe New Deal, Anti-Roosevelt, Roosevelt won't 
live 4 years, hate to see Truman take over," and "To get rid of wasteful spending ... 
balance the budget. .. efficiency in government, houseclean Washington, states' rights." 
Interestingly, only 4% ofNORC's post-election survey indicated that Roosevelt's health 
was a factor in their voting decision, while 45% of those questioned expressed the belief 
that Communists would not have more influence under Roosevelt (only 24% said they 
would). Sixty-four percent ofthose surveyed, meanwhile, believed that FDR waged the 
better campaign, while nearly 80% maintained that Dewey had waged the most negative 
one. Most voters received their news from the radio (59%). Newspapers came in second 
with 27%, and magazines last with 7%. Sixty-five percent indicated that they decided 
their presidential choice after the conventions. Of that number, 31 % decided in the last 
four to six weeks of the campaign. One of the most interesting questions asked by the 
NORC was "Ifthe war had been over, do you (Roosevelt voter) think you would have 
voted for Dewey?" While only 28% of those who voted for FDR answered this question, 
of that percentage, 21 % indicated that they would have changed their vote, while 79% 
said no. Translated into real (if small) numbers, it would have swung about 1.6 million 
votes to Dewey, and in the popular vote, at least, created a virtual tie. 136 
Shortly after 3 a.m., Dewey appeared in the ballroom of the Roosevelt Hotel in 
Manhattan, and conceded defeat. 
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It is clear that Mr. Roosevelt has been reelected for a fourth 
tenn, and every good American will wholeheartedly accept the will 
of the people. 
1 extend to President Roosevelt my hearty congratulations and 
my earnest hope that his next tenn will see speedy victory in the 
war, the establishment oflasting peace, and the restoration of 
tranquility among our people ... 
The Republican Party emerges from the election revitalized and 
a great force for the good of the country and for the preservation of 
free government in America. 
1 am confident that all Americans will join me in the devout 
hope that in the difficult years ahead Divine Providence will guide 
and protect the President of the United States. 137 
Dewey had not sent the traditional telegram of congratulations, and at Hyde Park, the 
President was not amused. "Always meticulous about the amenities," aide William 
Hassett noted in his diary, Roosevelt telegraphed the Governor, "I thank you for your 
statement, which 1 have heard over the air a few minutes ago." Forgetting about the 
Christian restraint he had talked about at Fenway Park a few days earlier, Roosevelt told 
Hassett, "I still think he is a son of a bitch.,,138 
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Chapter Seven: 
Conclusion 
The presidential campaign of 1944 reveals that campaigns do matter, in both 
theoretical and literal ways. First, in the theoretical, it challenges the theory of the 
predictable campaign through renewed emphases on Electoral College strategies and 
campaign uncertainties. At first glance, the 1944 race seems to conform to the 
predictable campaign theory-it was a wartime campaign and the popular incumbent 
(Franklin Roosevelt no less) was seeking reelection; the race was close from June to 
November, with an early and almost constant Roosevelt lead, and the conventional 
wisdom among a majority of voters was that Roosevelt would win, and he did. A close 
examination of the election by individual states, however, reveals that Dewey's hard 
work among local party leaders almost paid off. Indeed, in twelve states totaling 201 
electoral votes, Roosevelt won with less than 52.5% of the vote. A shift of 500,000 votes 
in the right states (including Michigan, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Missouri, and Pennsylvania)-all of which had Republican govemors--
would have given Dewey an Electoral College win and the presidency. These numbers, 
combined with the outcome of the election itself and the fact that in Great Britain's 
parliamentary elections just a few short months later, Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
was defeated by a relatively unknown politician named Clement Atlee, beg these 
questions in regard to the 1944 race: What did Dewey do wrong? What did Roosevelt do 
right? 
There were at least four mistakes made by the New York Governor that undermined 
his efforts to unseat Roosevelt. One was that for all his emphasis on speech writing, he 
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was unable (or unwilling) to narrow his focus to one or two issues. Thus, his message 
was scattered, and he talked about everything from Roosevelt's age and health to ending 
one-man rule and saving America from the Communists. Like other challengers in 
wartime presidential elections, Dewey faced the charge-which he unwittingly seemed to 
encourage-- that he was indecisive, inexperienced, and contradictory. After Roosevelt's 
Fala speech before the Teamsters, Dewey was easily rattled, and by the end ofthe 
campaign, he was swinging madly in all directions, resulting in (1) independent and 
undecided voters-turned offby Dewey's "negative" campaign-- turning to Roosevelt 
and (2) aid to frantic Democratic efforts to get out the vote on Election Day. Incidentally, 
his lack of focus contributed to Democratic charges that he lacked conviction and a "clear 
stand" on the issues. 
A second mistake made by Dewey was his unshakeable faith in the accuracy of news 
stories. For example, in late September, he told reporters that the administration was 
purposefully limiting MacArthur's capacity to fight in the Pacific, for fear of ending the 
war quicker, and electing Republicans. This assertion was silly, and costly for Dewey in 
that (1) it embarrassed Dewey when MacArthur successfully retook the Philippines a few 
days later, (2) it highlighted Dewey's youth (and gullibility) and relative lack of 
experience in foreign affairs, and (3) it reminded voters that while the war in Europe was 
approaching an end-a plus for Dewey-the war in the Pacific was far from over, and 
would require wartime leadership for probably another two years at least. The effect of 
this, of course, was to negate his message that the next administration would be a 
peacetime one. Also, the Roosevelt team was quick to point out his "exaggerations." 
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Dewey missed an opportunity to entice disgruntled blacks back to the party of Lincoln. 
Though historian Nancy Weiss, in her superb Farewell to the Party of Lincoln (1983), 
correctly observed that many African-Americans of the New Deal era were not guided by 
civil rights issues, expecting little, as much as by economic issues, there were, by 1944, 
growing expectations among blacks concerning civil rights, and thus some dissatisfaction 
with Roosevelt. Black Americans were especially bitter about segregation, 
discrimination, and humiliation in the armed services. Furthermore, there was a policy of 
black exclusion from most of the war housing projects developed with federal funds. To 
make matter worse, Roosevelt had dumped Vice President Wallace, who was a champion 
for the rights ofthe common man of whatever race, color, and creed. It had been Wallace 
who had declared at the Democratic National Convention: "The future belongs to those 
who go down the line unswervingly for the liberal principles of both political and 
economic democracy regardless of race, color, or religion ... there must be no inferior 
races. The poll tax must go."] Finally, the Democrats had a weak civil rights plank in 
their party platform. Though the Republican platform was rather progressive on civil 
rights, Dewey failed to forcefully speak on those issues on the campaign trail. He did 
boldly highlight FDR's hypocrisy on this issue in early October, and he did, in fact, have 
the support of some black newspapers, including the Pittsburgh Courier and Baltimore 
Afro-American, but he did not build a strong bridge to the black community and black 
leaders. There was no significant organization or effort to get out black voters. 
According to Henry Lee Moon in a post-election analysis, "The masses of the race were 
unconvinced of the ills of which they complained would be corrected by a Republican 
victory. They realized that all the discriminations which irked them had persisted under 
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Republican administrations. Roosevelt, they knew, had not created their difficulties; he 
simply inherited them."2 Herbert Brownell, chairman of the RNC, noted too that "a shift 
of 303 ,414 votes in fifteen states outside the South would have enabled Governor 
Thomas E. Dewey to capture 175 additional Electoral College votes and to win the 
presidency with an eight electoral-vote margin.,,3 In eight ofthose fifteen states, the 
black vote exceeded the number needed to shift the balance toward Dewey. For example, 
in Maryland, the 50,000 black votes cast in Baltimore alone for Roosevelt were more 
than doubled the President's 22,500 state plurality. 
In contrast, Roosevelt won because he campaigned, and because he was master at 
putting his opponents on the defensive. This was especially damaging for Dewey, who 
excelled at prosecutions. Throughout the late summer and early fall, Dewey the 
Prosecutor had been methodically making his case against Roosevelt. The President, 
waging a Rose Garden strategy that was meant to emphasize his importance as the 
incumbent, seemed tired, disinterested, and vulnerable. After polls in early September 
showed Dewey with a slight lead, Roosevelt abandoned his Rose Garden strategy and 
began campaigning, beginning with the Fala speech in late September. In fact, FDR was 
the first president to use the neutral White House in partisan politics, and deliver radio 
addresses. Furthermore, he not only campaigned, but he campaigned effectively. 
Roosevelt seized the high ground on the UN armed forces issue when Dewey bungled it. 
He played the role of the dutiful president. And he successfully identified Dewey with 
isolationists and thus wooed independents and Willkie Republicans into his campaign. 
Simultaneously, Roosevelt's backers, including Sidney Hillman's CIO-PAC, were able~ 
due to the excitement of the campaign~to interest more people, and increase turnout. In 
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those key states, big CIO-PAC cities like New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Detroit, St. 
Louis, and Boston, made the difference, giving him his fourth and final White House 
victory. Also, Roosevelt was impacted positively by what Dewey did not do-i.e. to 
share with the American people what he knew about Pearl Harbor and the 
administration's lack of preparedness. 
Finally, the campaign mattered in a literal sense in that, although the Democrats won, 
Dewey's low-key, reformist style, helped modernize the GOP without upheaval-
something Wendell Willkie could not have achieved. Shortly after the election, Ford 
Bond, Dewey's radio director, wrote that the objective of the Governor had been to 
rebuild the party so as to be worthy of national trust. According to Bond, the Saturday 
before the election, Dewey took him aside, put his hands on his shoulders, looked him in 
the eyes, and said, "Ford, I don't want you to be too disappointed-I want to tell you 
now: We may not win this election. But win or lose, it will not be until some time after 
November i h that a great many of the voters will be with us, in what we are telling them 
now. Even though we might lose now, it's worth all the fight we're putting into it. So 
don't be too disappointed if the vote is against us on the seventh of November." 
Encouraged, Bond noted that "the 1944 campaign was only the beginning-the take-
off-the'D' day of a mighty effort. An arduous campaign to get on the road once again 
to better things-to the things for which America seems so have been designed. To a 
reawakening and sharpening of the [Republican] effort to drive ever onward and upward 
toward the American ideal ... ,,4 
On 12 April 1945-just five months after his victory over Dewey-Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage at his presidential retreat in Warm Springs, 
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Georgia. He was sixty-three years old. Vice President Truman, who had been in office 
less than three months, was then sworn in as the Thirty-third President of the United 
States. Despite Republican charges of poor health the previous fall, the nation was 
stunned. "Shocked," "sudden," "unexpected," and "tragic" were words repeatedly used 
when Americans heard the news of the President's death.5 The New York Times, 
predicting that "Men will thank God on their knees, a hundred years from know, that 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the White House," reported under its banner headline on 13 
April that the "End Comes Suddenly at Warm Springs." In the U.S. Senate, Democrat 
Alben Barkley declared that he was "too shocked to talk." Republican Arthur 
Vandenberg, meanwhile, mourned "his untimely death." Addressing reporters on 13 
April, the President's physician, Ross McIntire said the President's death "came out of a 
clear sky." Though he paid his respects, announcing that "With a deep sense oftragedy 
the nation learns of the loss of Franklin Delano Roosevelt," Thomas Dewey was not 
terribly surprised.6 Shortly thereafter he also wrote to the new president, pledging his 
assistance and loyalty "in every action you may take in the interest of the winning of the 
war and the establishment of a sound and permanent peace." Truman warmly replied that 
he hoped to become better acquainted with the Governor. 7 
Thomas E. Dewey never became President of the United States. In 1948, he won the 
Republican nomination for a second time-the first defeated GOP candidate to ever do 
that-and was the favorite to win over Harry Truman and a divided Democratic Party. 
He was a "new Dewey" then, however- more polished, less bold. He lost. Incidentally, 
the 1948 loss was grounded, at least in part, in his misunderstanding of 1944. Dewey 
regretted his "gloves-off' style-as epitomized by his Boston speech late in the 1944 
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campaign-and four year later decided to follow instead the Rose Garden strategy that 
FDR employed in 1944 before Fala speech. It had nearly doomed "the Champ's" 
candidacy, and for whatever reason, went unnoticed by Dewey and his advisors. Dewey 
remained Governor of New York through 31 December 1954, and then retired to private 
life at his beloved Dapplemere estate in Pawling. He declined two offers by President 
Dwight Eisenhower to serve as Secretary of State, and one to become Chief Justice of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, he practiced law in New York City. Throughout the 
1960s, he continued to express support for both the death penalty and the Vietnam War. 
In 1969, Dewey once again turned down an offer-this time by President Richard Nixon-
- to serve as ChiefJustice. He was too old, he explained. Besides, "I'm a warrior... I 
don't want to be up there judging. I want to be down there in the arena, fighting."s 
Meanwhile, he struggled with writing his memoirs, and in the end, never finished it. On 
16 March 1971, while vacationing in Florida, he died of a heart attack. 
In his classic 1972 study, The Presidential Character, James David Barber articulated 
the pattern of style, character, and world view to detennine models (or classifications) of 
presidential behavior. Barber's so-called "Active-Negative" would apply most aptly to 
Dewey: "He seems ambitious, striving upward and seeking power. His stance toward 
the environment is aggressive and he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive 
feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous. Life is a hard struggle to achieve 
and hold power, hampered by the condemnations of a perfectionist conscience.,,9 This 
was the same classification into which Richard Nixon, Dewey's young apprentice and 
friend, fell. In fact, the personality similarities between Dewey and Nixon-though 
beyond the scope of this study-were quite striking. Both men were highly intelligent, 
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painfully shy, and very secretive. That is not to suggest that a President Dewey would 
have become entangled in a Watergate-like scandal, but it does shed light on what kind of 
president Dewey might have made in style and temperament. He would have been 
serious, hard-working, and very far-removed from the media and the American people. 
Dewey was the architect of Dwight Eisenhower's "Modem Republicanism." Writing 
on the two-party system in 1966, Dewey articulated his definition of Republicanism, 
expressing the belief that all problems could be solved "locally and voluntarily by 
community action, and by public opinion. When these are inadequate, then the solution 
is first to be attempted by local government, secondly by state and lastly by federal 
action." Democrats, meanwhile, sought to solve problems through "federal funds, federal 
personnel, and federal controls." However, there were only two domestic responsibilities 
ofthe national government, he argued, that towered above the others. One was to rely on 
general (and not direct) controls to influence and maintain business and employment. By 
this he meant that the government "should influence the economy mainly through sound 
monetary and fiscal policies. It should not set up an endless series of direct controls over 
prices, wages, costs, investments, and the like." The other responsibility was to maintain 
a stable currency by pursuing sound budget policies. "History," he wrote, "is strewn with 
the wreckage of nations which failed to keep a sound currency."IO Craig Shirley in a 
recent study of Ronald Reagan's unsuccessful quest for the presidency in 1976 
disapprovingly referred to Republicans such as Dewey, Nelson Rockefeller, and Gerald 
Ford as "Tories," who were pale attempts at Democracy. What kind of President would 
Thomas Dewey have made? He would have been like Dwight Eisenhower in 
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management style (efficient), like Richard Nixon in temperament (shy and secretive), and 
like George H. W. Bush in foreign policy ("realistic" and prudent). 
From the ashes of defeat-including his own-Dewey rebuilt the party of Hoover, to 
fit into (and to be a relevant alternative within) the post-World War II, New Deal order. 
He kept the party unified, while stirring it away from the Midwestern, isolationist 
influences of Senators Robert Taft, Joseph McCarthy, and Everett Dirksen, and guiding it 
towards the more internationalist, "pragmatic" conservatism of Dwight Eisenhower, 
Richard Nixon, and George H. W. Bush. He did this in at least two ways. First, Dewey, 
through his "nonpartisan" foreign policy arrangement with Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull in August 1944, moved beyond Republican orthodoxy and set foreign policy outside 
the political arena. In doing this, he not only helped establish the precedent of a 
bipartisan approach to foreign policy in Cold War elections, but also eliminated-at least 
from headlines-- the constant bickering within the GOP on foreign policy. The general 
internationalist contour of that policy was no longer subject to political debate. Politics 
had now stopped "at the water's edge"-and that was good for the future of the 
Republican Party. 
And second, he was an important agent of party modernization. As Dewey's modem 
biographer, Richard Norton Smith, observed in the late 1970s, the electoral viability of a 
party is grounded in its "willingness to discard something of its ideological past and 
advocate new policies that improve upon those of the dominant party. This willingness 
to expand the existing framework of political consensus is accompanied, at the same 
time, by fealty to basic party traditions." Dewey employed this theory of party 
modernization, for example, at the Mackinac Conference of September 1943 when-
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three months before Tehran and Roosevelt's "Four Policeman" pronouncement-- he fully 
embraced internationalism and called for a postwar organization including Great Britain, 
China, and the Soviet Union. According to Smith, Dewey, by 1942, had already dropped 
the "fuzzy isolationism" of his 1940 primary campaign, and had philosophically "caught 
with and passed Willkie"-all the while holding to traditional Republican values in his 
rhetoric. For instance, his call for international participation at Mackinac was coupled 
with reminders of the potential for economic benefits abroad. Speaking with a 
Republican voice, Dewey repeatedly told audiences that economic prosperity could be 
rescued from the artificial wartime levels through international trade and investments, 
and thus justified internationalism to GOP skeptics as financially healthy. There were 
few other, if any, Republicans who could have done that, and kept the party together in 
1944-not Taft and certainly not Willkie. 
In recent years, Willkie has become the internationalist favorite of many historians. 
More recently, journalist Charles Peters, in Five Days in Philadelphia: The Amazing" We 
Want Willkie!" Convention of 1940 and How It Freed FDR to Save the Western World 
(2005), argued (as his lengthy subtitle suggests) that Willkie, by supporting a military 
draft and breaking opposition to it in Congress and within the Republican Party, helped 
forge an American army of 1.6 million on the eve of Pearl Harbor (as opposed to the 
previous 270,000). The 1940 Republican National Convention in Philadelphia was, he 
argued, equally important as the Battle of Britain in defeating Germany. Those were five 
days that saved the Western world, Peters stated with great hyperbole, and Willkie was 
the "necessary man." Though Willkie was bold and visionary-and does indeed deserve 
credit for this stand in 1940-- he was not as effective as Dewey in transforming the GOP 
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into a more internationalist party. Willkie-described favorably by historian John 
Morton Blum in the 1970s as a "Republican heretic" -- was not a true party man. He had 
very shallow roots in the GOP and was thus suspect by a majority of the party faithful. In 
fact, the Hoosier had been a lifelong Democrat until just shortly before the 1940 
campaign. Furthermore, at the time of his death in the fall of 1944, he was flirting with 
the possibility of creating, with Roosevelt no less, a third party made up only of 
"progressives." A party "heretic," he could not persuade the party "faithful." 
It was the "faithful" Dewey who made the Republican Party safe for internationalism 
(and thus transformed the party permanently) by his two campaigns for the presidency in 
1944 and 1948, and in engineering the nomination of Dwight Eisenhower to the 
presidency in 1952. Furthermore, Eisenhower's administration was full of Dewey men: 
Jim Hagherty (White House press secretary), John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State), and 
Herbert Brownell (Attorney General). Dewey himself turned down offers by Eisenhower 
to head up the Justice Department and the Supreme Court. He also became the mentor of 
a young Senator from California, and Eisenhower's Vice President, Richard Milhous 
Nixon. In 1964, he tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent Barry Goldwater's nomination to the 
presidency, and in 1968, recommended to Nixon a young Texas Congressman named 
George Bush for vice president. Thomas Edmund Dewey never became President of the 
United States, but his influence upon the Republican Party from Eisenhower's "Modem 
Republicanism" to George Bush's "Thousand Points of Light" was great. 
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